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Note: This outline was prepared jointly with Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of
Law, University of Florida College of Law, Gainesville, FL and Daniel L. Simmons, Professor of Law,
University of California Davis, Davis CA.
This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to understand the significance of the
most important judicial decisions and administrative rulings and regulations promulgated by the Internal
Revenue Service and Treasury Department during the most recent twelve months - and sometimes a
little farther back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or outrageous. Most Treasury
Regulations, however, are so complex that they cannot be discussed in detail and, anyway, only a devout
masochist would read them all the way through; just the basic topic and fundamental principles are
highlighted - unless one of us decides to go nuts and spend several pages writing it up. This is the reason
that the outline is getting to be as long as it is. Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code generally are
not discussed except to the extent that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they have led to
administrative rulings and regulations, (3) they have affected previously issued rulings and regulations
otherwise covered by the outline, or (4) they provide Dan and Marty the opportunity to mock our elected
representatives; again, sometimes at least one of us goes nuts and writes up the most trivial of legislative
changes. The outline focuses primarily on topics of broad general interest (to the three of us, at least) -
income tax accounting rules, determination of gross income, allowable deductions, treatment of capital
gains and losses, corporate and partnership taxation, exempt organizations, and procedure and penalties.
It deals summarily with qualified pension and profit sharing plans, and generally does not deal with
international taxation or specialized industries, such as banking, insurance, and financial services.
Please read this outline at your own risk; we take no responsibility for any misinformation in it, whether
occasioned by our advancing ages or our increasing indifference as to whether we get any particular
item right. Any mistakes in this outline are Marty's responsibility; any political bias or offensive
language is Ira's; and any useful information is Dan's.
I. ACCOUNTING
A. Accounting Methods
1. New and improved automatic consent procedures for changes of
accounting methods. Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2008-36 I.R.B. 587 (8/19/08). This revenue procedure
provides automatic consent procedures for a wide variety of accounting method changes. Rev.
Proc. 2002-9, 2002-1 C.B. 327, as modified and clarified, is clarified, modified, amplified, and
superseded.
a. Automatic consent updated. Rev. Proc. 2009-39, 2009-38 I.R.B.
(8/27/09). The IRS has updated the procedures for obtaining automatic consent and advance
consent to change accounting methods. A taxpayer who complies with applicable provisions of
this revenue procedure has the IRS's consent to change an accounting method. The extensive list
of changes is in the Appendix. Rev. Proc. 97-27, 1997-1 C.B. 680 is modified and clarified, and
Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2008-2 CB 587 is amplified, clarified, and modified.
2. Hindsight is poor sight when looking for § 9100 relief. Acar v.
Commissioner, 545 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 9/23/08). The taxpayer was a financial planner and part-
time securities trader. He attempted to make a § 475(f) mark-to-market election for 1999 and
2000 in 2002 by submitting amended returns. The election was untimely tinder Rev. Proc. 99-17,
1999-1 C.B. 503 and the IRS refused to grant relief under Reg. § 301.9100-3(c). The court
upheld the IRS's denial of § 9100 relief because he had used hindsight in making the late
election and thus pursuant to Reg. § 301.9100-3(b)(3)(iii) did not satisfy the "good faith
requirement." The court of appeals distinguished the Tax Court's decision in Vines v.
Commissioner, 126 T.C. 279 (2006), granting § 9100 relief for a late § 475(f) election on the
ground that in Vines, unlike in the instant case, there had been no trading between the time the
election should have been made and the time it was made, and thus Vines obtained no hindsight
advantage.
3. Is the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in the intensive
care unit? Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 8/22/08) (2-1), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (5/18/09). Judge Rogers held that the Article II Appointments Clause
was not violated by having members of the PCAOB appointed by the SEC commissioners, nor
was the separation of powers doctrine violated by the for-cause limitation on removal of PCAOB
members.
Judge Kavanaugh dissented strongly, stating:
The two constitutional flaws in the PCAOB statute are not matters of mere
etiquette or protocol. By restricting the President's authority over the Board, the
Act renders this Executive Branch agency unaccountable and divorced from
Presidential control to a degree not previously countenanced in our constitutional
structure. This was not inadvertent; Members of Congress designed the PCAOB
to have "massive power, unchecked power." 148 CONG. REc. at S6334 (statement
of Sen. Gramm). Our constitutional structure is premised, however, on the notion
that such unaccountable power is inconsistent with individual liberty. "The
purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers in general, and of the
unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but
to preserve individual freedom." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the
branches seek to transgress the separation of powers."). The Framers of our
Constitution took great care to ensure that power in our system was separated into
three Branches, not concentrated in the Legislative Branch; that there were checks
and balances among the three Branches; and that one individual would be
ultimately responsible and accountable for the exercise of executive power. The
PCAOB contravenes those bedrock constitutional principles, as well as long-
standing Supreme Court precedents, and it is therefore unconstitutional.
B. Inventories
C. Installment Method
D. Year of Inclusion or Deduction
1. God didn't answer this Trinity's prayers. Trinity Industries, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 2 (1/28/09). The taxpayer, which was on the accrual method, built
barges for customers, and part of the payment of the purchase price was contractually deferred
until 18 months after delivery of each barge. The customers later claimed there were defects in
other barges purchased previously and asserted common law rights to offset their claimed
damages against the deferred payments. The taxpayer included only the payments actually
received and excluded the deferred payments. The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held that the full
contract price was includable in the year the barges were delivered, and the amount could not be
reduced by the amount withheld by the purchasers under their asserted right to offset claimed
damages. The court reasoned that the offset claims affected only the timing of the taxpayer's
receipt of the sales proceeds, not its right to receive the proceeds, because the taxpayer
subsequently received the withheld amounts when, pursuant a settlement agreement, they were
applied in compromise of the purchasers' claims for damages. Furthermore, § 461(f) did not
apply to allow the taxpayer to deduct the withheld amounts in the year of the sale because the
withheld amounts were not "transferred" by the taxpayer, as required by § 461(f), and even if
they were constructively "transferred," as asserted by the taxpayer - an argument that the court
did not accept - the transfer did not occur in the year the barges were delivered, but in a later
year.
2. Thirty-five percent is not substantial here, even though it might be
elsewhere in the Code. Nelson v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 70 (2/28/08). Section 451(d) permits
a cash method farmer who normally reports income from the sale of his crops in the year
following crop production to elect to defer treating as income crop insurance proceeds received
in a year until a following year. The taxpayers, who routinely reported only 65 percent of income
realized from the sale of crops in the year of sale and 35 percent the following year [which the
IRS stipulated was an acceptable accounting method], were not permitted to defer reporting 100
percent the proceeds of crop insurance until the following year. The Court (Judge Swift) applied
Rev. Rul. 74-145, 1974-1 C.B. 113, which allowed deferred recognition of crop insurance
proceeds under § 451(d) to a farmer who, under his normal method of accounting for crop
income, deferred to the following year not all but more than 50 percent of his crop income, a
percentage which the ruling referred to as a "substantial portion" of the farmer's annual crop
income, and concluded that because the taxpayers did not normally defer a substantial portion of
their crop income - 35 percent not being "substantial" for this purpose - § 451(d) was
inapplicable.
a. Affirmed, 568 F.3d 662, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-2621 (8th Cir.
6/10/09). The court of appeals also followed Rev. Rul. 74-145, stating as follows: "The
legislative history, however, indicates Congress intended § 451(d) to ameliorate the effects of
forcing farmers to report two years of income in a single tax year. Because of Congress' clearly
expressed intent, the IRS's revenue ruling reasonably concludes only farmers who customarily
defer all or a substantial portion of their crop income to the tax year following production were
intended to benefit from a § 451 (d) deferment of insurance proceeds." The court also rejected the
taxpayers' alternative argument that they satisfied the substantial portion test because they
deferred more than fifty percent of aggregate annual crop income. Reg. § 1.451-6(a)(2) requires
a farmer who receives crop insurance proceeds from two or more damaged crops, and elects to
defer insurance proceeds under § 45 1(d), to defer all insurance proceeds attributable to crops
constituting a single trade or business. On the basis of this provision, the taxpayers claimed that
the substantial portion test applies to the entire farming operation, not to a single crop. The court
held that Reg. § 1.451-6(a)(2) did not apply because it only applies "[i]n the case of a taxpayer
who receives insurance proceeds as a result of the destruction of, or damage to, two or more
specific crops ... " and the insurance proceeds in the instant case related only to one crop.
3. Is whether a purported sale is bona fide really a fact question for the jury
rather than a question of law? "Yes," says the Fourth Circuit. Volvo Cars of North America,
LLC v. United States, 571 F.3d 373, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5248 (4th Cir. 7/9/09). Volvo sold
excess parts inventory to a purchaser who would store the parts for up to 15 years in its own
warehouses. Under the original 1981 contract, Volvo not only retained the right to repurchase the
inventory at 90% of standard cost, but in addition, the purchaser was required to notify Volvo
prior to any planned disposition of Volvo parts inventory to third parties, giving Volvo an
opportunity to repurchase that inventory before was sold it to others. Either party had the right to
cancel the arrangement unilaterally, upon 60 days written notice. An amended April 1983
agreement eliminated the right to prior notice before the inventory was sold to a third party. The
IRS challenged Volvo's loss deductions on the parts sales, asserting that the sales were not bona
fide. Volvo conceded that under the test of Paccar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 754 (1985),
aff'd, 849 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1988), the sales pursuant to the first contract [1981 and 1982 sales]
were not bonafide, but argued that all of the sales in 1983 and thereafter were governed by the
April 1983 contract and that they were bona fide sales. In the district court refund suit, the
district court instructed the jury on the four relevant factors set forth by the Tax Court in Paccar,
and submitted two questions to the jury: (1) whether there was a bona fide sale of inventory
physically transferred before execution of the 1983 contract, and (2) whether there was a bona
fide sale of inventory physically transferred after execution of the 1983 contract. The jury
returned a verdict in Volvo's favor. However, the district court entered a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the government with respect to transfers of inventory
made prior to execution of the amended contract, concluding as a matter of law that the amended
contract did not address inventory previously transferred to the warehouser. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit (Judge Niemeyer) vacated the district court's judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. He found that the jury had been properly instructed regarding the relevant law and could
have reasonably concluded that the 1983 contract replaced the 1980 contract and covered not
only inventory to be transferred after execution of the 1983 contract but also inventory that had
been transferred under the 1980 contract and was still in the purchaser's warehouses or had been
purchased by third parties.
a The four relevant factors set forth by the Tax Court in Paccar
are : (1) Who determined what items were taken into inventory; (2) who determined when to scrap
existing inventory; (3) who determined when to sell inventory; and (4) who decided whether to alter
inventory.
4. The taxpayer won the substantive issue, but foot-faulted on seeking a
change in method of accounting, so most of the deficiency is upheld. But in future years, it's
"ooh la la" for the taxpayer! Capital One Financial Corp. v. Commissioner; 133 T.C. No. 8
(9/21/08). This case involved two issues and over $280,000 million - $175 million for one year
alone - (apart from penalties). The first issue was the time that third-party credit card issuers
are required to recognize credit card income known as interchange. Interchange is the difference
between the amount charged on a credit card and the lesser amount remitted to the merchant by
the issuing bank. Interchange resembles interest in that it is expressed as a percentage of the
amount lent, usually with an additional nominal fee, although it is not time-sensitive and does
not vary as interest rates fluctuate. The government argued that interchange income was credit
card fee income that was recognized under the all events test at the time the interchange accrued
- when the cardholder's credit card purchase was settled through either the Visa or MasterCard
system - while the taxpayer argued that the interchange income was original issue discount
(OID) that was properly recognized under § 1272(a)(6)(C)(iii), which was added to the Code in
1997, over the anticipated life of the pool of credit card loans to which the interchange related.
The Tax Court (Judge Haines) agreed with the taxpayer and held that the interchange income
was OID. Interchange is not a fee for any service other than the lending of money. However,
because the taxpayer failed to follow proper procedures to change its accounting methods, the
OLD method was not available for credit card receivables creating or increasing OID in 1998 or
1999. With certain modifications, the method used by the taxpayer to compute the OID income
(using a model developed by KPMG) was reasonable.
* A second issue was whether the taxpayer could currently
deduct the estimated cost of future redemptions of "miles" it issued to cardholders that could be
redeemed for airline tickets, the cost of which would be paid by the taxpayer. The court held that
under § 461(h) and Reg. § 1.461-4, those expenses could not be deducted currently, but instead were
deductible only to the extent that the amounts were fixed and known under the all events test and for
which economic performance had occurred.
II. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Income
1. Pate v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-272 (12/9/08). The Tax Court
(Judge Cohen) disregarded the taxpayer's purported joint venture and S corporation as having no
economic substance and held the taxpayer liable to report income from working as an
"independent contractor" on the taxpayer's individual return. The taxpayer was also responsible
for employment taxes. Further, the court refused to treat the taxpayer's cattle operation as having
a profit motive.
2. This looks pretty good but questions still remain. The 2009 ARRTA,
§ 1231(a), added Code § 108(i), which defers and then ratably includes income arising from
business indebtedness discharged by the reacquisition of a debt instrument. This new provision
allows a taxpayer to irrevocably elect to include cancellation of debt income realized in 2009 and
2010 ratably over five tax years, rather than in the year the discharge occurs, if the debt was
issued in connection with the conduct of a trade or business or by a corporation. For partnerships
and S corporations, the election is made by the partnership or corporation, not by the individual
partners or shareholders. §108(i)(5)(B)(iii). Under the § 108(i) election, income from a debt
cancellation in 2009 is recognized beginning in the fifth taxable year following the debt
cancellation; the income is recognized ratably in each of 2014 through 2018. Income from a debt
cancellation in 2010 is recognized beginning in the fourth taxable year following the debt
cancellation; the income is recognized ratably in each of 2014 through 2018. If a taxpayer elects
to defer debt cancellation income under § 108(i), the § 108(a) exclusions for bankruptcy,
insolvency, qualified farm indebtedness, and qualified real property business indebtedness do not
apply to the year of the election or any subsequent year. § 108(i)(5)(C). Thus, the election cannot
be used to move the year of inclusion to a year in which it is expected that one of the exceptions
will apply. Once the election is made, inclusion is inevitable; the statute requires acceleration of
inclusion to the taxpayer's final return in the event of the intervening death of an individual or
liquidation or termination of the business of an entity. § 108(i)(5)(D). The acceleration rule also
applies in the event of the sale or exchange or redemption of an interest in a partnership or S
corporation by a partner or shareholder.
0 Although the statute speaks in terms of cancellation of debt
income arising from "reacquisition" of a "debt instrument," the statutory definitions of
"reacquisition" and "an applicable debt instrument," respectively, are broad enough for the provision
to apply to most situations in which the debt is cancelled. Section 108(i)(3)(B) broadly defines "debt
instrument" to include a bond, debenture, note, certificate, or any other instrument or contractual
arrangement constituting indebtedness within the meaning of § 1275(a). Section 108(i)(4)(B) defines
"acquisition" to include (1) an acquisition of the debt instrument for cash, (2) the exchange of the
debt instrument for another debt instrument, including an exchange resulting from a modification of
the debt instrument (which includes a reduction of the principal amount of the debt), (3) the
exchange of the debt instrument for corporate stock or a partnership interest, (4) the contribution of
the debt instrument to capital, and (5) the complete forgiveness of the indebtedness by the holder of
the debt instrument.
* An omission, however, appears to be the cancellation of a
debt in connection with a property transfer, for example, a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Perhaps the
Treasury Department and IRS will provide by regulation or ruling that the statute applies in such a
situation. Or, perhaps, they won't; Congress was given the opportunity to include debt in connection
with a property transfer and did not include it in the statute, although the legislative history contains
some indication that this type of debt cancellation is included.
q Query when and to what extent real estate ownership
qualifies as a trade or business.
a. Many of the questions are answered. Rev. Proc. 2009-37, 2009-
36 I.R.B. 309 (8/17/09). This revenue procedure provides the exclusive procedure for taxpayers
to make § 108(i) elections. Section 4.04(3) permits partial elections, with the partnership
permitted to determine "in any manner" the portion of the COD income that is the "deferred
amount" and the portion of the COD income that is the "included amount" with respect to each
partner. Section 4.11 permits protective elections where the taxpayer concludes that a particular
transaction does not generate COD income but fears that the IRS may determine otherwise. A
partner's deferred § 752 amount, arising from a decrease in his share of partnership liabilities,
will be treated as a current distribution of money in the year that the COD income is included.
Taxpayers are allowed an automatic one-year extension from the due date to make the election,
and taxpayers who made elections before the issuance of the revenue procedure will be given
until November 16 to modify (but not revoke) their existing elections. Corporate taxpayers
making a § 108(i) election are required to increase earnings and profits for the year of the
election.
3. This arbitration award is income rather than a return of capital. Who
does he think he is, Richard Hatch? Bachmann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-51
(3/11/09). The taxpayer received an arbitration award of $1,369,729 against his employer,
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. based on the taxpayer's claim that Smith Barney had failed to
compensate him for the use of the taxpayer's idea to create trust preferred stock. The trust
preferred stock arrangement involved the issue by a group of banks of debt to a trust which in
turn issued preferred securities to investors for cash. The court (Judge Morrison) rejected the
taxpayer's claim that the arbitration award was a return of capital. The court indicated that the
taxpayer failed to prove that he had any basis in the idea. In addition, the court opined that the
payment from Smith Barney for the taxpayer's business idea was nothing more than a payment
for services. The court further rejected the taxpayer's reasonable cause and good faith arguments
to impose substantial understatement penalties under § 6662.
4. AT&T, Inc. v. United States, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-2072 (W.D. Tex.
5/4/09). Magistrate Judge Nowak recommended summary judgment treating payments from the
Federal government for universal telephone access as includible in income and not as
contributions to capital under § 118. The decision follows United States v. Coastal Utilities, 514
F.3d 1184 (1 lth Cir. 1/23/08).
a. The recommendation was accepted by the District Court.
AT&T, Inc. v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6036 (W.D. Tex. (7/16/09).
5. Tax-free dollars to fight gypsy moths and southern pine beetles. Rev.
Rul. 2009-23, 2009-32 I.R.B. 177 (7/27/09). The Forest Health Protection Program administered
by the US Forest Service will be treated for purposes of § 126 is substantially similar, within the
meaning of § 126(a)(9), to the type of programs described in § 126(a)(1) through (8). Cost
sharing payments received by nonindustrial private forest landowners to establish an acceptable
integrated pest management strategy that will prevent, retard, control, or suppress gypsy moth
infestations, southern pine beetle infestations, spruce budworm infestations, or other major insect
infestations are eligible for exclusion from gross income to the extent permitted by § 126. The
extent of the exclusion is determined under § 126(b) and Reg. § 16A. 126-1.
6. Pizza, the eighth deadly sin, and the ninth is stealing the sausage
process, even if the damages are taxable. Joseph Freda v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-
191 (8/25/09). The taxpayer supplied Pizza Hut with pre-cooked sausage prepared with its
patented process. The taxpayer also entered into license and royalty agreements to provide its
trade secrets to other Pizza Hut suppliers. After discovering that Pizza Hut disclosed the process
to an unlicensed supplier who also sold pre-cooked sausage to Pizza Hut, the taxpayer recovered
damages from Pizza Hut for misappropriation of trade secrets. The court (Judge Chiechi) held
that the damages were received as compensation for lost profits, and thus were taxable as
ordinary income. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the damages were for injury to
or destruction of the trade secret, a capital asset.
B. Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization
1. Not all the "green in" the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
is federal money. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Division C, § 318,
extends the deduction allowed by § 198 for environmental remediation expenses (which might
otherwise be capital expenditures) to expenditures through 2009. To qualify, a site must be
certified by the appropriate State environmental agency to be an area at or on which there has
been a release (or threat of release) or disposal of a hazardous substance; sites that are identified
on the national priorities list under CERCLA do not qualify.
a. The Act, § 322 also extends the incentives for investment in the
District of Columbia to expenditures in 2009.
2. Legal fees incurred resisting states' attorney general challenges to the
privatization of Blue Shield are capital expenses. Wellpoint, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2008-236 (10/27/08). The taxpayer provides health insurance coverage through operating
subsidiaries that are licensees of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association and are a result of
mergers with Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations that were once characterized as tax-
exempt charitable entities. Several state attorneys general brought cy-pres or charitable trust
actions against the taxpayer claiming assets of the charitable organizations that were impressed
with charitable trusts. The taxpayer made payments of nearly $200 million to settle these actions.
The court (Judge Kroupa) held the taxpayer's legal fees and settlement payments were incurred
in a dispute over the equitable ownership of assets allegedly impressed with charitable trust
obligations, and that the fees and payments were thus required to be capitalized. The court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that the payments were incurred to protect its business
practices.
3. West Covina Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-237
(10/27/08). Taxpayer was required to capitalize legal fees paid on behalf of its related party
lessor in protecting the taxpayer's interest in leased property on which the taxpayer's auto
dealership was located. The taxpayer's related party lessor declared bankruptcy and the bank
holding the mortgage on the leased property threatened to remove the taxpayer. The court (Judge
Kroupa) held that the fees were incurred in defense of title and not subject to an exception that
allows deduction of legal fees paid to benefit another where adverse consequences to the
taxpayer's business are direct and proximate. The court also required capitalization of legal fees
incurred in the acquisition of the assets of another auto dealership consisting largely of
inventory. The court also upheld accuracy-related substantial underpayment penalties.
4. Those fancy Pyrex® and Oneida® branded kitchen products are made by
Robinson Knife Manufacturing, which is required to capitalize license fees. Robinson Knife
Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-9 (1/14/09). The taxpayer
designs and produces kitchen tools for sale to large retail chains. To enhance its marketing, the
taxpayer paid license fees to Coming for use of the Pyrex trademark and Oneida for use of the
Oneida trademark on kitchen tools designed and produced by the taxpayer. The taxpayer's
production of kitchen tools bearing the licensed trademarks was subject to review and quality
control by Coming or Oneida. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer's licensing fees were subject to
capitalization into inventory under § 263A under Reg. § 1.263A-1 (e)(3)(ii)(u), which expressly
includes licensing and franchise fees as indirect costs that must be allocated to produced
property. Agreeing with the IRS, the court (Judge Marvel) rejected the taxpayer's argument that
the licensing fees, incurred to enhance the marketability of its produced products, were
deductible as marketing, selling, or advertising costs excluded from the capitalization
requirements by Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(iii)(A). The court noted that the design approval and
quality control elements of the licensing agreements benefited the taxpayer in the development
and production of kitchen tools marketed with the licensed trademarks. The court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that Rev. Rul. 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 331, which allowed a current deduction
for costs incurred in obtaining ISO 9000 certification as an assurance of quality processes in
providing goods and services, was applicable to the quality control element of the license
agreements. The court noted that although the trademarks permitted the taxpayer to produce
kitchen tools that were more marketable than the taxpayer's other products, the royalties directly
benefited and/or were incurred by reason of the taxpayer's production activities. The court also
upheld the IRS's application of the simplified production method of Reg. § 1.263A-2(b) to
allocate the license fees between cost of goods sold and ending inventory as consistent with the
taxpayer's use of the simplified production method for allocating other indirect costs.
5. The increased cost of double-wide is affirmed. Load, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 559 F.3d 909, 103A.F.T.R.2d 2009-423 (9th Cir. 3/4/09), aff'g T.C. Memo.
2007-51 (3/6/07). The taxpayer sells manufactured homes purchased from the manufacturer by
placing for sale and demonstration models on leased lots where they are sold by independent
sales persons. The court adopted the Tax Court holding and its opinion that costs attributable to
placement of model manufactured homes on leased retail sales lots were includible in inventory
under § 263A. The costs were not on-site storage costs under Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(iii)(I)
because transfers to independent re-sellers prevented taxpayer from being considered as selling
exclusively to retail customers.
6. The IRS discovers internet retail sales. Notice 2009-25, 2009-15 I.R.B.
758 (4/13/09). Under Reg. § 1.263A-3(c)(5) storage costs attributable to off-site storage of
inventory must be capitalized, but storage costs attributable to the operation of an on-site storage
facility are not required to be capitalized. An on-site storage facility is defined as a facility that is
physically attached to a retail sales facility, which is a facility where the taxpayer sells
merchandise exclusively to retail customers in on-site sales. A facility that functions both as
storage for an on-site retail facility and as storage for off-site sales is classified as a dual function
storage facility with respect to which costs must be allocated between storage for the on-site
retail sales and off-site sales, generally on the basis of gross sales. The IRS has recognized that
the nature of retail sales has changed in that retailers may both sell merchandise on-site to walk-
in customers and make sales over the internet or by facsimile orders from the same facility. The
current regulations create problems by requiring these retailers to treat storage facilities attached
to a retail sales facility as a dual function storage facility. The notice solicits comments about
changed retail business practices resulting from technological advances and existing trends that
affect the application of the existing regulations along with information about contemporary
business models. The notice also solicits comments regarding changes in the regulations to
reflect current business practices. Comments are requested before 7/13/09.
7. Merger termination fee to defend business from hostile takeover is
deductible and not a capital expense. Santa Fe Pacific Gold Co. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C.
No. 12 (4/27/09). As part of a strategy to thwart a hostile takeover attempt by Newmont USA
Limited, a larger mining company, Santa Fe entered into a merger agreement with the
Homestake Mining Company. The Homestake merger agreement contained a termination clause,
which required Santa Fe to pay Homestake $65 million in the event the merger was terminated
by either party. Following announcement of the Homestake merger agreement, several lawsuits
were filed alleging that the Santa Fe board breached its fiduciary duties to shareholders for
failing to negotiate further with Newmont and that the Homestake merger agreement was entered
into to protect the interests of Santa Fe's board and management. After negotiations and
increased offers from both Newmont and Homestake, the Santa Fe board accepted Newmont's
stock-for-stock merger offer and indicated that it would pay the termination fee to Homestake.
Santa Fe deducted the termination fee. The IRS asserted that the fee was a capital expenditure
incurred to provide a long term benefit to Santa Fe. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) concluded that
the termination fee was deductible under § 162 and alternatively that the fee was incurred by
Santa Fe to abandon the merger transaction with Homestake and was therefore deductible as an
abandonment loss under § 165. The court rejected the IRS argument that the fee was incurred as
part of an integrated transaction in which the termination fee was paid to extricate Santa Fe from
one contract in order to enter into a more favorable contract and thus not attributable to an
abandoned transaction.
8. Intelligently pursuing wealth is not a trade or business. Woody v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-93 (4/30/09). Throughout 2004 the taxpayer investigated and
took steps to establish a real estate business, including taking a course on real estate investing
from the Wealth Intelligence Academy. The taxpayer purchased an unoccupied rental property
on 12/30/04, which was not rented until after 2004. The court (Judge Gustafson) suggested that
the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business in 2004 before the rental property was
actually held out for rent in a subsequent year. In any event, the court held that all of the
expenses incurred before the taxpayer acquired property on 12/30/04, were start-up expenses
subject to § 195. In addition, the court held that the taxpayer's education expense was incurred to
prepare for a new trade or business and therefore not deductible under § 162.
9. Leasehold improvements treated as a substitute for rent are currently
deductible; the transaction did not lack economic substance even though the lessor was a tax
indifferent party. Remember, § 109 does have a parenthetical. Hopkins Partners v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2009-107 (5/19/09). Hopkins Partners operated the Sheraton
Cleveland Airport Hotel under a lease agreement with the City of Cleveland. The agreement
provided that the hotel and related parking facilitates were the property of the city. The
partnership negotiated a modification to the lease agreement under which the cost of
improvements to the hotel and parking facilities by the partnership above a specified level would
result in reductions in the amount of rental payments due under the lease. The court (Judge
Wells) noted that, under Reg. § 1.162-11(b), the cost of improvements by a lessee to leased
property generally are recoverable through depreciation deductions. The court found an
exception, however, in Reg. § 1.61-8(c), which requires a lessor to recognize as rental income
the cost of improvements placed on real property as a substitute for rent. The court indicated that
because the regulation is "clear" that improvements in lieu of rent are treated as "rent" to the
lessor, the cost of improvements in lieu of rent are currently deductible by the lessee under
§ 162(a)(3). The court held that whether improvements are in lieu of rent depended upon the
intent of the parties. The court found that the language of the lease agreement treating the cost of
improvements as a rent credit, and the testimony of the parties established an intent to treat the
cost of improvements as rent. The fact that the lessor was a tax indifferent party did not change
the result. The court rejected the IRS's argument that the cost of improvements treated as rent
must be limited in duration. The court also held that the immediate transfer of improvements to
the city in exchange for rent were not illusory transactions, notwithstanding the fact that the
partnership retained control over the improvements. The court also rejected the IRS's
contentions that the rent credit agreement lacked economic substance, that the deduction for the
improvements failed to clearly reflect income under § 446, and that the deduction was an
accounting method change under § 446(e) that required adjustments under § 481.
10. In the scrum of foreign corporate takeovers, these management costs
must be capitalized. Canterbury Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-175
(7/27/09). Taxpayers were partners in an LLC, which in turn formed a New Zealand corporation
called Canterbury Holdings, to acquire New Zealand publicly held shares of LWR Industries,
Ltd. LWR was a 104-year-old garment manufacturing company that owned the Canterbury
brand, rugby shirts. Canterbury holdings entered into a management agreement with the 2/3
owner of LWR, from which it had an option to purchase LWR stock, and to manage LWR during
the takeover. At a point, the U.S. LLC [in which the taxpayers were members] made direct
payments to the former LWR stock holder which it claimed as deductible management expenses.
The court (Judge Holmes) rejected the taxpayer's assertion that the expenses were incurred to
protect the LLC's reputation and credit in its trade or business of acquiring, managing and
turning around distressed companies. Instead, the court held that the expenditure was incurred to
protect the LLC's investment in its New Zealand subsidiary and was thus a capital expense. The
court noted that the only purpose of the LLC was the single acquisition of LWR and the only
purpose of the expenditure was to protect the value of its investment in LWR stock. The court
also rejected the taxpayers' argument that the payments to its New Zealand holding company
were payments of the management fee through its agent. The court refused to allow the LLC to
ignore its own organizational choices. The court also disallowed deductions for claimed interest
expenses paid by the LLC on obligations of the New Zealand holding company. The court
refused, however, to impose accuracy related penalties finding that the taxpayers reasonably
relied on the advice of experienced CPAs in claiming the deductions.
C. Reasonable Compensation
1. The price of a bail-out includes limitations on compensation.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 301(a), adding § 162(m)(5). The limit
on deductible compensation is reduced to $500,000 for the CEO and CFO, plus the three highest
paid employees of an employer for the tax year in which more than $300 million of troubled
assets are acquired under the "troubled assets relief program" (TARP") under the bail-out act.
The limitation includes deferred deductions for compensation to a covered executive for services
during an applicable employer taxable year. Note that the limitation is not limited to
corporations, but covers any employer who sells troubled assets under TARP.
a. And the rip-cord is pulled on golden parachutes that are
replaced by a tarp. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 301(b), added
new § 280G(e). The deduction disallowance and 20 percent excise tax imposed on golden
parachute payments (compensation contingent on a take-over exceeding three times an
executive's average compensation in the preceding five years) has been extended to severance
payments by reason of involuntary discharge from an employer participating in the troubled
assets relief program.
b. Notice 2008-94, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1070 (10/14/08), provides detailed
guidance and definitions regarding the application of new §§ 162(m) and 280G(e), enacted as
part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, to limit deductions on
compensation paid to executives of employers accepting bail-out funds. Taxpayers may rely on
the guidance in the notice until further guidance is issued. Any future guidance that is more
restrictive will be prospective only.
2. But a provision in ARRA specifically permitted the AIG bonus
payments. ARRA § 7001 (in Title VII - Limits on Executive Compensation) amends § 111 of
EESA of 2008. EESA of 2008 § 11 l(b)(3)(D)(iii) specifically exempts from the prohibition "any
bonus payment required to be paid pursuant to a written employment contract executed on or
before February 11, 2009." Senator Dodd (D-CT) - after weaseling around for a while -
admitted that he added this exemption to the statute at the request of the Treasury Department.
a. In 2009, the Ides of March fell during an Orwellian "Hate
Week" against AIG, culminating a House-passed 90-percent tax rate on AIG bonus
recipients. H.R. 1586, "To impose an additional tax on bonuses received from certain TARP
recipients," was introduced on 3/18/09 by House Ways & Means Committee Chair Charles
Rangel (D-NY) and passed by the House on the following day by a vote of 328 to 93. No
legislative action has yet occurred in the Senate; this can only be attributed to a temporary
reprieve from the mid-March madness.
0 After all, Caesar was only stabbed to death on the Ides of
March; his children's lives were not threatened.
3. Tax Court distinguishes Exacto Spring in case appealable to Seventh
Circuit. Menard, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-207 (9/16/04), reconsideration
denied, T.C. Memo. 2005-3 (1/6/05). In this decision, appealable to the Seventh Circuit and
presumably governed by the "hypothetical independent investor" test of Exacto Spring Corp. v.
Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (1999), the Tax Court (Judge Marvel) nevertheless applied the
traditional factor of compensation for CEOs of comparable publicly-traded corporations to
disallow deduction of $13 million of the $20 million of compensation (which included 5 percent
of pre-tax profits) paid to the John R. Menard, the CEO and owner of 89 percent of taxpayer's
stock rather than applying solely the hypothetical independent investor test. The court focused
on language in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3), which was not discussed in Exacto Spring, and
which provides as follows:
In any event the allowance for the compensation paid may not exceed what is
reasonable under all the circumstances. It is, in general, just to assume that
reasonable and true compensation is only such amount as would ordinarily be
paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances.
a. On reconsideration, Judge Marvel made clear that two prongs
are required, i.e., (1) that the amounts paid be intended as compensation and (2) that they
be reasonable in amount. T.C. Memo. 2005-3 (1/6/05). In denying taxpayer's motion for
reconsideration, Judge Marvel reiterated - as an alternative ground for her decision - that the
taxpayer did not intend that its payment be for services in light of (1) it never having paid
dividends, (2) the CEO's contractual obligation to repay any portion of the compensation found
to be excessive, and (3) the failure of the board of directors to make any effort to evaluate
whether the compensation was excessive.
b. Judge Posner is bullish on Menard, Inc., bearish on the Tax
Court. No compensation is unreasonable for Judge Posner as long as shareholders are
happy - even if it's all in the family. By the way, was it only by chance that Judge Posner
was on the panel for this case? Menard, Inc. v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 3/10/09).
In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision, T.C.
Memo. 2004-207 (9/16/04), reconsideration denied, T.C. Memo. 2005-3 (1/6/05), and held that
all of the compensation paid to Menard was reasonable. In 1998, the tax year at issue, the
taxpayer was the third largest home improvement retailer in the United States, following Home
Depot and Lowes. The founder and CEO of the taxpayer, John Menard, held all of the
company's voting shares and 56 percent of the nonvoting shares. The remaining shares were held
by family members. Menard was paid a base compensation of $157,000, a profit share
participation of $3 million, plus a bonus equivalent to five percent of the taxpayer's before tax
net income that amounted to over $17 million. The compensation plan had been adopted by the
company in 1973. In 1998 the taxpayer earned a return to shareholders of 18.8 percent. Judge
Posner's opinion reflects displeasure that the Tax Court (Judge Marvel) applied its traditional
multi-factor test rather than the Seventh Circuit's "hypothetical independent investor" test of
Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (1999). In Exacto Spring, the Seventh
Circuit created a presumption that "when ... the investors in his company are obtaining a far
higher return than they had any reason to expect, [the owner/employee's] salary is presumptively
reasonable." The court added that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the
company's success was attributable to extraneous factors or that the company intended to pay a
dividend rather than salary. Judge Posner's opinion found fault with the Tax Court's reasoning in
numerous respects.
(1) First, he found that although a comparison of the
compensation of the shareholder/employee in question with the compensation of executives of
other companies is "helpful only the comparison takes into account the details of the
compensation package of each of the compared executives, and not just the bottom-line salary."
He concluded that the Tax Court failed to conduct such an analysis and because "the Tax Court
acknowledged that the presumption of reasonableness had been established but thought it
rebutted by evidence that corporations in the same business as Menards paid their CEOs
substantially less than Menards paid its CEO." He faulted the Tax Court for its "failure to
consider the severance packages, retirement plans, or perks of the CEOs with whom it compared
Menard (although it did take account of their stock options), even though such extras can make
an enormous difference to an executive's compensation." Thus, the fact that the CEO of Home
Depot was paid a mere $2.8 million, and the CEO of Lowes was paid $6.1 million (both of
which were larger companies), did not suggest that the more than $20 million compensation paid
to Menard was unreasonable. Menard's compensation was subject to different risk, and the Tax
Court did not consider the severance packages, retirement packages available to the CEO's of
Home Depot and Lowes, although the Tax Court did consider stock options. According to the
court, the CEO of Home Depot hired two years after the tax year in issue, was paid $124 million
in salary, exclusive of stock options, for the six years he held the post and received a severance
payment of $210 million (including stock options) when he was fired in 2007.
(2) Second, and pointedly relevant to Exacto Spring Corp. as
law of the circuit, Judge Posner emphasized that there was "no suggestion that any of the
shareholders were disappointed that the company obtained a rate of return of 'only' 18.8
percent."' Furthermore, the company's success was not due to windfall factors. "The Tax Court
did not consider the possibility, which the evidence supports, that Menard really does do it all
himself." (3) Third, Judge Posner criticized the Tax Court's conclusion
that Menard's compensation, in addition to being excessive, was intended as a dividend, based
on (1) his agreement to reimburse the corporation if the deduction for the bonus were disallowed
by the IRS, and (2) a bonus of 5 percent of corporate earnings year in and year out "looked"
more like a dividend than like salary. Judge Posner's rejoinder was: "These are flimsy grounds."
He concluded that (1) it was prudent, even though not in Menard's personal financial interest, for
the corporation to require him to reimburse it if the IRS successfully disallowed the deduction,
and (2) "5 percent of net corporate income [does not] look at all like a dividend." The court also
noted that it was prudent for the taxpayer to require as part of the bonus plan that Menard return
the bonus if the taxpayer's compensation deduction were challenged by the IRS.(4) Fourth, Judge Posner addressed the Tax Court's concern
that the board of directors that approved the 5 percent bonus was controlled by Menard. Judge
1 We note that Judge Posner seemed to gloss over the fact that Menard owned all of the voting stock and
89 percent of all of the stock, and thus was unlikely to complain.
Posner reasoned that since it could not be otherwise, because Menard was the only shareholder
who is entitled to vote for members of the board of directors, the "logic of the Tax Court's
position is that a one-man corporation cannot pay its CEO (if he is that one man) any salary!" He
went on sarcastically to state that:
The Tax Court has flirted with that strange logic, as we shall see. ... The
Tax Court's opinion strangely remarks that because Mr. Menard owns the
company he has all the incentive he needs to work hard, without the spur of a
salary. In other words, reasonable compensation for Mr. Menard might be zero.
How generous of the Tax Court nevertheless to allow Menard to deduct $7.1
million from its 1998 income for salary for Menard!
(5) Fifth, Judge Posner criticized what he considered to be the
Tax Court's main focus on whether Menard's compensation exceeded that of comparable CEOs,
i.e., whether it was objectively excessive, and thus functionally, even though not intentionally a
dividend rather than a bonus, instead of focusing on whether the corporation was acting in good
faith in paying $17.5 million as a bonus rather than as a dividend).
For compensation purposes, the shareholder-employee should be treated like all
other employees. If an incentive bonus would be appropriate for a
nonshareholder-employee, there is no reason why a shareholder-employee should
not be allowed to participate in the same manner. In essence, the shareholder-
employee is treated as two distinct individuals for tax purposes: an independent
investor and an employee." Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d
1315, 1328 (5th Cir. 1987) ....
9 Additionally, the fact that the next highest paid employee of
the taxpayer received a salary of $468,000 was rejected as a factor because the "Tax Court did not
consider the possibility, which the evidence supports, that Menard really does do it all himself." The
fact that the taxpayer paid no dividends was not influential because many corporations choose to
retain earnings rather than distribute dividends. The court stated that a bonus based on five percent
of profits doesn't look like a dividend, which is normally calculated as an amount per share rather
than a percentage of earnings.
D. Miscellaneous Deductions
1. The IRS responds to high gasoline prices. Announcement 2008-63,
2008-28 I.R.B. 114 (6/24/08), modifying Rev. Proc. 2007-70. The IRS announced that the
business mileage rate for the second half of 2008 will be 58.5 cents per mile - an increase of 8
cents per mile - and that the medical/moving rate will also increase by 8 cents per mile to 27
cents per mile. The statutory rate for charitable mileage under § 170(i) remains at 14 cents per
mile.
a. But gas prices abruptly declined in fall 2008. Rev. Proc. 2008-
72, 2008-50 I.R.B. 1286 (11/24/08). The business mileage rate for 2009 will be 55 cents per mile
- a decrease of 3.5 cents per mile - and that the medical/moving rate will decrease by three cents
to 24 cents per mile. The statutory rate for charitable mileage under § 170(i) remains at 14 cents
per mile.
2. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act, § 303, extends the § 179D current deduction for
installation of certain energy efficient property in a commercial building to property placed in
service before 1/1/14.
3. Have you documented that your own cell phone is used for business
rather than personal purposes? Tash v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-120 (4/29/08).
Among the many deductions claimed by a lawyer that Judge Haines disallowed was the
deduction claimed for his cellular telephone, because "[t]he record did not indicate whether
petitioner used his cellular telephone for business and/or personal calls." Inasmuch as cell
phones are listed property, Reg. § 1.274-5(a), (c) requires substantiation for the deduction.
a. It might or might not be OK to drive while talking on your cell
phone, but it is imperative to take notes in your log book while chatting on the phone.
Alami v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-42 (2/23/09). Judge Vasquez denied the taxpayer's
claimed business deductions for cellular telephone service because the taxpayer failed to
establish the amount of time he used his cell phone for business and personal purposes. A
cellular phone is "listed property" that is subject to the strict substantiation requirements of
§ 274(d) pursuant to § 280F(d)(4)(A)(v), and a taxpayer must establish the amount of business
use and the amount of total use for the property to substantiate the amount of expenses for listed
property. An alternative ground for denying the deduction was that the taxpayer's employer did
not require that he have a cell phone.
0 Query whether there are employer reporting obligations with
respect to cell phones furnished to employees who fail to keep records?
b. But, simplified methods for reporting cell phone use are under
consideration. Notice 2009-46, 2009-23 I.R.B. 1068 (6/8/09). IRS is considering methods to
simplify treatment of employer-provided cell phones, including a (1) "minimal personal use
method" (if the employee accounts to the employer that he has a personal cell phone for use
during business hours); and (2) a safe harbor method under which an employer would treat 75
percent of each employee's use of the cell phone as business usage.
4. Wouldn't it just have been easier to cut rates in October 2004? No. Was it
because that's what the French-looking Vietnam War veteran was proposing? No, it was a
replacement for the FSC/ETI export subsidies. Section 102 of the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004 added new Code § 199, which provides a magical 9 percent deduction of a percentage of
taxable income attributable to domestic manufacturing activities.
a. Proposed regulations. REG-105847-05, Income Attributable to
Domestic Production Activities: Deduction, 70 F.R. 67220 (11/4/05). The Treasury has
published massive [224 pages] proposed regulations [§§ 1.199-1 through -8] relating to the
deduction for U.S. manufacturing income under § 199. The "shrinking back" concept of taking
the deduction for only the value of the beans in a cup of brewed coffee, or for the value of the
U.S.-manufactured shoelaces on a pair of foreign-manufactured sneakers is much discussed.
b. Finally, final regulations! Final § 199 regulations are out and
are 247 pages long, but that is only 137 pages in Lexis and 55 pages in the Federal Register.
T.D. 9263, Income Attributable to Domestic Production Activities, 71 F.R. 31268 (6/1/06). You
have to be addlepated if you expect a summary.
c. Only a masochist would bother to read these regulations unless
billable hours were involved. T.D. 9381, TIPRA Amendments to Section 199, 73 F.R. 8798
(2/15/08), corrected, 73 F.R. 16518 (3/28/08). The IRS has promulgated a raft of amendments of
the already incomprehensible § 199 regulations.
d. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act
§ 502(b), treats compensation to actors, production personnel, directors and producers for film-
making services in the U.S. as W-2 compensation for purposes of the § 199 deduction.
e. Oil and gas producers had their benefits curtailed because
gasoline prices were too high. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division
B], Act § 401, would freeze the § 199 domestic manufacturing deduction for oil and gas
producers at 6 percent, rather than increasing to 9 percent in 2010 as scheduled under current
law.
5. Yearout Mechanical & Engineering, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2008-217 (9/24/08). The taxpayer was a construction company that expanded into high-tech
buildings during boom years in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Due to its financial position and the
difficulty of reliably obtaining rental equipment, the taxpayer entered into rental equipment
leases with its shareholders. The Tax Court (Judge Gale) rejected the Commissioner's assertion
that rental payments under long-term lease contracts, which also contained actual use provisions,
were excessive and allowed the taxpayer's deductions for the rental payments. The court found
that the unique nature of equipment required for "clean room" construction and the general
business climate in which the taxpayer operated established a business reason for the unique
leasing arrangements.
6. Since we are not willing to pay school teachers a living wage, let's give
them a tax break worth less than $2 a week at their tax brackets. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division C], Act § 203,extended through 2009 the § 62(a)(2)(D)
above-the-line deduction for up to $250 paid by an eligible educator for books, supplies,
computer equipment (including software), other equipment, and supplementary materials used
by the eligible educator in the classroom.
7. Ferguson v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 498, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-2170 (5th
Cir. 5/12/09). The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that involuntary conversion of the
taxpayer's Chapter 11 bankruptcy to Chapter 7 constituted abandonment in that year of farm
property within the bankruptcy estate. The taxpayer did not realize loss from abandonment of
bankruptcy estate property until the following year when the property was sold at a foreclosure
sale.
8. Doherty v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-99 (5/14/09). The Tax Court
(Judge Marvel) denied claimed deductions for depreciation, legal fees, and other expenses
related to the taxpayer's investment in pay phones and ATM's through a program run by Alpha
Telcom, Inc. The court found that other than bare legal title the taxpayer did not possess any of
the incidents of ownership regarding pay phones and ATM's.
a. Snyder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2009-97 (5/14/09). Same
date, same judge, same issue, same result.
9. Frozen on the ship, and frozen out of half of his meal deductions.
Kurtz v. Commissioner, 575 F.3d 1275, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 5467 (1 lth Cir. 7/23/09), aff'g T.C.
Memo. 2008-111 (4/22/08). Section 274(n)(2)(E) exempts from the 50-percent limitation on
deductions for meal expenses any expenses for food or beverages "required by any Federal law
to be provided to crew members of a commercial vessel." The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Tax
Court Judge Cohen's holding that § 274(n)(2)(E) did not apply to meal expenses incurred by the
taxpayer as an independent contractor on the crew of a commercial fishing boat in the Bering
Sea, because federal law does not require commercial fishing boats to provide meals to crew
members. Accordingly, only 50 percent of the taxpayer's shipboard meal expenses were
deductible.
10. Revised per diem rates for lodging, meal, and incidental expenses.
Rev. Proc. 2009-47, 2009-42 I.R.B _ (9/30/09). The IRS has provided up dated rules for
employer provided per diem allowances that do not require substantiation, and which may be
used by self-employed persons and employees who are not reimbursed for travel expenses. Per
diem rates for travel within the U.S. are the rates for government travel set forth in 41 C.F.R. ch.
301, appx. A. Travelers may use the rates in effect for the firstnine months of 2009 for all travel
within 2009, or may use the updated rates for travel between October 1 and December 31, 2009.
Rates for travel outside the continental United States (including Alaska and Hawaii) are
published by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and are updated monthly. The
rates are available at www.gsa.gov. A traveler may use per diem allowances for meals and
incidental expenses along with actual lodging expenses. The revenue procedure also provides
fixed high-low per diem rates of $258 for a high cost locality, with a list provided, and $163 for
travel to any other locality.
11. Holding herself out as a contract attorney did not establish a trade or
business. Forrest v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-228 (10/5/09). Before 1988 the taxpayer
worked as a contract attorney performing work for other attorneys. She then went to work for the
California Department of Corporations, but was terminated from that position in 2000. She
worked as a contract attorney in 2000, but not in 2001 and 2002. In 2003 the taxpayer attempted
again to work as a contract attorney, incurring expenses, before she was reinstated with the
Department of Corrections in 2003. The court (Judge Vasquez) held that the taxpayer's activities
were not sufficiently regular or continuous to qualify as a trade or business. The court also
concluded that, even if the taxpayer's prior activities were sufficient to qualify as a trade or
business, there was insufficient continuity into her activities in 2003 to constitute a continuation
of her previous trade or business. The court also noted that the taxpayer's attendance at a four
day ABA meeting and attempts to solicit contract work were not regular and continuous business
activates, that she did not negotiate or perform contract attorney services during the year, and
that her efforts were terminated when she resumed employment with the Department of
Corporations.
E. Depreciation & Amortization
1. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, P.L. 110-185, reinstated the first
year 50 percent depreciation allowance of § 168(k) for property placed in service in 2008.
a. The IRS says that the old regulations still apply. I.R. 2008-58
(4/11/08). The IRS has indicated that Reg. § 1.168(k)-1, promulgated under the earlier provision,
will apply to bonus depreciation claimed for 2008. The IRS promises new guidance regarding
additional issues raised under the current provision and covering increased first year deductions
under § 179 (watch for the 2009 version of this outline).
b. Stimulating deductions. Rev. Proc. 2008-54, 2008-38 I.R.B. 722
(8/29/08). This revenue procedure provides guidance regarding amendments in the Economic
Stimulus Act of 2008 to § 168(k) allowing a 50-percent additional first year depreciation for
certain new property acquired and placed in service during 2008 and to § 179 increasing the
dollar limitations for expensing depreciable property for taxable years beginning in 2008.
Specifically, the revenue procedure clarifies:
(1) How the Stimulus § 179 deduction interacts with the increased § 179 amounts
provided under § 1400N(e) for certain § 179 GO Zone property.
(2) How the Stimulus additional first year depreciation deduction interacts with the GO
Zone additional first year depreciation deduction for GO Zone property.
(3) How the Stimulus § 179 deduction interacts with the increased § 179 amounts
applicable to the Kansas disaster area.
(4) How the Stimulus additional first year depreciation deduction interacts with the 50-
percent additional first year depreciation deduction applicable to the Kansas disaster area.
0 The IRS and the Treasury Department also intend to amend
Reg. § 1.179-5(c) to permit taxpayers to make a § 179 election without IRS consent on an amended
return for taxable years beginning after 2007.
c. And 50 percent bonus depreciation continues. The 2009
ARRTA, § 1201, extended the Code § 168(k) 50 percent additional first year depreciation
allowance to qualified property placed in service before 1/1/10. (Aircraft and "long-production-
period property" qualify if placed in service before 1/1/1 1.)
d. And more guidance for extension property. Rev.. Proc. 2009-33,
2009-29 I.R.B. 150 (6/30/09). The revenue procedure provides guidance regarding the election
out of additional depreciation, which increases general business credits, for 2009 extension
property. The additional first year depreciation is available for 2009 property if the taxpayer had
previously elected out for property placed in service in previous years.
2. Farm machinery is treated as five-year recovery property. Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 505(a), amended § 168(e)(3)(B). Farm machinery,
the original use of which commences with the taxpayer, and which is placed in service in 2009,
is treated as five-year recovery property for MACRS. The provision does not apply to a grain
bin, ginning equipment, fences or other land improvements.
a. There is something for race fans. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 317, extends seven-year recovery for motorsports facilities
defined in § 168(i)(1 5) to property placed in service in 2009.
b. And for film lovers. The Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Act § 502(b), extends the expensing option of § 181 for qualified film and
television production to costs incurred in production commencing before January 1, 2010. In the
case of production costs exceeding $15 million ($20 million for production in low income
communities or in areas of distress [will this result in more episodes of The Wire]), the first $15
million (or $20 million) of production costs may be expensed.
3. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 305(a),
amending § 168(e)(3)(E), extends fifteen-year amortization for qualified leasehold improvement
property (improvements constituting § 1250 property made more than three years after a
nonresidential building is placed in service) and qualified restaurant property (more than 50% of
square footage devoted to food preparation and seating) placed in service before January 1, 2010.
4. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Division B, § 308,
adds § 168(m) to provide a 50 percent first year depreciation allowance of the adjusted basis of
qualified reuse and recycling property acquired after August 31, 2008, which is reuse and
recycling property with at least a five year useful life the original use of which commences with
the taxpayer. The allowance is available under the AMT.
5. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended through
2009 § 179E permits, which allows a taxpayer to elect to treat 50 percent of the cost of any
"qualified advanced mine safety equipment" as a current expense.
6. On Boxing Day, the IRS privately provides for the creation of
depreciable interests in land. PLR 200852013 (12/26/08). In this private letter ruling three
sellers separately owned interests in a building with residential and commercial units, a parking
structure and a surface parking lot. The sellers sold a remainder interest to an unrelated buyer,
and a term interest in the land, buildings and other improvements and fixtures to the taxpayer.
The sellers, the remainder interest holder, and the taxpayer are unrelated. Citing Reg. § 1.167(a)-
l(b), Gordon v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 309, 322-323 (1985), and Lomas Santa Fe, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 662, 683 (1980), aff'd, 693 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1982), the IRS held that the
taxpayer may claim depreciation deductions for the cost allocated to the term interest in land
over the term of the interest. The taxpayer is allowed to claim capital recovery for the buildings
and parking structure under the rules of § 168.
7. Now that's a whole lotta expens'n goin' on! For taxable years beginning
in 2008 and 2009, the 2009 ARRTA, § 1202, increases the Code § 179 maximum deductible
amount to $250,000 and provides a phase-out threshold of $800,000. The maximum amount
allowed to be deducted under § 179 is increased by another $35,000 for (a) qualified enterprise
zone property, Code § 1397(a)(1), and (b) qualified renewal community property acquired and
placed in service after 2001 and before 2010. Code § 1400J. In addition, for both qualified
enterprise zone property and qualified renewal community property, only fifty percent of the cost
of property in excess of the threshold for the phase-out is taken into account. Code § 1397(a)(2).
Code § 179(e) increases the maximum amount allowed to be deducted under § 179 by $100,000,
and increases the phase-out threshold by $600,000, for qualified disaster assistance property
placed in service after 2007 (with respect to disasters declared after that date) and before 2010.
The increased expensing and ceiling limits under the 2009 ARRTA also affect the special
expensing rules for enterprise zone property, renewal property, and for qualified disaster
assistance property. Thus, the maximum § 179 deduction for qualified enterprise zone and
renewal property is $285,000 for 2008 and 2009 ($250,000 + $35,000). For qualified disaster
assistance property in 2008 and 2009 the maximum deduction is $350,000 ($250,000
+$100,000), and the phase-out threshold is $1,400,000 ($800,000 + $600,000).
8. Rev. Proc. 2009-24, 2009-17 I.R.B. 885 (4/9/09). For automobiles placed
in service in 2009 that do not qualify as § 168(k) property, the limits on depreciation deductions
are $2,960 for the placed in service year, $4,800 for the second tax year, $2,850 for the third tax
year, and $1,775 for each succeeding year; for automobiles that qualify as § 168(k) property, the
limits are $10,960 for the first year, $4,800 for the second year, $2,850 for the third year, and
$1,775 for each succeeding year; for light trucks or vans that are not § 168(k) property, the limits
are $3,060 for the first year, $4,900 for the second year, $2,950 for the third year, and $1,775 for
each succeeding year; for light trucks or vans that qualify as § 168(k) property, the limits are
$11,060 for the first year, $4,900 for the second year, $2,950 for the third year, and $1,775 for
each succeeding year).
9. Converting corn to ethanol is waste reduction and resource recovery,
not a chemical process. Notice 2009-64, 2009-36 I.R.B. 307 (8/24/09). The notice contains a
proposed revenue ruling to classify tangible assets used to convert corn into fuel grade ethanol as
belonging to asset class 49.5 of Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, ten year property with a
seven year MACRS recovery period. The IRS concludes that such assets are not properly
assigned to asset class 28, manufacture of chemicals and allied products, that have a 9.5 year
class life and five year MACRS recovery period.
F. Credits
1. Corporate taxpayers need spreadsheet net present value analysis to
figure out this election. The Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, § 3081, provides for an
increase in available § 38 credits for increased research activity in lieu of the § 168(k) 50 percent
first year allowance for property placed in service in 2008. For property placed in service after
3/1/08, a corporation may elect to forego the additional deduction under § 168(k) and increase
the research credit or minimum tax credit limitation of §§ 38(c) and 53(c) (AMT credits are
limited to the excess of regular tax over tentative tax) by 20 percent of the bonus depreciation
amount. The increase in credits may provide refundable credits against regular tax liability. For
eligible property the bonus depreciation amount is the amount of increased depreciation
deductions available under § 168(k). The bonus depreciation amount is limited to the lesser of
$30 million or six percent of the sum of research credit carryforwards from years beginning after
1/1/06 and minimum tax credits attributable to adjusted minimum tax for years after 1/1/06.
Depreciation for eligible property for both regular tax and AMT purposes is computed under the
straight line method. This provision is included in a section of the act entitled "Revenue
Provisions."
* This amendment allows corporate (but not individual)
taxpayers to elect to accelerate the AMT credit and the research credit in lieu of claiming bonus
depreciation.
a. Jesus Chrysler? And the Pork takes a drive in a new car -
powered by corn. The Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, § 3081, also provides that "an
applicable partnership" may elect to be treated as making a deemed tax payment in the amount
of the least of (1) the bonus depreciation that would be allowed if an election were in effect for
the partnership, (2) the amount of the partnership's research credit for the year, or (3) $30
million (reduced by any deemed payment for a prior taxable year). An applicable partnership is
"a domestic partnership that was formed on August 3, 2007, and will produce in excess of
675,000 automobiles during the period beginning on January 1, 2008, and ending on June 30,
2008." There must be a lot of qualified partnerships out there. ©
b. And it's all explained by the IRS. Rev. Proc. 2008-65, 2008-44
I.R.B. 1082 (10/10/08). Section 168(k)(4) allows an election to treat the 50 percent bonus
depreciation amount (over regular depreciation) as an increase in the limitation of § 38(c) on the
general business credit or as an increase in the § 53(c) limitation on the amount of credit against
regular tax liability for lower tentative minimum tax (refundable). The increases are allowed to
corporations and the Chrysler LLC (not identified by name in the revenue procedure). The
election is available for qualified property placed in service between 3/31/08 and 1/1/10. The
revenue procedure defines eligible property under the various provisions of the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008, provides rules for making the election, determining the bonus
depreciation amounts, and allocating the bonus depreciation amount between the limitations of
§§ 38(c) and 53(c).
c. The IRS supplements the explanation. Rev. Proc. 2009-16,
2009-6 I.R.B. 449 (1/23/09). The revenue procedure contains rules for electing under § 168(k)(4)
to claim an increase in the business tax credit limitation and the AMT credit limitation in lieu of
claiming 50 percent first year depreciation allowances under § 168(k), and provides rules for
allocating the increases among members of a controlled group and to corporate partners of a
partnership allowed to make the election (Chrysler). The revenue procedure clarifies that an S
corporation may make the election, but points out that any business or AMT credit limitation
increases that result are applied at the corporate level, and not at the shareholder level. This
means that the credit limitation increase will only affect credits allowed against tax due on
recognized built-in gains under § 1374.
d. One more year! ARRTA § 2001 amended Code § 168(k)(4) to
extend this election for one year to property placed in service in 2009.
2. How many tax professionals know what "lignocellulosic" and
"hemicellulosic" matter are? Section 40(b)(6), added by the Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and
Horticulture Act of 2008, adds the cellulosic biofuel producer credit as a new component of the
§40 alcohol fuels credit. Generally, the amount of the credit is $1.01 for each gallon of qualified
production after 12/31/08 and before 1/1/13. If a cellulosic biofuel is alcohol, the amount of the
credit is reduced by the amount of credit allowable under other parts of §40. Cellulosic biofuel is
liquid fuel which is derived from any renewable lignocellulosic or hemicellulosic matter;
examples of such matter include dedicated energy crops, wood, plants, grasses, animal wastes,
and municipal solid waste.
a. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division
B], the Energy Improvement and Extension Act, § 201, amends § 168(l)(3), which provides a
50 percent first year allowance for qualified cellulosic biomass ethanol plant property to provide
a definition of cellulosic biofuel to include, "any liquid fuel which is produced from any
lignocellulosic or hemicellulosic matter that is available on a renewable or recurring basis." This
definition replaces "cellulosic biomass ethanol."
3. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act, § 306, amends § 168(e)(3)(D) to treat qualified
smart electric meters and a smart grid system, as defined in § 168(i)(18) and (19), as ten-year
property, but limits the depreciation method in § 168(b)(2)(C) to 150 percent declining balance.
4. The "temporary" research credit that never sunsets is extended again.
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, [Division C] § 301, extended the § 41
credit for increased research activities for amounts paid or incurred through December 31, 2009.
The Act also increased the § 41(c)(5) alternative simplified credit to 14 percent for years ending
after December 31, 2008, and amended § 41(c) to provide that the election to claim the
§ 41 (c)(4) alternative incremental credit shall not apply to years beginning after December 3 1,
2008.
5. Indian credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
[Division C], § 314, extended the § 45A Indian Employment Credit for taxable years beginning
on or before December 31, 2009.
6. Marketing credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
extended the § 45D New Markets Tax Credit through 2009, permitting up to 3.5 billion in
qualified equity investments for that calendar year.
7. Schoolhouse credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 provides that the § 1397E Qualified Zone Academy Bond Credit does not apply to any
bond issued after October 3, 2008, but added new § 54E, which provides a virtually identical
credit for, and authorizes issuance of, up to $400 million of new qualified zone academy bonds
issued after October 3, 2008 and before 2010.
8. Katrina Employee credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008 extended the Work Opportunity Credit through Aug. 28, 2009 for certain employees
hired in the core disaster area of Hurricane Katrina. The credit for Katrina employees hired to a
new place of employment outside of the core disaster area was not extended.
9. Historic New Orleans credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 extended §1400N(h) through December 31, 2009. Section 1400N(h), was added by
the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, to increase the 10 percent credit § 47 rehabilitation to 13
percent, and the 20 percent credit to 26 percent, for qualified expenditures incurred on or after
August 28, 2005, and before January 1, 2009, with respect to structures and buildings located
within the Katrina-related Gulf Opportunity Zone.
10. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division C]
contains other credit provisions:
a. Section 302, extends the § 45D credit for equity investment in
qualified active low-income community business.
b. Section 316, extends the Railroad Track Maintenance Credit of
§ 45G to expenditures made in 2009 and allows the credit for AMT purposes.
c. Section 320 extends the rehabilitation credit through 2009.
11. A credit for Vinny Gambini hiring disadvantaged "yutes" or "utes."
The 2009 ARRTA, § 1221, added two new categories of eligible employees for 2009 and 2010
under the existing Code § 51 Work Opportunity Tax Credit: unemployed veterans and
"disconnected youths." To qualify as an unemployed veteran, the employee (1) must have been
discharged from active duty in the military (after serving at least 180 days or being discharged
for a service-connected disability) during the five-year period ending on the hiring date, and (2)
must have received unemployment compensation for at least four weeks during the one-year
period ending on the hiring date. A disconnected youth is an individual certified by the
designated local agency who is (1) at least age 16 but not yet age 25 on the hiring date, (2) not
regularly attending any secondary, technical, or post-secondary school during the six-month
period preceding the hiring date, (3) not regularly employed during the six-month period
preceding the hiring date, and (4) not readily employable by reason of lacking a sufficient
number of skills.
a. Disconnected yutes defined. Notice 2009-28, 2009-24 I.R.B.
1082 (5/28/2009). 2009 ARRTA amended § 51 to add two new targeted groups for purposes of
the § 51 work opportunity credit: unemployed veterans and disconnected youths who begin work
for an employer during 2009 or 2010. This provides guidance on the definition of "disconnected
youth." It also provides transition relief for employers who hire unemployed veterans or
disconnected youths after 12/31/08, and before 7/17/09.
12. Will this myriad of new credits lead to an electric outlet on every parking
meter even outside of the Arctic portions of the U.S.? Code § 30D, added to the Code by the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, was amended by § 1141(a) of the 2009
ARRTA, to provide a plug-in electric drive motor vehicle credit. The statute defines a credit-
eligible "new qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicle" as a motor vehicle, the original use
of which is by the taxpayer, that (1) draws propulsion using a traction battery with a capacity of
at least 4 kilowatt hours, (2) recharges its battery with an external source of energy, (3) meets
certain environmental standards, (4) is acquired by the taxpayer for use or lease (rather than for
resale), and (5) is made by a manufacturer. The amount of the credit is $2,500 for each
qualifying vehicle placed in service by a taxpayer during a taxable year, with an increase of $417
in the credit amount for each kilowatt hour of traction battery capacity in excess of 4 kilowatt
hours. However, for vehicles acquired before January 1, 2010, the total amount of the credit for
any one vehicle cannot exceed $7,500 if the vehicle weighs 10,000 pounds or less, cannot exceed
$10,000 if the vehicle weighs more than 10,000 pounds but not more than 14,000 pounds, cannot
exceed $12,500 if the vehicle weighs more than 14,000 pounds but not more than 26,000 pounds,
and cannot exceed $15,000 if the vehicle weighs more than 26,000 pounds. For vehicles acquired
after December 31, 2009, only vehicles with a gross vehicle rating of less than 14,000 pounds
qualify, and the credit cannot exceed $7,500. Once the total number of qualified plug-in electric
drive vehicles sold for use in the United States after December 31, 2009, reaches 200,000, the
credit will be phased out, with the phase-out period beginning in the second calendar quarter
following the calendar quarter in which the 2 00,000t sale occurs. During the first two calendar
quarters of the phase-out period, the credit is 50 percent of the otherwise allowable amount; in
the third and fourth calendar quarters, the credit is 25 percent of the otherwise allowable amount;
and no credit is allowable after the end of the fourth calendar quarter.
• 0 A taxpayer electing to claim the credit must reduce its basis in
the vehicle by the amount of the credit. (Section 30D(f)(6) permits the taxpayer to elect not to claim
the credit.) Any deduction or credit otherwise allowable with respect to the purchase of the vehicle
must be reduced by the amount of the credit claimed. The statute directs the Treasury to promulgate
regulations providing for the recapture of the credit with respect to any vehicle which ceases to be
credit-eligible property (including the case of a lease period shorter than a vehicle's economic life).
In the case of a qualifying vehicle used in the taxpayer's trade or business, the credit is part of the
general business credit. In the case of qualifying personal use vehicle, the credit is treated as a
personal credit, and is allowed against both the regular income tax and the AMT. The credit applies
to taxable years beginning after 12/31/08, but will not be available for vehicles purchased after
12/31/14.
* If the vehicle is placed in service by a tax-exempt entity, the
person selling the vehicle to the tax-exempt entity may claim the credit, but only if the seller
discloses to the entity the amount of the credit. § 30D(f)(3).
a. And just to make things simpler, a second, alternative credit
for plug-in electric vehicles. The 2009 ARRTA, § 1142(a), significantly revised the Code § 30
renewable electricity production credit, which now applies only to "plug-in" vehicles. The
revisions apply to vehicles acquired after 2/17/09. Revised § 30 allows an elective credit equal to
10 percent of the cost of any qualified plug-in electric vehicle placed in service in a trade or
business or for personal use up to a maximum per-vehicle credit of $2,500. The statute defines a
credit-eligible "qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicle" as a motor vehicle, the original
use of which is by the taxpayer, that (1) is propelled to a significant extent by an electric motor
that draws power from a battery with a capacity of at least 4 kilowatt hours (2.5 kilowatt hours in
the case of a 2-or 3-wheeled vehicle), (2) recharges its battery with an external source of energy,
(3) has a gross vehicle rating of less than 14,000 pounds, (4) is acquired by the taxpayer for use
or lease (rather than for resale), (5) is made by a manufacturer, and (6) and is either (i) a "low
speed vehicle within the meaning of section 571.3 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations" as in
effect on 2/17/09 or (ii) is a 2-or 3-wheel vehicle. A taxpayer electing to claim the credit must
reduce its basis in the vehicle by the amount of the credit. (Section 30(e)(6) permits the taxpayer
to elect not to claim the credit.) Any deduction or credit otherwise allowable with respect to the
purchase of the vehicle must be reduced by the amount of the credit claimed. The statute directs
the Treasury to promulgate regulations providing for the recapture of the credit with respect to
any vehicle which ceases to be credit-eligible property. In the case of a qualifying vehicle used
in the taxpayer's trade or business, the credit is part of the general business credit. In the case of
qualifying personal use vehicle, the credit is treated as a personal credit, and is allowed against
both the regular income tax and the AMT. The credit will not be available for vehicles purchased
after 12/31/11. Furthermore, for any vehicle acquired after 2/17/09 and before 1/1/10, the § 30
credit is not available if a credit is allowed under § 30D.
b. Credit for figuring out how to plug in an old car. The 2009
ARRTA, s 1143(b), amended § 30B to extend the alternative motor vehicle credit to a "plug-in
conversion." The plug-in conversion credit is an amount equal to 10 percent of the first $40,000
of cost to convert a vehicle to "qualified plug-in electric drive vehicle," as defined in § 30D. The
plug-in conversion credit is allowed in addition to any other credits allowed with respect to the
vehicle. The credit applies only to conversions placed in service after 2/17/09 and before 1/1/12.
In addition, new § 30B(g)(2) permits the § 30B alternative motor vehicle credit to be claimed
against the alternative minimum tax for years after 2008.
13. Let's not give all the credit to electric cars, save something for the oil
patch and the corn belt. Section 30C, added to the Code by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of
2005, and amended by § 1123(a) of the 2009 ARRTA, provides a credit equal to 50 percent (30
percent for years before 2009) of the cost of any qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling
property placed in service by the taxpayer. Qualifying fuels are ethanol, natural gas, compressed
natural gas, liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, hydrogen, mixtures of diesel and
biodiesel containing at least 20 percent biodiesel, and electricity. For a business taxpayer, the
credit may not exceed $50,000 ($30,000 for years before 2009) with respect to all qualified
property placed in service by the taxpayer during the taxable year at a particular location, but if
the vehicle uses hydrogen as a fuel the maximum credit is increased to $200,000.The credit is
also available to a taxpayer installing a refueling facility on the grounds of his personal residence
for personal use, but the maximum amount of the nonbusiness credit is $2,000 ($1,000 for years
before 2009). The business credit aspect is part of the general business credit, and the personal
credit is allowed only to the extent of the excess of the regular tax (reduced by certain other
credits) over the tentative minimum tax. The credit is not available for property placed in service
after 2010 (or after 2014, in the case of property relating to hydrogen).
14. And some tax credit help for homebuilders. Section 45L, which
previously had been scheduled to expire at the end of 2008, provides a credit, in the amount of
either $2,000 or $1,000, to an eligible contractor (including the producer of a manufactured
home) who constructs and sells an energy efficient home to a person who will use the home as a
residence. The 2009 ARRTA extended the life of the § 45L credit through 2009.
15. Pick, choose, and apply a combination of proposed and final
regulations. FedEx Corp. v. United States, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-2722 (W.D. Tenn. 6/9/09).
Federal Express claimed $11.6 million of § 41 research credits for years 1997-2007 for a
business software development project initiated in 1996 and abandoned as not technologically
feasible in 2001. The discovery test of § 41(d)(1)(B) requires that to be eligible for the credit
qualified research must be undertaken for the purpose of discovering information which is
technological in nature, is useful in the development of a new or improved business component,
and the activities must be experimental in nature. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(3) of regulations finalized in
2001, but applicable to expenditures for internal use software incurred after 1985, defined the
discovery test as requiring that "research be undertaken to 'obtain knowledge that exceeds,
expands, or refines the common knowledge of skilled professionals in a particular field of
science or engineering."' Under § 41(d)(4)(E), internal use software is qualified for the research
credit only to the extent provided in regulations. Regulations § 1.41-4(c)(6)(vi) provided that
internal use software is qualified for the research credit if the software is innovative,
development requires significant economic risk, and the software is not commercially available.
Regulations proposed in 2001 and finalized in 2003, applicable to taxable years ending after
12/26/01, revised the discovery test to apply to research that, "is intended to eliminate certain
uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a business component." The
preamble to the 2001 proposed regulations stated that the IRS generally will not challenge return
positions consistent with the proposed regulations. (66 F.R. 66362.) The 2003 finalized
regulations did not adopt the internal use software test, marking that section of the regulations as
reserved. In Ann. 2004-9, 2004-6 I.R.B. 441, the Service indicated that taxpayers could continue
to rely on the internal use software test of the 2001 regulations, but if they did so, they were also
subject to the discovery test of those provisions. Granting summary judgment, the court (Judge
Mays) accepted Federal Express' assertion that it could rely on the broadened discovery test of
the 2003 regulations and the internal use software test of the 2001 regulations. The court rejected
the IRS argument that the taxpayer cannot "cut and paste" portions of the 2001 and 2003
regulations to produce a favorable result. The court concluded that deference to administrative
regulations under Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
requires that taxpayers be permitted to rely on promulgated regulations. The Treasury statements
in the preamble to the 2003 regulations that indicate that those provisions better reflect
legislative history, precludes the IRS from forcing the taxpayer to apply the earlier and modified
provision. The IRS announcement as an interpretation of regulations did not merit Chevron
deference over the promulgated regulations. The taxpayer was allowed to rely on the internal use
software provisions of the 2001 regulations as those provisions were the only regulatory
provisions in existence with respect to the taxpayer's expenditures.
16. With "a little song, a little dance," the Fifth Circuit holds that the Cohan
rule permits courts to estimate qualified research expenditures. United States v. McFerrin, 570
f.3d 672, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-2566 (5th Cir. 6/9/09). Through a clerical error, the IRS granted
the taxpayer's claim for a refund that was based on § 41 research credits previously unclaimed
on taxpayer's return. In the IRS suit to recover the refund the burden of proof fell on the IRS.
Reversing Judge Atlas's decision in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the
Fifth Circuit held that under the rule of Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), if
the taxpayer can demonstrate that his activities were qualified research, then the trial court can
estimate the expenses associated with those activities. In addition, the court held that the District
Court erred in not reviewing the claimed research activities under the 2003 final regulations
defining "discovery." The taxpayer's claim for refund was based on language of regulations
proposed in 2001, the preamble to which indicated that taxpayers could rely on the test of the
proposed regulations. The case was remanded to the District Court for reconsideration under the
2003 regulations.
17. REG-130200-08, Election of Reduced Research Credit under Section
208C(c)(3), 74 F.R. 34523 (7/16/09). These proposed regulations would "simplify" how
taxpayers make the election to claim the "reduced research credit" under § 280C(c)(3).
G. Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
1. Safer mines credit. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, Act § 310, extended through 2009 the $10,000 § 45N credit for expenses incurred in
training "qualified mine rescue team employees."
2. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 311, extends
the § 179E 50 percent expensing provision for mine safety equipment to include equipment
placed in service before 1/1/10.
3. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act, § 209, extends the 50 percent expensing allowance
by two years for qualified refinery property to property placed in service before 1/1/11. The
definition of a qualified refinery in § 179C(d) is expanded to the refining of fuel directly from
shale or tar sands.
4. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act, extended several credits and added a few new twists.
a. Section 101 extends the § 45 credit for wind and refined coal
facilities for property placed in service before 1/1/10. The credit is extended for certain other
facilities to include property placed in service in 2009 and 2010.
b. The energy credit contains special rules for energy produced
from refined coal. Section 101(b) changes the definitions of qualified refined coal to eliminate
the requirement of § 45(c)(7)(A)(i)(IV) that the fair market value of refined coal be increased by
50 percent over the value of feedstock coal, and increases the requirement of § 45(c)(7)(B) for
emissions reduction from 20 percent to 40 percent. Section 108 of the Act amends the
§ 45(c)(7)(A) definition of refined coal to include fuel produced from coal that is sold with a
reasonable expectation that the fuel will be used to produce steam, is certified as resulting in a
qualified emission reduction, and is produced in a manner that results in a 50 percent increase in
value over feedstock coal or is steel industry fuel. Steel industry fuel is produced by liquefying
coal waste sludge and distributing it on coal that is used for the manufacture of coke.
c. Section 101(c) changes the definitions of trash facilities, biomass
facilities, and facilities for hydropower production of § 45(c) and (d).
d. Section 102 adds facilities for production of electricity from
waves, tides and ocean currents.
e . Section 103 extends the solar energy credit to include property
placed in service in periods ending before 1/1/17, for fuel cell property and microturbine
property in periods ending after 12/31/16.
f. Section 103(b) allows the § 46 energy credit as an offset against
the AMT, adding § 38(c)(4)((B)(v).
g. Section 103(c) expands the § 48 energy credit to include power
systems that combine power generation with steam generation for heat.
h. Section 103(d) increases the credit limitation of § 48(c) for
qualified fuel cell property from $500 for each 0.5 kilowatt capacity to $1500.
i. Section 103(f)(2) allows the § 48 energy credit as an offset against
the AMT, adding § 38(c)(4)((B)(v).j. Section 104(a) adds qualified small wind energy property to the 30
percent energy credit of § 48.
k. Section 105 adds geothermal heat pump to the list of energy
property available for the § 48 energy credit.
1. Section 106 expands the credit for residential energy efficient
property by extending the credit to 12/31/16, eliminating the $2,000 limitation for solar electric
property expenditures, adding a 30 percent credit for small wind energy property limited to $500
for each half kilowatt of capacity not to exceed $4,000, adding geothermal heat pump property to
the list of eligible expenditures (limited to $2,000), and allows the credit against the alternative
minimum tax.
m. Section 111 expands the investment credit under § 48 for
qualifying advanced coal projects. The credit is allowed for projects certified by the IRS in
consultation with DOE under a competitive bidding process. Amended § 48A(d)(3)(A) expands
the amount of available credits from $1.3 billion to $2.55 billion. Section 48A(a)(3) is added to
provide a 30 percent credit for projects described in § 48(d)(3)(B), which include greenhouse gas
capture capability, increased by-product utilization, applicants who have a partnership with an
educational institution, and other benefits. The IRS is also directed in § 48A(d)(3)(B) to direct
specified amounts to particular types of projects. Section 48A(e)(1) is amended to direct the IRS
to give priority to projects that capture and sequestrate carbon dioxide emissions.
n. Section 112 increases the coal gasification credit of § 48B from 20
percent to 30 percent and expands the total amount of available credits to $3.5 billion. Section
48B(f) is added to provide for recapture of the credit for any project that fails to meet the carbon
dioxide separation and sequestration requirements of § 48B(d)(1).
o. And the scientists are to tell us whether any of this works to
reduce hot air. Section 117 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to enter into an agreement
with the National Academy of Sciences to undertake an audit of the Code to determine which
provisions have the greatest affect on carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions.
p. Section 202 increases the § 40A credit for biofuel from 50 cents to
$1 for each gallon of biofuel used in the production of a qualified biodiesel mixture. The credit is
extended to biofuel used in the production of aviation jet fuel. (Southwest may find a new use for
its peanuts, gas production.) The credit is not available for fuel produced using feedstock that is
not biomass.
q. Section 203 restricts the fuels credits under §§ 40 (alcohol), 40A
(biodiesel), 6426 (excise tax), by excluding fuels produced outside of the United States for use
outside of the United States.
r. Section 210 extends exclusion from the 100 percent of income
limitation on percentage depletion that is provided for production from marginal properties for
one year to include production in a tax year beginning before 12/31/09.
s. Section 304 extends the energy efficient home credit of § 45L
through 2009.
t. Section 305 extends the § 45M credit (part of the § 38 investment
credit) for production of energy efficient dishwashers, clothes washers, and refrigerators to
products manufactured in 2009, with different dates for different products.
5. Notice 2008-72, 2008-43 I.R.B. 998 (10/27/08). The § 43 enhanced oil
recovery credit for taxable years beginning in the 2007 calendar year is phased out completely,
because the reference price for the 2006 calendar year ($66.52) exceeds $28 multiplied by the
inflation adjustment factor for the 2006 calendar year ($41.06) by $25.45.
6. Section 115 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
[Division B], the Energy Improvement and Extension Act, adds a new credit to § 38 business
credits for carbon dioxide sequestration. Section 45Q provides a credit of $20 per metric ton of
qualified carbon dioxide which is captured by the taxpayer and disposed of in secure geological
storage and $10 per ton of captured carbon dioxide that is used as a tertiary injectant in a
qualified enhanced oil or natural gas recovery project.
a. Guidance on determining eligibility for carbon dioxide
sequestration credits. Notice 2009-83, 2009-44 I.R.B. (10/8/09). Section 45Q provides a
credit equal to $20 per metric ton of carbon captured by a taxpayer at a qualified facility and
disposed of in a secure geological storage within the United Sates, or $10 per metric ton of
captured CO 2 captured and used as a tertiary injectant in a qualified enhanced oil or natural gas
recovery project. Section 45Q(d)(6) requires recapture of the credit for CO2 that leaks back out.
The notice contains several definitions with respect to the credit including-
1) Industrial facility defined as a facility that produces a CO2 stream from a fuel
combustion source, but not including a facility that produces CO2 from CO2
production wells,
2) Qualified carbon dioxide as CO2 captured from an industrial source that would
have been released, which is measured at the source and verified at the point of
disposal or injection, and
3) Qualified facility as a facility that is owned by the taxpayer where carbon capture
equipment is in place and where at least 500,000 metric tons of CO2 is captured
during the taxable year.
a The amount of CO 2 claimed for a credit must be measured by
weight at the source and at the disposal point and is the lesser of the two figures. A partnership that
owns a qualified industrial facility will be treated as the taxpayer for purposes of the credit.
However, if a partnership that has made a § 761(a) election, each of the partners will be considered
the taxpayer, and each may claim the credit in accordance with its portion of the total amount of CO2
that is commensurate with its undivided ownership in the qualified facility. The credit will cease to
be available at the end of the taxable year that the IRS certifies in consultation with the EPA that
75,000,000 metric tons of CO2 has been taken into account for purposes of the credit.
* To claim the credit the CO2 must be stored in a secure
geologic storage which includes storage at deep saline formations, oil and gas reservoirs, and
unminable coal seams under such conditions as the Secretary may determine under regulations that
have yet to be issued. The notice provides interim procedures to determine whether a storage facility
is secure including a requirement for procedures to assure that CO2 does not escape into the
atmosphere. The notice also sets out annual reporting requirements.
7. Notice 2008-89, 2008-43 I.R.B. 999 (10/27/08). The applicable percentage
under § 613A to be used in determining percentage depletion for marginal oil and gas properties
for the 2007 calendar year is 15 percent.
8. And they call the wind Maria. The 2009 ARRTA, § 1302(a), added to
the 30 percent energy credit (investment credit) under Code § 46, wind facilities eligible for the
§ 45 renewable electricity production credit placed in service in 2009 through 2012, and any
other facility eligible for the § 45 renewable electricity production credit placed in service in
2009 through 2013 (except small irrigation power facilities, refined coal production facilities,
and Indian coal production facilities). If the § 48(a) energy credit is claimed for any such facility,
the § 45 renewable electricity production credit cannot be claimed. The Act also added to the
§ 46 credit the § 48C qualifying advanced energy credit.
* Wind power is capable of completely replacing oil as an
energy source if only the wind industry would deploy its back-up gerbils on calm days.
9. Another green energy credit. The 2009 ARRTA, § 1302(b), added the
§ 48C "qualifying advanced energy project" credit as part of the § 46 investment credit. The
credit amount is 30 percent of the investment, measured by basis, in eligible property placed in
service in a qualified advanced energy manufacturing project after 2/17/09. A qualified advanced
energy manufacturing project is defined as a project that re-equips, expands, or establishes a
manufacturing facility for the production of (1) property designed to be used to produce energy
from the sun, wind, or geothermal deposits or other renewable resources, (2) fuel cells,
microturbines, or an energy storage system for use with electric or hybrid-electric motor
vehicles, electric grids to support the transmission of intermittent sources of renewable energy,
including storage of that energy, (4) property designed to manufacture equipment for use for
carbon capture or sequestration, (5) property designed to refine or blend renewable fuels to
produce energy conservation technologies (including energy-conserving lighting technologies
and smart grid technologies), (6) new § 30D qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicles, (7)§ 30(d) qualified plug-in electric vehicles or components that are designed specifically for use
with these vehicles, including electric motors, generators, and power control units, or (8) other
advanced energy property designed to reduce green house gas emissions. Only (1) depreciable
tangible personal property, and (2) "other tangible property (not including a building or its
structural components)" - presumably meaning fixtures - used in a qualified advanced energy
manufacturing project qualify for the credit. Property used in the refining or blending of any
transportation fuel, other than renewable fuels, does not qualify. Although the accompanying
committee report states that the basis of qualified property must be reduced by the amount of
credit, the statute does not so provide; presumably a technical correction will be necessary to
implement any requirement of a basis reduction. If a credit is allowed under § 48C, no credit is
allowed for the expenditure under §§ 48, 48A, or 48B. Section 48C(b)(3) limits the credit to
qualified advanced energy manufacturing projects certified as eligible by the Treasury
Department, after consultation with the Secretary of Energy. The maximum amount of credits
that may be certified is $2.3 billion. The statute sets time frames for applying for certification
and certain procedures and criteria that the Treasury Department should apply in determining
whether any particular project should be certified. The Treasury Department is required to
review projects for which credits have been allocated, and may reallocate credits under certain
circumstances.
H. Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs
1. Duh! Stock that is still trading is not worthless yet. Rendall v.
Commissioner, 535 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 8/5/08), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2006-174. The taxpayer lent
$2 million to a publicly traded company that he had founded. The loan was secured by stock of
the company held by the lender, Merrill Lynch. The loan proceeds were used to partially fund
construction of a plant in Canada to extract crude oil from oil shale. In 1997 the corporation
declared bankruptcy in Canada and the United States. Merrill Lynch sold a portion of the
taxpayer's pledged stock to satisfy the debt. The company arranged to sell most of its assets, but
retained rights to certain of its patented technologies. At the close of the 1997 tax year the
company stock was traded over-the-counter for $3 per share. The court affirmed the Tax Court
holding denying a deduction in 1997 for worthless debt. The court agreed with the Tax Court's
conclusion that at the end of 1997 the taxpayer had not met the standard for treating the debt as
worthless, which it described as "fixed by identifiable events that form the basis of reasonable
grounds for abandoning any hope of recovery."
* A debt owed to the taxpayer by a bankrupt corporation, that
possibly was insolvent and which had agreed to sell all of its operating assets, was not worthless
where the stock was still trading for $3 per share and the corporation still owned numerous
technologies, patents, office space, a research facility, and land and continued to employ a team of
engineers. "'Where a debtor company continues to operate as a going concern the courts have often
concluded that its debts are not worthless for tax purposes despite the fact that it is technically
insolvent."' (quoting Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 1176, 1182 (6th Cir. 1980)).
* The court also rejected the taxpayer's claim that it realized no
gain on the disposition of its pledged stock. The taxpayer argued that Merrill Lynch sold the stock
without permission and that any income should be taxed to Merrill Lynch which obtained the stock
by theft. The court also upheld the Tax Court's allocation of basis to the sold shares on a FIFO basis.
a. But optimism doesn't always pay when selecting the year to
claim a worthless stock loss. Bilthouse v. United States, 553 F.3d 513, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-
429 (7th Cir. 1/15/09), aff'g 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-6191 (N.D. Ill. 9/28/07). The taxpayers were
passive investors (they did not materially participate) in an S corporation that had passed-
through losses that were suspended. The taxpayers asserted that cancellation of indebtedness
income realized by the insolvent S corporation in 1997 increased the taxpayers' stock basis and
that the stock became worthless in 1997, thereby allowing the taxpayers to treat the
worthlessness as a disposition, permitting deduction of the passive activity losses. The taxpayers
filed a refund claim based on the theory that the stock became worthless in 1997, and that the
worthlessness was a complete taxable disposition under § 469(g) that allowed the losses to be
claimed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the refund claim on the
ground that the stock had become worthless in 1995, not 1997, as claimed by the taxpayer, and
that 1995 thus was the year of the disposition. As of 1995, the stock of the corporation had no
liquidating value. Although it was pursuing a lawsuit from which the shareholders claimed that
the corporation expected a large financial recovery that would have allowed it to stay in
business, the record did not demonstrate that the lawsuit represented a reasonable possibility that
the corporation would remain in business after 1995, because there was no evidence proving any
basis for why anyone thought the lawsuit would be successful. The suit was settled in 1997 with
no damages being awarded to the corporation. The court stated "a taxpayer relying on the
potential value of a company to put off the year of worthlessness must provide objective
evidence of this value; merely asserting his self-serving hopes will not do."
2. Ordinary gain and loss on sale of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Preferred Stock. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 301, contains an
off-code provision allowing an applicable financial institution to treat losses on the sale of
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac preferred stock held on September 6, 2008, as ordinary losses. The
EESA allows the Secretary to treat transferred basis stock as held on the requisite date.
Applicable financial institutions are defined in § 582(c)(2) and include banks, savings banks, a
small business investment company, and a business development corporation. The EESA also
allows depository institutions to treat losses as ordinary.
a. Benefits extended to partners and subsidiaries. Rev. Proc. 2008-
64, 2008-47 I.R.B. 1195 (10/29/08). The ordinary loss treatment is extended to the distributive
share of loss of a qualified financial institution partner in a partnership that held qualified Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac preferred stock on 9/6/08, and sold the stock after that date, and to the sale
of a partnership interest by a qualified financial institution if 95% of the partnership's assets
consisted of qualified preferred stock or cash equivalents. A qualified financial institution that
receives a distribution of qualified preferred stock from a partnership 95% of whose
partnership's assets consisted of qualified preferred stock or cash equivalents, is treated as
holding the qualified preferred stock on 9/6/08. Sales of qualified preferred stock of subsidiaries
of a qualified financial institution are treated as ordinary gain or loss. Qualified preferred stock
held by a qualified financial institution whose basis is determined from the basis of the person
who transferred the stock and who held the stock on 9/6/08, is also treated as having held the
stock on 9/6/08.
3. Jojoba partnership investment may have been worthless from the
outset, but not enough to claim a loss deduction. Helbig v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-
243 (10/29/08). The taxpayer invested in Contra Costa Jojoba Research Partners, an investment
in jojoba beans promoted by Charles B. Toepfer. Deductions from the partnership investment
were denied for 1983, 1984, and 1985 in Utah Jojoba IResearch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1998-6, to which the taxpayer had agreed to be bound. The court (Judge Wherry) denied
taxpayer's additional claim that the investment was worthless from the outset giving rise to loss
deductions in 1983-1985. The court noted that the taxpayer continued to pursue the investment
through 1993.
The court also upheld negligence penalties under § 6653(a)
and substantial understatement penalties under § 6661.
a. Heller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-232 (10/20/08). The
court upheld negligence penalties under § 6653 and substantial understatement penalties under
§ 6661 on investors in the Contra Costa jojoba bean shelter. The court held that the Hellers had
been negligent in their failure to consult a tax expert before taking the large deductions from
Contra Costa's research and development efforts.
4. Worthless stock is not theft, even though it may feel like it. Electric
Picture Solutions, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2008-212 (9/8/08). The corporate taxpayer
purchased publicly traded Novatek stock through a California broker. The SEC filed a civil
complaint alleging massive fraud on Novetek investors. The taxpayer claimed a theft loss under
§ 165(a) (instead of a capital loss for worthless securities). In denying the deduction the court
(Judge Thornton) observed that under California law that a purchaser of securities on the open
market cannot support a claim of theft because there is no privity between the perpetrator and the
victim.
5. A bad investment in an abusive shelter is a theft loss, but the taxpayer
has to prove no possibility of recovery. Vincentini v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2008-271
(12/8/08). The taxpayer in 1999 invested in an international tax fraud scheme on the basis of
listening to audio tapes produced by Keith Anderson, founder of Anderson Ark and attending an
Anderson Ark conference in Costa Rica. In a petition challenging the IRS assessment of a
deficiency for 1999 denying losses claimed from the taxpayer's Anderson Ark investment, the
taxpayer claimed a theft and casualty loss from the investments in 2001 or 2002 that could be
carried back to taxpayer's 1999 taxable year. In 2002 the Anderson Ark promoters were
convicted of money laundering and/or conspiracy to commit money laundering by the District
Court for the Eastern District of California (United States v. Anderson, 391 F.3d 970, 974 (9th
Cir. 2004).) In 2004 the same defendants were convicted in the Washington District Court on
charges of conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud and to defraud the United States. The
judgment of the Washington District Court ordered the Anderson Ark defendants to provide
restitution to Anderson Ark investors, including the taxpayer. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel)
held that since the Government in the Anderson Ark criminal cases took the position that the
taxpayer was a victim of fraud and was entitled to restitution, judicial estoppel prevented the
Government from asserting in the Tax Court that the taxpayer did not suffer a theft loss.
However, the court also held that the taxpayer failed to establish that it was reasonably certain at
the end of 2001 that the taxpayer would not recover his loss from Anderson Ark. Thus, the
casualty loss deduction was denied. In addition, the taxpayer was assessed penalties under§ 6662 with respect to losses claimed from the Anderson Ark investment. The court rejected the
taxpayer's assertion of reasonable reliance on the advice of a tax professional noting that,
reliance on the advice of an accountant who was referred to the taxpayer by the promoter was
not reasonable reliance.
6. Carry me back to those long ago days of yore, when there were profits
to be offset by today's NOL. The 2009 ARRTA, § 1211 (b), amended Code § 172 to permit an
"eligible small business" to elect to extend the carryback period for a net operating loss arising
in 2008 to any number of years greater than two or fewer than six - i.e., the elected carryback
period may be five, four, or three. (Absent an election the normal two year carryback rule still
applies.) An "eligible small business" is defined in § 172(b)(1)(H)(iv) (through cross references
to § 172(b)(1)(F)) as a corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship with average annual gross
receipts of $15 million or less. An election under § 172(b)(1)(H) must be made by the due date
(including extensions) for filing the taxpayer's return for the year the net operating loss arose
(i.e., 2008). If the taxpayer is on a fiscal year, the election can be made with respect to either the
taxable ending in 2008 or the taxable year beginning in 2008, but not with respect to both taxable
years. § 172(b)(1)(H)(ii),(iii). The election is irrevocable.
a. And here's instructions on how to get back to those days of
yore. Rev. Proc. 2009-19, 2009-14 IRB 747 (3/16/09). This revenue procedure provides
guidance under § 1211 of 2009 ARRTA, which amended § 172(b)(1)(H) to allow a taxpayer that
is an eligible small business to elect a 3, 4, or 5-year NOL carryback for a taxable year ending
after 2007.
b. Rev. Proc. 2009-19 was modified and superseded by Rev. Proc.
2009-26. Rev. Proc. 2009-26, 2009-19 I.R.B. 935 (4/25/09). This revenue procedure was issued
because many eligible small businesses inadvertently failed to make valid elections that
complied with Rev. Proc. 2009-19.
7- "Take your submarine sandwich shop and shove it" earns a loss
deduction for the franchise fee. Alami v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-042 (2/23/09).
Judge Vasquez held that the taxpayer had established abandonment of Quiznos restaurant
franchise (basis $25,000), and an associated corporate charter (basis $750). The taxpayer
continually expressed intent to abandon the franchise by repeatedly expressing to Quiznos
representatives his desire to have he franchise fee refunded because he no longer sought to open
a Quiznos restaurant, he did not contribute the additional money needed to open a Quiznos
restaurant or select a location within the 1-year limit in the initial franchise agreement, and he
filed a complaint with the state attorney general when Quiznos failed to respond to repeated
requests for a refund. There was no evidence that the taxpayer took any steps to use the
corporation for purposes other than running a Quiznos franchise; rather, at trial the taxpayer was
not even aware whether the corporation remained in existence.
8. The IRS comes to rescue the loss deductions of Bernie Madoff's Ponzi
scheme victims. Rev. Rul. 2009-9, 2009-14 I.R.B. 735 (3/17/09). This Revenue Ruling, issued
in response to the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme scandal, comprehensively addresses the tax
treatment of losses to investors from criminally fraudulent "Ponzi" investment schemes. As for
the proper treatment, the IRS ruled as follows:
(1) A loss from a Ponzi scheme is a loss from a criminal fraud or embezzlement in a
transaction entered in profit that is a theft loss, not a capital loss, under § 165.
(2) The loss is deductible under § 165(c)(2), not § 165(c)(3). (Rev. Rul. 71-381 is
obsoleted to the extent that it holds that a theft loss incurred in a transaction entered into for
profit is deductible under § 165(c)(3) rather than § 165(c)(2)).
(3) The loss is an itemized deduction, but is not subject to the limitation on personal
losses in § 165(h), or the limitations on itemized deductions in §§ 67 and 68.
(3) The theft loss is deductible in the year it is discovered, to the extent that the loss is not
covered by a claim for reimbursement, with respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of
recovery.
(4) The amount of a theft loss is the amount invested in the arrangement, less amounts
withdrawn, if any, reduced by reimbursements or recoveries, and reduced by claims as to which
there is a reasonable prospect of recovery. Where an amount is reported to the investor as
income prior to discovery of the arrangement and the investor includes that amount in gross
income and reinvests this amount in the arrangement, the amount of the theft loss is increased
by the purportedly reinvested amount.
(5) A theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit may create or increase a net
operating loss under § 172 that can be carried back up to 3 years and forward up to 20 years; the three-
year carryback for a theft loss is permitted under § 172(b)(1)(F). The investor can also qualify as an
eligible small business under § 172(b)(1)(F)(iii) and § 172(b)(1)(H)(iv) , and if the investor qualifies,
under § 172(b)(1)(H)(iv), the investor may elect either a 3, 4, or 5-year net operating loss carryback for an
applicable 2008 net operating loss.
0 The ruling also holds that certain relief provisions do not
apply: (1) A theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit does not qualify for § 1341
treatment.
(2) A theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit does not qualify for the application
of the mitigation rules in §§ 1311-1314 to adjust tax liability in years that are otherwise barred
by the period of limitations on filing a refund claim.
a. And a safe-harbor to ease the burden of calculating potential
recoveries that affect the amount and proper year for the deduction. Rev. Proc. 2009-20,
2009-14 I.R.B. 749 (3/17/09). This Revenue Procedure provides an optional safe harbor under
which qualified investors (as defined in the revenue procedure) may treat a Ponzi scheme loss as
a theft loss deduction. Its purpose is to alleviate the problems that arise because highly factual
determinations regarding Ponzi schemes that are required by Rev. Rul. 2009-9, which describes
the proper treatment regarding claiming Ponzi scheme theft losses. The revenue procedure
requires many qualifying conditions, and it does not include a person that invested solely in a
fund or other entity that invested in the specified fraudulent arrangement (although it can apply
to the fund or entity itself). Among the qualifying conditions are the lead figure (1) must have
been either (a) charged by indictment or information with a crime that would have been theft if
convicted, or (b) subject to a state or criminal complaint alleging such a crime, and (2) either (a)
the complaint alleged an admission by the lead figure, or the execution of an affidavit by that
person admitting the crime; or (b) a receiver or trustee was appointed with respect to the
arrangement or assets of the arrangement were frozen. If the myriad of qualifying conditions is
satisfied, the safe harbor deduction amount is computed under the following formula:
(1) Multiply the amount of the "qualified investment" by -
(a) 95 percent, for a qualified investor that does not pursue any potential
third-party recovery; or
(b) 75 percent, for a qualified investor that is pursuing or intends to pursue
any potential third-party recovery;
(2) Subtract from this product the sum of any actual recovery and any potential
insurance and/or Securities Investor Protection recovery.
0 Generally speaking, the amount of the "qualified investment"
equals the sum of(1) the amount invested (money and the basis of property)in the arrangement, and
(2) amounts previously included in gross income by investor that were purportedly reinvested, minus
any amounts withdrawn. The safe harbor "discovery year' for claiming the deduction is the
investor's taxable year in which the indictment, information, or complaint is filed.
9 The amount of the deduction so determined is not further
reduced by potential direct recovery or potential third-party recovery. However, the investor may
have income or an additional deduction in a subsequent year depending on the actual amount of the
loss that is eventually recovered. Special procedures must be followed in completing the investor's
tax return to flag that the investor is claiming a safe-harbor theft loss under the revenue procedure.
The taxpayer must sign and attach to the return a statement agreeing: (1) not to deduct in the
discovery year an amount in excess of the deduction permitted under the revenue procedure; (2) not
to file returns or amended returns to exclude or recharacterize income reported with respect to the
investment arrangement in taxable years preceding the discovery year; (3) not to apply § 1341 with
respect to the theft loss deduction allowed by the revenue procedure; and (4) not to apply the
doctrine of equitable recoupment or the mitigation provisions in §§ 1311-1314 with respect to
income from the investment arrangement that was reported in taxable years that are otherwise barred
by the period of limitations.
* A taxpayer that does not elect to use the safe harbor provided
by the revenue procedures is subject to all of the generally applicable provisions governing the
deductibility of losses under § 165, including proof that a theft occurred, proof of the year of
discovery, and proof that there is no reasonable prospect of recovery. A taxpayer that does not apply
the safe harbor and files or amends income tax returns for years prior to the discovery year to
exclude amounts reported as income from the investment arrangement must establish that those
amounts were actually or constructively received (or accrued by a taxpayer using an accrual method
of accounting).
9. In re Harvard Industries, 568 F.3d 444, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-2701 (3d
Cir. 6/17/09). Section 172(b)(1)(C) provides for a ten year carryback of specified liability losses,
which are defined in § 172(f) as product liability losses that arise out of physical or emotional
injury or loss of use of property on account of a defect in products produced by the taxpayer, and
liability that arose out of state or federal law, or out of any tort committed by the taxpayer. In a
bankruptcy proceeding the taxpayer claimed Federal tax refunds based on carrybacks of
specified liability losses. The taxpayer produced defective lock nuts for use in aircraft engines.
No one was actually injured as a result of the defects, but the taxpayer suffered losses in actions
by distributors who could not sell the defective lock nuts. The court concluded that 'loss of
property' could refer to the loss of the defective product itself so that losses attributable to
settlements with distributors who could not sell the defective product qualified under the
definition of specified liability losses. The court also held that losses incurred in making
payments to its pension plan as required by the PBGC were losses incurred under Federal law
because of the minimum funding requirements of ERISA. Finally, the court affirmed lower court
rulings that retrospective workers compensation insurance premiums, including the portion of
the premiums representing the insurance company's administrative costs, represented specified
liability losses as they arose under state workers compensation laws.
I. At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses
1. A closing agreement does not override the passive activity loss rules.
Shelton v. United States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-6287 (Fed. Cl. 9/23/08). The taxpayers entered
into a closing agreement in a partnership audit that provided that, "Any losses disallowed under
this agreement are suspended under I.R.C. § 465. Such suspended losses may be used to offset
the taxpayers' pro rata share of any income earned by the partnership and/or other income in
accordance with the operation of I.R.C. § 465." The taxpayer asserted that the closing agreement
allowed deduction of suspended loss in a year that at-risk amounts are increased, regardless of
the passive activity loss limitation of § 469. The Claims Court (Judge Miller) held on summary
judgment that § 469 always applies after the limitation of § 465 is overcome and that any
absence of a reference to § 469 in the closing agreement does not eliminate its application.
2. You don't need a real estate broker's license from the state to be a
real estate broker for purposes of § 469. Agarwal v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-29(3/2/09). The taxpayer, who worked full-time as a licensed real estate agent, but was not a
licensed real estate broker, deducted losses from a real estate rental activity in which she
materially participated against her compensation income. Under § 469(c)(7), if more than one
half of the personal services performed by the taxpayer during the year are performed in one or
more real property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially participates and the
taxpayer performs more than 750 hours of services in such activities, then any real property
rental activity in which the taxpayer materially participates is not treated as a per se passive
activity, and losses are fully deductible against the taxpayer's income from all sources. Section
469(c)(7)(C) defines a real property trade or business as any real property development,
redevelopment, construction, acquisition, conversion, rental, management, leasing, or brokerage
business. Special Trial Judge Dean held that for purposes of § 469(c)(7), the "business" of a real
estate broker includes, but is not limited to: (1) selling, exchanging, purchasing, renting, or
leasing real property; (2) offering to do those activities; (3) negotiating the terms of a real estate
contract; (4) listing of real property for sale, lease, or exchange; or (5) procuring prospective
sellers, purchasers, lessors, or lessees. Under this standard, a licensed real estate agent qualifies
as a real estate broker for purposes of § 469(c)(7), even if the agent is not a licensed real estate
broker under state law.
3. Rock, hammer, warehouse - these activities are not an economic unit.
Senra v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-79 (4/15/09). The taxpayer owned a warehouse
through a disregarded LLC, which leased the warehouse to a C Corporation, 86.75 percent of
which was owned by the taxpayer and which employed the taxpayer. The taxpayer deducted
losses from the rental activity against his salary from the C Corporation, claiming that the
warehouse leasing and employment by the C corporation was a single activity under Reg.
§ 1.469-4. The Tax Court (Judge Chabot) held that the warehouse activity could not be grouped
with the C corporation activity. Reg. § 1.469-4(d)(5)(ii) permits an activity that a taxpayer
conducts through a C corporation to be grouped with another activity only for the purposes of
determining whether the taxpayer materially or significantly participates in the other activity.
Otherwise, an activity conducted through a C corporation may not be grouped with another
activity. Thus, the warehouse activity losses could not be deducted against the salary from the C
corporation. The court also noted that although the taxpayers may have undertaken their
activities with a different structure that would have permitted use of the losses, they are bound
by the form of the business they adopted.
4. Limited Liability Partnership and Limited Liability Company membership
interests are not presumptively limited partnership interests under the passive activity loss rules.
Garnett v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 19 (6/30/09). The taxpayers held a number of direct and
indirect interests in limited liability partnerships and LLCs that were engaged in agribusiness.
Section 469(h)(2) provides that a limited partnership interest shall not be treated as an interest
with respect to Which a taxpayer is a material participant. Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3) defines a
limited partnership interest as an interest designated as a limited partner interest in a partnership
agreement or an interest for which the partner has limited liability. Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)
(ii) has an exception from the material participation rule for an interest of a limited partner who
also holds a general partner interest. The court (Judge Thornton) concluded that in the case of an
interest in a limited liability partnership or a limited liability company, both of which the court
describes as different from a limited partnership, the interests are not to be treated as limited
partnership interests under § 469(h)(2). Holders of such interests are not barred by state law from
materially participating in the affairs of the entity and thus hold their interests as general partners
within the meaning of the temporary regulations. Thus, whether or not the taxpayer is a material
participant requires a full factual inquiry.
a. The Court of Federal Claims agrees. Thompson v. United States,
87 Fed. Cl. 728, 104 A.F.T.R. 2d 2009-5381 (7/20/09). The court granted summary judgment
treating the taxpayer member/manager of an LLC as a material participant. The taxpayer's
degree of participation was stipulated and the only question was whether § 469(h)(2) precluded
treating the taxpayer as a material participant in a Texas LLC. The court noted that § 469(h)(2)
treats limited partners differently because of an assumption that limited partners do not
materially participate in their limited partnerships. In an LLC, on the other hand, all members
have limited liability but members may participate in management. The court noted that Temp.
Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3) treats a partnership interest as a limited partner interest if the holder has
limited liability "under the law of the State in which the partnership is organized." The court
held that the quoted language applies only to an entity that is a partnership under state law,
which does not include an LLC that is a different state law entity that is treated as a partnership
for tax purposes. The taxpayer was both a member and manager of the LLC. Unlike a limited
partner, a member manager does not lose limited liability by participation in the management of
the LLC. The court also recognized that shareholders of an S corporation have limited liability as
shareholders, but participate in management, and are not subject to being automatically treated
as passive participants. The taxpayer, therefore, was "able to demonstrate his material
participation in the activity by using all seven of the Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a) tests."
5. Deciding on whether to uphold the Commissioner's rejection of this
horse lover's losses is like pulling teeth. Cunningham Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-194
(8/31/09). The taxpayer, a New York dentist, claimed losses from five partnership horse
activities in California on returns prepared by a tax return preparer. The court (Judge Cohen)
found that the taxpayer's had no knowledge of whether or not the horse activities occurred as
represented in the partnership returns. He relied on representations by the return preparer in
deducting the partnership losses against their other income. The taxpayer's suggestion that the
court Google the return preparer to ascertain that the taxpayer was mislead by a charlatan and
that paying the tax would result in financial hardship did not impress Judge Cohen, and the
deficiency was upheld. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that he had reasonable
cause for failing to file a timely return and imposed penalties under § 6651 (a)(1).
III. INVESTMENT GAIN AND INCOME
A. Gains and Losses
1. New rules for determining basis in securities. The Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], Act § 403, amends § 1012 to create new
rules for determining the basis of securities acquired after December 31, 2010. The FIFO or
other conventions for determining the basis of securities when sold must be applied on an
account-by-account basis. Thus, with respect to a taxpayer who holds the same stock in more
than one account, determining the basis of sold securities from any account will be determined
from the basis of securities in that account. In addition, § 1012(d) provides for averaging the
basis of stock acquired in a dividend reinvestment plan. Stock in a dividend reinvestment plan is
treated as held in a separate account for purposes of determining basis.
a. No more fooling the IRS about basis. The Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], § 403, adding § 6 0 4 5(g), requires brokers to
report the customer's basis in a "covered security" and whether gain or loss is long-term or
short-term, in addition to the existing requirement that the broker report gross sales proceeds. In
general, the customer's basis is to be reported on a first-in first-out method, unless an average
basis method is permissible (stock acquired in a reorganization where basis can't be identified).
Covered securities include securities acquired through an account with the broker or transferred
to the broker from another account on or after an applicable date. The applicable date for stocks
is January 1, 2011, for stocks under the average basis method, January 1, 2012, and of any other
security, January 1, 2013 or such later date as specified by the Secretary. Under § 6045A, a
taxpayer transferring securities to a broker will be required to report information required by
regulations necessary to permit the broker to meet its reporting requirements. Section 6045B
requires the issuer of any security to report information describing any organizational action that
affects the basis of the security.
2. Taxpayer took the position that he was exchanging appreciated stock for a
private annuity contract, while the IRS asserted that he was instead simply exercising his puts.
The IRS lost, but would have prevailed had proposed regulations applied. Katz v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2008-269 (12/3/08). Taxpayer received publicly held UICI stock when his student-
loan business was acquired. Thereafter, he engaged in an equity swap transaction with Merrill
Lynch to hedge some of that stock by purchasing 200,000 common stock put options at $23.09
per share and selling 200,000 common stock call options at $26.93 per share. These options were
European-style options which could be exercised only on 2/3/00. This had the effect of collaring
the taxpayer's UICI stock value between those two share prices. Pursuant to an arrangement
facilitated by Merrill Lynch on the morning of 2/3/00, taxpayer exchanged the equity swap [i.e.,
200,000 shares of UICI stock and the put options] for a single lump-sum private variable annuity
from a successful Canadian businessman's wholly-owned Bahamian corporation (SJA). Five
days later, Merrill Lynch settled the sale of the UICI stock and (after some typical Merrill
Lynchish fumbling around) deposited most of the $4.6 million proceeds in SJA's account. The
Tax Court (Judge Foley) held that pursuant to Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, when a taxpayer
exchanges appreciated property for a private annuity, the "gain should be reported ratably over
the period of years measured by the annuitant's life expectancy and only from that portion of the
annual proceeds which is includible in gross income by application of section 72."
,, The Commissioner argued that the equity swap was exercised
before the purchase of the private annuity, which would result in taxpayer being taxed immediately
on the gain. Judge Foley held that stipulations entered into in this case negated the Commissioner's
position that the substance of the transaction [i.e., realization of the gain before the purchase of the
annuity] trumped the form of the transaction [i.e., transfer of the equity swap to SJA in exchange for
the annuity].
a. Note that the result set forth in Rev. Rul. 69-74 would be
reversed when proposed regulations [which will treat taxpayers who exchange property for
an annuity as if they had sold the property] become final. REG-141901-05, Exchanges of
Property for an Annuity, 71 F.R. 61441 (10/18/06). The Treasury has published proposed
regulations that provide a single set of rules for the taxation of an exchange of property for an
annuity contract. Essentially, the proposed rules will treat the transaction as if the property was
sold for cash equal to the value of the annuity contract [as determined under § 7520] and the
proceeds were used to buy an annuity contract; however, taxpayers may continue to structure
transactions as § 453(b) installment sales. These proposed regulations do not change existing
Reg. § 1.1011-2 for charitable gift annuities, but will change prior law on exchanges of
appreciated property for private annuities to the extent it permitted open transaction treatment or
ratable recognition as the annuities were paid. The effective date is 10/18/06, with a delayed
effective date of 4/18/07 for non-abusive transactions. These proposed regulations would bring
the current treatment of exchanges of appreciated property for private annuities into line with the
tax treatment of exchanges for commercial annuities. Before these regulations are applicable, the
law generally postponed tax on the exchange based on the assumption that the value of a private
annuity contract could not be determined for federal income tax purposes.
3. Stimulating stock investments in small business corporations. The
2009 ARRTA, § 1241(a), amended Code § 1202 to provide special rules for qualified small
business stock acquired in 2009 and 2010, regardless of when the stock is sold. For such stock,
seventy-five percent of the gain (rather than fifty percent) is excluded under § 1202(a), and the
special rules of § 1202(a)(2) for stock in a qualified empowerment zone business do not apply.
4. Gain is recognized on an exchange even if the taxpayer didn't yet
have what she got and she might not have gotten to keep it. United States v. Culp, 99
A.F.T.R.2d 2007-618, 2007-1 .U.S.T.C. 50,399 (M.D. Tenn. 12/29/06). The government was
granted summary judgment in an erroneous refund suit. The taxpayer exchanged her partnership
interest in Ernst & Young for stock of a corporation acquiring E&Y's consulting business, in a
transaction that was not a statutory nonrecognition event; however, the stock was held in escrow
to enforce a forfeiture provision if the seller-taxpayer failed to perform certain services as an
employee of the acquiring corporation. The court held that the open transaction doctrine was not
applicable. If a taxpayer exchanges one property for a different property, the gain realized on the
exchange must be recognized in the year the exchange occurs, even though the property received
in the exchange is forfeitable if contractual provisions or representations in the contract for
exchange are not subsequently satisfied and even though the property received in the exchange is
held in escrow to assure enforcement of the forfeitability provisions.
a. The Seventh Circuit affirmed taxable exchange treatment for
an E&Y consulting partner in a Capgemini exchange. United States v. Fletcher, 562 F.3d 839
(7th Cir. 4/10/09), aff'g 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-588, 2008-1 U.S.T.C. 50,149 (N.D. Ohio
1/15/08). In this 2000 exchange of taxpayer's partnership interest in E&Y for restricted stock of
Capgemini, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Easterbrook) affirmed the summary judgment award to
the government in this erroneous refund suit, and in the process "Fletcherized ''2 the E&Y
consulting partner involved because she initially took the position of the parties to the
transaction that all of the Capgemini shares received vested in the year 2000 [the year of the
exchange], but after the stock declined in value took the position that she received income in
2000 only to the extent of cash she received in that year and the remainder of her income was
recognized in 2003 [when the stock was worth less than one-fifth of its 2000 value].
0 Judge Easterbrook did not appreciate the argument that she
signed the "consulting partner transaction agreement" [which provided for taxable gain in 2000]
only because she was afraid she would be fired if she did not do so. Both the district court and the
Seventh Circuit held that under either Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967), or
the alternative "strong proof' test, taxpayer was bound by the agreement she signed. he stated that
Fletcher argues that she didn't "really" agree to the structure that Ernst &
Young and Cap Gemini (and most of her partners) wanted in 2000. If she had
voted no and refused to sign, she maintains, she would have been excluded from
the economic benefits and might have been fired. If this is so, then she had a
difficult choice to make; it does not relieve her of the choice's consequences.
Hard choices may be gut-wrenching, but they are choices nonetheless. Even naive
people baffled by the fine print in contracts are held to their terms; a sophisticated
business consultant who agrees to a multi-million-dollar transaction is not entitled
to demand the deal's benefits while avoiding its detriments. The argument that
Fletcher can avoid the terms as a matter of contract law is frivolous. All that
matters now are the tax consequences of the contracts she signed.
0 Judge Easterbrook concluded:
The more likely it is that the conditions will be satisfied, and all
restrictions lifted, the more sensible it is to treat all of the stock as constructively
received when deposited in the account. To see this, suppose that the parties had
wanted to defer the recognition of income and had put $ 2.5 million in each
partner's account, with the condition that the whole amount would be forfeited if
the temperature in Barrow, Alaska, exceeded 80 [degrees] F on January 1, 2005.
Would the remote possibility of an Arctic heat wave enable the partners to defer
paying taxes? Surely not. See Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d
749 (7th Cir. 2008). If, on the other hand, the parties agreed that the ex-partners
would receive $ 2.5 million only if the temperature in Barrow on January 1, 2005,
exceeded 80 [degrees] F, then none of the partners would constructively receive
income in 2000; everything would depend on events in 2005.
The sort of contingencies that could lead to forfeitures were within the ex-
partners' control. That implies taxability in 2000, for control is a form of
constructive possession. And the agreement to discount the stock by only 5% tells
us that the parties deemed forfeitures unlikely. Fletcher's acknowledgment that
the risk of forfeiture was small shows that the conditions of constructive receipt in
2000 have been satisfied.
Thus although we agree with Fletcher that the ex-partners are entitled to
contest the tax treatment called for by the 2000 contracts, we hold that the shares
are taxable in 2000 at their value on the date of deposit to the accounts at Merrill
2 Horace Fletcher (1849-1919), a health food faddist, argued that food should be chewed thirty-two times
before being swallowed. "Nature will castigate those who don't masticate."
Lynch. Income was constructively received in that year not because the contract
said that everyone would report it so to the IRS, but because the parties were right
to think that this transaction's actual provisions made the income attributable to
2000. That the price of Capgemini stock dropped in 2001 and later does not
entitle the parties to defer the recognition of income. Fletcher must repay the
refund (and amend her returns for later years to reflect receipt of the income in
2000).
5. The IRS gives insureds a partial pass on the "substitute for ordinary
income" limitation on capital gains treatment when they sell their life insurance policies. Rev.
Rul. 2009-13, 2009-21 I.R.B. 1029 (5/1/09). This revenue ruling addresses the amount and
character of income recognized with respect to the disposition by the insured of a life insurance
policy in three different factual situations. First, upon the surrender by owner of a life insurance
contract to the issuer for its cash surrender value, amount of income is the amount received
minus the investment in contract, and the income is ordinary income. Second, if a life insurance
contract is sold to unrelated person who would not suffer loss if beneficiary died, the amount of
income realized is the amount received on sale minus the adjusted basis in contract (adjusted to
properly reflect "cost of insurance," which is excluded from the contract's basis in determining
the gain realized on the sale); the portion of the gain reflecting inside build-up immediately prior
to the sale is ordinary income, but any excess amount is capital gain, which is long term if the
contract has been held for more than one year. Third, if a term-life contract with no cash
surrender value is sold to an unrelated person who would not suffer a loss if beneficiary died, the
amount of income recognized is'the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis of
contract; because the cost of insurance each month is presumed to equal to monthly premium
paid, there is no inside build-up under contract, and thus the entire amount recognized is long-
term capital gain.
a. Let the life insurance gambling tax shelter wave begin. The
IRS gives a third-party purchaser of life insurance who buys the insured's contract a full
pass on the "substitute for ordinary income" limitation on capital gains treatment when he
sells the life insurance policy instead of waiting for ordinary gain on the payout. Rev. Rul.
2009-14, 2009-21 I.R.B. 1031 (5/1/09). This revenue ruling deals with the treatment in three
different situations of a cash method taxpayer who purchases a life insurance contract from the
insured. In all three situations, the contract was a level premium fifteen-year term life insurance
contract without cash surrender value. The purchaser had no insurable interest or relationship to
the insured. At the time of purchase, the remaining term of the contract was 7 years, 6 months,
and 15 days. The monthly premium for the contract was $500, due and payable on the first day
of each month. The purchaser named itself beneficiary under the contract immediately after
acquiring the contract.
* In the first situation, the purchaser paid the insured $20,000
for the contract, paid premiums totaling $9,000 to keep the contract in force, and received $100,000
under the life insurance contract upon the insured's death. The ruling concludes that although the life
insurance contract was not property described in § 1221 (a)(1)-(8), and thus was a capital asset in the
purchaser's hands, "neither the surrender of a life insurance or annuity contract nor the receipt of a
death benefit from the issuer under the terms of the contract produces a capital gain." Accordingly,
the $71,000 income recognized by the purchaser upon the receipt of the death benefit was ordinary
income.
* In the second situation, prior to the insured's death the
purchaser sold the life insurance contract to another person for $30,000, after paying the insured
$20,000 for the contract and premiums totaling $9,000. The ruling held that $9,000 of premiums
paid by the purchaser to keep the contract in force were capital expenditures that were added to the
original $20,000 basis in the contract. The purchaser recognized a $1,000 gain, which was a capital
gain because the life insurance contract was not property described in § 1221 (a)(1)-(8), and thus was
a capital asset.
* The third situation was the same as the first situation, except
the purchaser was a foreign corporation that was not engaged in any U.S. trade or business. The
purchaser again recognized $71,000 of income upon the receipt of death benefits. This income is
"fixed or determinable annual or periodical" income subject to U.S. under § 881(a)(1), see Reg.
§ 1.1441-2(b); Rev. Rul. 64-51, 1964-1 C.B. 322; Rev. Rul. 2004-75, 2004-1 C.B. 516.
6. Small-time, one-time real state developer gets capital gain treatment.
Rice v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-142 (6/16/09). The taxpayers purchase a 14.4 acre
parcel of land on which to build their "dream home." They originally planned to keep the entire
property and build a single home for them and their children. When Mrs. Rice became concerned
about being too "isolated," they subdivided a portion of the property and sold eight lots (only six
suitable for construction) to six different buyers, over nine years, reserving one lot for their
daughter and keeping the remaining land for their residence, on which they built a home with
8,000 square feet of interior space and 4,000 square feet of garages and porches. They had never
before (or subsequently) engaged in real estate development and sales activities, and both had
full-time jobs. Judge Kroupa held that the taxpayers realized capital gains, not ordinary income
on the sales of the three lots sold during the year at issue. The total number of lots sold in all
years was small, and the substantiality and frequency of sales is among the most important
factors in determining whether sales were to customers in the ordinary course of business. The
lots were sold primarily to friends, friends of friends, and relatives. Other than posting a sign
outside the subdivision, petitioners did not advertise or promote the sale of lots. Their efforts
were "more characteristic of those of investors than of dealers." Finally, although the taxpayers
made significant improvements to develop and sell the lots, many of those improvements would
have been necessary merely to build their own residence.
B. Interest, Dividends, and other Current Income
1. Billions and billions of new private activity tax-free bonds. Code
§ 1400U-2, added by § 1401(a) of the 2009 ARRTA, creates a new category of tax-exempt
private activity bonds, which are termed "recovery zone facility bonds." Generally speaking
recovery zone facility bonds are subject to the rules that apply to qualified private activity bonds,
except that they are not subject to the aggregate annual State private activity bond volume limits
in Code § 146 and the Code § 147(d) restriction on acquisition of existing property does not
apply. Under § 1400U-1, $15 billion in recovery zone facility bonds can be issued during 2009
and 2010. Each state will receive a share of the national allocation based on that state's job
losses in 2008 as a percentage of national job losses in 2008, although each state will receive a
minimum allocation of each of these bonds that is not less than 0.9 percent of the total bonds to
be issued. These allocations will be, in turn, sub-allocated to local municipalities in proportion tojob losses within the state. Municipalities receiving an allocation of these bonds can use the
proceeds of the bonds to invest in infrastructure, job training, education, and economic
development in areas within the boundaries of the State, city or county. To be designated as an
economic recovery zone an area must have significant poverty, unemployment, general distress,
or home foreclosures, or be an area for which a designation as an empowerment zone or renewal
community is in effect. To qualify as a recovery zone facility bond, 95 percent or more of the net
proceeds of the bond issue must be used for "recovery zone property" and the issue must be
designated by the issuer as a recovery zone facility bond. "Recovery zone property" is any
depreciable property to which § 168 applies (or would apply but for § 179): (1) that was
purchased by the taxpayer after the designation of the recovery zone took effect; (2) the original
use of which in the recovery zone commences with the taxpayer; and (3) substantially all of the
use of which is used in the active conduct of a qualified business by the taxpayer in the recovery
zone. A "qualified business" is any trade or business except residential rental property or the
operation of a private or commercial golf course, country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility,
suntan facility, racetrack or other facility used for gambling, or liquor store. Apparently bars and
nightclubs qualify.
a. Code § 7871, added by § 1402(a) of the 2009 ARRTA, allows
Indian tribal governments to issue "tribal economic development bonds," the interest on which is
tax exempt under Code § 103. Tribal economic development bonds issued by an Indian tribal
government are treated as if such bonds were issued by a State, except that Code § 146 (relating
to State volume limitations) does not apply. A tribal economic development bond is any bond
issued by an Indian tribal government (1) the interest on which would be tax-exempt if issued by
a State or local government, and (2) that is designated by the Indian tribal government as a tribal
economic development bond. The aggregate face amount of bonds that may be designated by
any Indian tribal government cannot exceed the amount of national tribal economic development
bond limitation allocated to such government. There is a national ceiling of $2 billion, which
will be allocated by the Treasury Department, in consultation with the Department of the
Interior. Tribal economic development bonds cannot be used to finance any portion of a casino
or any facility located outside of the Indian reservation.
2. Code § 54AA, added by § 1531 of the 2009 ARRTA, provides a credit for
holders of "build America" bonds on any interest payment date. The amount of the credit is 35
percent of the interest payable, and the credit can be claimed against the alternative minimum
tax; unused credits can be carried over. A build America bond is any state or local obligation
(other than a private activity bond), the interest received on which would otherwise be tax-
exempt under § 103, which is issued before 2011 and which the issuer elects to be treated as a
build America bond. Interest on build America bonds must be included in gross income, and the
amount of the credit must be included as well. §§ 54AA(f)(2), 54A(f). The issuer of a "qualified
build America bond" can elect to claim a refundable credit equal to 35 percent of the interest
payable in lieu of the holder being entitled to the credit. To be a qualified build America bond,
one hundred percent of the available project proceeds, less a reasonably required reserve (as
defined in § 150(a)(3)), must be used for capital expenditures. For build America bonds that are
"designated recovery zone economic development bonds," the credit rate for the issuer is 45
percent. Code §§ 1400U-2(a)(1) ; 6431(g). New Code § 1400U-2 creates tax credit bonds for
investments in economic recovery zones. New Code § 1400U-1 authorizes $10 billion in
recovery zone economic development bonds that can be issued during 2009 and 2010. To be
designated as an economic recovery zone the area must have significant poverty, unemployment,
general distress, or home foreclosures, or be any area for which a designation as an
empowerment zone or renewal community is in effect. Each state will receive a share of the
national allocation based on that state's job losses in 2008 as a percentage of national job losses
in 2008, although each state will receive a minimum allocation of each of these bonds that is not
less than 0.9 percent of the total bonds to be issued. These allocations will be, in turn, sub-
allocated to local municipalities in proportion to job losses within the state. Municipalities that
receive an allocation of these bonds can use the proceeds of the bonds to invest in infrastructure,
job training, education, and economic development in areas within the boundaries of the State,
city or county (as the case may be) that has significant poverty, unemployment or home
foreclosures.
3. Credits for lenders who buy bonds to build schools. Code § 54F, added
by § 1521(a) of the 2009 ARRTA, creates another new category of new category of tax-credit
bonds for purposes of the § 54A credit: qualified school construction bonds. A taxpayer holding
a qualified school construction bond on a credit allowance date is entitled to a tax credit at a rate
[determined by the Treasury Department] that is the percentage rate that would permit issuance
of such bonds without either discount or interest cost to the issuer. The amount of the tax credit
is determined by multiplying the bond's credit rate by the face amount of the bond. The credit
accrues quarterly, is includible in gross income as if it were an interest payment on the bond, and
can be claimed against regular income tax liability and alternative minimum tax liability. Unused
credits may be carried forward to succeeding taxable years. Credits may be separated from the
ownership of the underlying bond in a manner similar to the manner in which interest coupons
can be stripped from interest-bearing bonds. To qualify, a school construction bond must meet
three requirements: (1) 100 percent of the available project proceeds of the bond issue is used for
the construction, rehabilitation, or repair of a public school facility or for the acquisition of land
on which such a bond-financed facility is to be constructed; (2) the bond is issued by a State or
local government within which such school is located; and (3) the issuer designates such bond as
a qualified school construction bond. The maturity of qualified school construction bonds is the
term that the Treasury Department determines will result in the present value of the obligation to
repay the principal on such bonds being equal to 50 percent of the face amount of such bonds,
using as a discount rate the average annual interest rate of tax-exempt obligations having a term
of 10 years or more that are issued during the month the qualified school construction bonds are
issued. There is a national limitation on qualified school construction bonds of $11 billion for
each of 2009 and 2010. The statute provides elaborate rules for allocating the allowable dollar
volume of bonds among the states, the District of Columbia, United States possessions, Indian
tribal government schools, and large local educational agencies. Qualified school construction
bonds generally are subject to the arbitrage limitations of § 148, with a number of modifications.
However, available project proceeds invested during the three-year spending period are not
subject to the arbitrage restrictions (i.e., yield restriction and rebate requirements). In addition,
amounts invested in a reserve fund are not subject to the arbitrage restrictions to the extent: (1)
such fund is funded at a rate not more rapid than equal annual installments; (2) such fund is
funded in a manner reasonably expected to result in an amount not greater than an amount
necessary to repay the issue; and (3) the yield on such fund is not greater than the average annual
interest rate of tax-exempt obligations having a term of 10 years or more that are issued during
the month the qualified school construction bonds are issued.
C. Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
1. Hammering employees whose deferred compensation comes from
offshore, i.e., hedge fund managers. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 added
new Code § 457A, which provides that any nonqualified deferred compensation (as defined in
§ 409A) under a plan of a nonqualified entity must be included in gross income in the first year
in which there is no substantial risk of forfeiture. Nonqualifed entities include (1) a foreign
corporation unless substantially all of its income is either: (a) effectively connected with the
conduct of a U.S. trade or business; or (b) subject to a comprehensive foreign income tax; and
(2) any partnership unless substantially all of its income is allocated to persons other than: (a)
foreign persons with respect to whom such income is not subject to a comprehensive foreign
income tax; or (b) tax exempt organizations. If the amount of the deferred compensation is not
determinable when the right to it vests, the deferred compensation will be included when it
becomes determinable, but an interest charge at the deficiency rate plus one percent will be
added with respect to the period between the year when the compensation was deferred, or
vested if later, and the year it becomes includible. To the extent provided in regulations if
compensation is determined solely by reference to the amount of gain recognized on the
disposition of an investment asset, the compensation will be treated as subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture until the disposition.
2. Judge Posner says that the distinction between a temporary and indefinite
work location is untenable: "work can be, and usually is, both temporary and indefinite." Wilbert
v. Commissioner, 553 F.3d 544, 103 A.F.T.R. 2d 2009-485 (7th Cir. 1/21/09), aff'g T.C. Memo.
2007-152 (6/14/07). Taxpayer was a mechanic for Northwest Airlines, who was laid off at his
work location in Minneapolis. He exercised seniority rights to bump a mechanic in Chicago, but
he worked there for only a few days before being bumped by a more senior mechanic.
Subsequently, he bumped a mechanic in Anchorage, and worked there for three weeks before
being himself bumped. He then bumped a mechanic at LaGuardia Airport, but worked there for
only a week before he was bumped again. Three weeks later the airline hired him back, outside
the bumping system, to fill an interim position (maximum nine months) in Anchorage. He
occupied that position for several months before being laid off again. He never had a realistic
prospect of returning to work for Northwest in Minneapolis. He kept his home in Minneapolis,
where his wife continued to live. Because he was working too far from home to be able to live
there, he incurred living expenses of almost $20,000 that he would not have incurred had he
remained in Minneapolis. The Tax Court denied the deduction. Because of the indefinite nature
of the employment at the alternative locations, the taxpayer was not temporarily away from
home. Although the Court of Appeals affirmed, the appellate court's reasoning (Judge Posner)
differed from that of the Tax Court. According to Judge Posner, "[t]he problem with the Tax
Court's distinction is that work can be, and usually is, both temporary and indefinite ... ." Rather,
Judge Posner looked to the principles of Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946), and
Hantzis v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 248 (1st Cir. 1981), that deny the deduction for travel
expenses unless the taxpayer has a business rather than a personal reason to be living in two
places if he decides not to move. He compared Wilbert's situation to the common case of the
construction worker who works at different sites throughout the country, never certain how long
each stint will last and reluctant therefore to relocate his home, who is nevertheless denied a
deduction. See Yeats v. Commissioner, 873 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1989).
a. Alami v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-42 (2/23/09). This case




1. Don Quixote [a/k/a David Aughtry] tilted at the windmill and
deflected only the penalty, not the deficiency. Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Commissioner, 132
T.C. No. 6 (3/31/09). This opinion by Judge Halpern applied § 1031(f) to deny tax-free like-kind
exchange treatment in the following situation: (1) The taxpayer transferred appreciated real
property (Wesleyan Station) to a qualified intermediary; (2) an unrelated third party purchased
the Wesleyan Station property from the qualified intermediary for cash; (3) a partnership related
to the taxpayer sold like-kind property (Barnes & Noble Comer) to the qualified intermediary for
cash; and (4) the qualified intermediary transferred the like-kind Barnes & Noble Comer
property to the taxpayer. But for the application of § 1031 (f)(4), the exchange with the qualified
intermediary would have qualified for § 1031 nonrecognition. The taxpayer, who wanted the
replacement property to be in the same general geographic area, i.e., middle Georgia, as the
surrendered property, argued that the reason for the acquisition of replacement property from a
related person was that it was unable to locate a suitable replacement property within the time
limits imposed on deferred like-kind exchanges by § 1031(a)(3) and Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(b). A
careful reading of the facts, however, reveals that the taxpayer entered into the agreement to
acquire the replacement property only five days after the relinquished property was sold and
actually closed the purchase before the 45-day identification period had even lapsed. As argued
by the Commissioner, Judge Halpern held that § 1031(f)(4) required recognition because the
taxpayer had "structured" the transaction "to avoid the purposes" of the rule of § 1031(f)
denying non recognition for an exchange to a related person if the transferee sells the property
within two years. Based on the legislative history, he concluded that the "basis shifting" that
resulted from the transaction "suppl[ied] the principal purpose of tax avoidance." The basis shift
effected an approximately $1.8 million reduction in taxable gain, because if the related party had
acquired Wesleyan Station from the taxpayer in a like-kind exchange for Barnes & Noble
Comer, the related party's substituted basis in Wesleyan Station, which in the taxpayer's hands
was only around $716,164, would have been $2,554,901 (equal to the related person's basis in
Barnes & Noble Comer). In addition, if § 1031 applied, the gain on the sale of Wesleyan Station
would have been taxed at only 15 percent, the applicable rate for capital gains taxed to the
partners of the related partnership, instead of the 34 percent rate that would have applied had the
taxpayer sold the property. Judge Halpern further found the case to be substantially similar to
Teruya Bros., Ltd. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 45 (2005), in which the taxpayer
transferred properties to a qualified intermediary, who sold them to unrelated third parties and
used the proceeds to purchase like-kind replacement property from a related party. In Teruya
Bros., Judge Thornton held that the transactions were economically equivalent to direct
exchanges between the taxpayer and related party, followed by the related party's sale of the
properties to unrelated third parties, and that they were structured to avoid the purposes of
§ 103 1(f). The taxpayer argued that unlike the taxpayer in Teruya Bros., it did not have a
prearranged plan to use property from a related person to complete a like-kind exchange, but
Judge Halpern found that the presence of the prearranged plan in Teruya Bros. was not a critical
element of the holding in that case. Nevertheless, the taxpayer avoided the § 6662 negligence
penalty because (1) the return reporting the transaction as a § 1031 like-kind exchange was
prepared by an accountant with extensive experience in representing real estate developers,
(2) the accountant was aware of all relevant facts, and (3) when the taxpayer filed its return, the
Tax Court had not yet decided Teruya Bros., and while Rev. Rul. 2002-83, 2002-2 C.B. 927
(presaging the result in Teruya Bros.) had been issued, Judge Halpern did "not think that the
ruling left the result free from doubt."
a. "[Ijt appears that these transactions took their peculiar
structure for no purpose except to avoid § 1031(f)." Teruya Bros., Ltd. v. Commissioner, _
F.3d ___, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6274 (9th Cir. 9/8/09), affg 124 T.C. 45 (2005). The taxpayer
transferred properties to a qualified intermediary, who sold them to unrelated third parties and
used the proceeds to purchase like-kind replacement property from a related party. In the Tax
Court, Judge Thornton held that the transactions were economically equivalent to direct
exchanges between the taxpayer and related party, followed by the related party's sale of the
properties to unrelated third parties, and that they were structured to avoid the purposes of
§ 1031(f). He further held that taxpayer failed to prove that avoidance was not one of the
principal purposes of the transactions under the § 1031 (f)(4) exception. The taxpayer argued that
even though more gain was recognized by the related party on some of the properties, the only
tax consequences of the gain recognition were reduction of the related party's net operating loss
- as opposed to current taxation for taxpayer. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Curt's
decision, stating, "it appears that these transactions took their peculiar structure for no purpose





1. Tax protection for lenders to over-exuberant short-sellers. Rev. Proc.
2008-63, 2008-42 I.R.B. 946 (9/26/08). Section 1058 provides nonrecognition to a person whose
stock or securities is lent to another person to effect a short sale of that stock or securities.
Technically, the transaction is a transfer of stock or securities in exchange for a contractual right
to receive back identical stock or securities, together with any dividends, interest, or other
payments receivable with respect to the stock or securities during the period between the initial
transfer and the transfer back or replacement securities, which otherwise is a realization and
recognition event. This revenue procedure provides that if a securities loan under § 1058 is
terminated because of the bankruptcy of the borrower or an affiliate and the lender applies the
collateral to the purchase of identical securities as soon as is commercially practicable (but in no
event more than 30 days following the default), the IRS will treat the purchase as an exchange to
which § 1058(a) applies.
IV. COMPENSATION ISSUES
A. Fringe Benefits
1. Six more months to try to get away with buying beer and cigs at the
pharmacy with health FSA and HRA debit cards. Notice 2008-104, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1298
(12/5/08). Notice 2007-2, 2007-1 C.B. 254, provided that after 12/31/08, health FSA and HRA
debit cards could not be used at stores with the Drug Stores and Pharmacies merchant category
code unless: (1) the store participates in the inventory information approval system in Notice
2006-69, 2006-2 C.B. 107; or (2) 90 percent of the individual store's gross receipts during the
prior taxable year were from items that qualify as expenses for medical care under § 213(d)
(including nonprescription medications as described in Rev. Rul. 2003-102, 2003-2 C.B. 559).
This notice extends the deadline in Notice 2007-2 by six months. After 6/30/09, health FSA and
HRA debit cards may not be used at stores with the Drug Stores and Pharmacies merchant
category code unless the requirements are satisfied.
2. "A woman needs a fish like a man needs a bicycle." Qualified
transportation includes bicycles. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division
B], Act § 211, adds to the qualified transportation fringe benefit excluded from income under
§ 132(f), a qualified bicycle commuting benefit. The provision excludes from income an
employer reimbursement during the 15 month period beginning on the first day of the taxable
year of up to $20 per month of bicycle commuting for the purchase, improvements, repair and
storage of a bicycle. A qualified bicycle commuting month is any month during which an
employee regularly uses the bicycle for a substantial portion of travel between the employee's
residence and work place and does not receive the benefit of any other qualified transportation
fringe benefit. The bicycle benefit is not subject to the cash alternative escape from constructive
receipt of § 132(f)(4).
3. Economists say that everything happens on the fringes. Using fringe
benefits to stimulate public transportation. The 2009 ARRTA, § 1151(a), amended Code
§ 132(f) to provide that the $175 ceiling (as adjusted for inflation) on tax free parking benefits
also applies to transit passes and qualified commuter highway vehicle use for months beginning
after February 2009 and before 1/1/11. The 2009 amount for the $175 ceiling on tax free parking
benefits, as adjusted for inflation, is $230 per month.
4. Involuntarily terminated employees will receive assistance with their
COBRA premiums for a while. The 2009 ARRA § 3001 (in Title III - Premium Assistance for
COBRA Benefits) provides premium assistance for COBRA benefits to the extent of 65 percent
of the otherwise applicable COBRA premium. Eligibility for this benefit is more restrictive than
eligibility for COBRA, with elimination of the premium subsidy for high-income individuals as
well as for those eligible for another form of medical coverage, e.g., retiree medical. The DOL
has provided a model notice to individuals pursuant to ARRA § 3001.
a The premium subsidy is only provided with respect to
involuntary terminations that occur on or after 9/1/08 and before 1/1/10.
B. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
C. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and Stock Options
1. Section 409A added a new layer of rules for nonqualified deferred
compensation. Section 885 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 added new § 409A,
which modifies the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation plans for amounts deferred
after 2004. Section 409A has changed the tax law governing nonqualified deferred compensation
by making it more difficult to avoid current inclusion in gross income of unfunded deferred
compensation. Nevertheless, § 409A has not completely supplanted prior law. The fundamental
principles of prior law continue in force but have been modified in certain respects.
a. Notice 2008-113, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1305 (12/5/08) This Notice
provides procedures to obtain relief from the full application of the income inclusion and
additional taxes requirements of § 409A with respect to certain operational failures to comply
with the requirements of § 409A. Comments were also requested on whether procedures for the
correction of a failure of a plan to comply with the plan document requirements of § 1.409A- 1(c)
should be adopted.
2. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division C], Act
§ 504(c), provides that up to $100,000 of amounts received by a taxpayer engaged in the fishing
business from the settlement of Exxon Valdez litigation can be contributed to retirement
accounts in the year of receipt.
3. My employer cheated on me (and a lot of others) but it's still income.
Gourley v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6119 (Fed. Cl. 8/26/09). The taxpayer, a
WorldCom employee, exercised nonqualified stock options for 90,300 shares of WorldCom
stock valued at $42,125 per share on January 28, 2000. The value of the stock was reflected in a
W-2 issued to the taxpayer by WorldCom. The taxpayer disposed of the stock during 2000 and
2001. On June 25, 2002, WorldCom announced a major restatement of its financials admitting
that because of fraudulent accounting practices it incurred undisclosed losses from 2000 to 2001.
The taxpayer thus claimed in a refund action that the stock he received in January 2000 was
worth only $12.52 per share and that the W-2 issued by WorldCom was grossly inflated. The
court rejected the refund action pointing out that the known fair market value of the WorldCom
stock on the date of the taxpayer's exercise formed the basis of the taxpayer's gross income. The
court pointed out that the market price based on imperfect information is nonetheless the
prevailing market price.
D. Individual Retirement Accounts
1. Congress encourages retirees to drain their ravaged IRAs to benefit
charities. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended through 2009 Code§ 408(d)(8), which permits tax-free distributions up to $100,000 directly to charities that arepublicly supported under § 509(a)(1) and (2) (but not § 509(a)(3)) from IRAs owned by
individuals over 702 years of age. These direct distributions to charities would be applied
towards satisfying the § 401 (a)(9) required minimum distribution amounts.
2. Us weary 70 + geriatrics do not have to take RMDs for the 2009 year.
WRERA, § 201, amends Code § 401(a)(9) to suspend required minimum distributions("RMDs") from 401 (k) plans, IRAs and similar retirement accounts for 2009. RMDs for the year2008 were not affected, including RMDs for 2008 that are permitted to be made in 2009 by
reason of an individual's required beginning date being 4/1/09.
3. A distribution not itself subject to the § 72(t) penalty tax does not trigger a
modification of an existing series of substantially equal periodic payments. Benz v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 15 (5/11/09). Section 72(t)(2)(A)(iv) provides an exception from
the 10-percent penalty tax on premature IRA distributions for distributions that are part of a
series of substantially equal periodic payments made for the life of the owner of an IRA (or thejoint lives of the owner and a designated beneficiary). However, if the series of substantially
equal periodic payments is modified within 5 years of the date of the first distribution (other than
by reason of death or disability), or before the employee has attained age 59-1/2, the 10-percent
penalty tax is imposed retroactively on prior distributions made before the taxpayer attains age
59-1/2, plus interest. Within five years of making an election to receive distributions from herIRA in a series of substantially equal periodic payments before attaining age 59-1/2, the taxpayer
withdrew additional amounts to pay qualified higher education expenses as defined in § 72(t)(7)
relating to her son's college expenses. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that a distribution that
satisfies the statutory exception to the penalty tax on premature withdrawals under § 72(t)(2)(E)
for payment of higher education expenses is not a modification of a series of substantially equal
periodic payments. Such a withdrawal does not trigger the § 72(t) penalty tax where the taxpayer
receives the distribution within 5 years after the taxpayer begins receiving distributions under a
series of substantially equal periodic payments.
V. PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Rates
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. Congress provides tax relief for sub-prime mortgage borrowers, e.g.,
"NINJA borrowers." The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 added new§ 108(a)(1)(E), which excludes from gross income the discharge of "qualified principal
residence indebtedness" (QPRI) that takes place on or after 1/1/07 and before 1/1/10. The
provision is, of course, a legislative response to the sub-prime mortgage loan crisis. QPRI is
defined as acquisition indebtedness, a loan on a taxpayer's principal residence, as defined in§ 163(h)(3)(B), except that for purposes of § 108(a)(1)(E) the ceilings are $2,000,000 (for
married couples filing joint returns) and $1,000,000 (for other taxpayers). QPRI does not include(1) indebtedness on a home that is not the taxpayer's principal residence, or (2) home equity
indebtedness. The exclusion is not available if the discharge is not on account of either (1) a
decline in the value of the home or (2) the financial condition of the taxpayer. The taxpayer's
basis in the principal residence must be reduced by the amount excluded under § 108(a)(1)(E). If
only a portion of the cancelled debt is QPRI, the exclusion applies only to the extent the amount
discharged exceeds the non-QPRI portion of the loan. If a taxpayer qualifies for both the QPRI
exclusion and the insolvency exclusion of § 108(a)(1)(B), the QPRI exclusion applies unless the
taxpayer elects the application of the insolvency exclusion.
a. Anticipating the tax consequences of the next wave of ARMs
and teaser-rate home mortgages that reset interest rates. Longer-term relief for sub-prime
borrowers, and the way things are going South, also for folks who were not sub-prime
borrowers when they took out the mortgage. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 extended § 108(a)(1)(E), excluding from gross income discharge of COD that is qualified
principal residence indebtedness (QPRI) through 12/31/12. The provision, which was added in
the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Act of 2007, had been scheduled to expire after 12/31/09.
2. Police arrest procedures did not result in "physical injury." Stadnyk v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-289 (12/22/08). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that
damages received on account of false imprisonment were not excludable under § 104(a)(2), even
though the taxpayer was detained, handcuffed and searched, because she suffered no physical
harm. The damages received in the settlement compensated the taxpayer for "the ordeal ...
suffered as a result of her arrest, detention, and indictment" as the result of her bank erroneously
stamping a check "NSF" when it had been stopped for "dissatisfied purchase." The damages
were "stated in terms of recovery for nonphysical personal injuries: Emotional distress,
mortification, humiliation, mental anguish, and damage to reputation." Judge Goeke also rejected
summarily the taxpayer's claim that damages received for personal injuries are not gross income
within the meaning of § 61(a) and that "section 104(a)(2) conflicts with section 61(a) and
violates the Sixteenth Amendment to the extent that it taxes compensatory damages received for
personal injuries."
* The court did not impose taxpayer penalties because
taxpayers had received "disinterested advice" that the damages were not includable in income. The
advice came from taxpayer's lawyer, the bank's lawyer and the mediator who negotiated the
settlement. In holding a § 6662 penalty inappropriate, Judge Goeke stated,
Petitioners received unsolicited advice from three separate and independent
individuals that the settlement would not be taxed. At least two of those
individuals were disinterested parties with no relationship with petitioners. This
advice confirmed petitioners' previous understanding of the taxation of settlement
awards. Although none of those individuals had specialized knowledge in tax law,
they were experienced in personal injury lawsuits and settlements. Petitioners
acted reasonably and in good faith when following their advice and preparing
their own return as they have done for over 40 years.
3. Helping the unemployed. The 2009 ARRTA, 1107(a), amended Code
§ 85 to provide an exclusion for up to $2,400 of unemployment compensation received by an
individual in 2009.
4. Kerzner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-76 (4/6/09). The taxpayers,
who were equal partners in a partnership and equal shareholders of an S corporation, attempted
to avoid the § 1366(d) limitation on passed-through losses from an S corporation by borrowing
money from the partnership and re-lending the loan proceeds to the S corporation, which in turn
paid equivalent amounts of rent back to the partnership. The Tax Court (Judge Nims) disallowed
the pass-through losses, holding that the taxpayers did not acquire any basis in indebtedness
from the S corporation from the transactions because they involved a circular flow of funds and
there was no real expectation that they would ever repay the borrowed funds. Thus the taxpayers
had not incurred any economic outlay.
5. Judge Gale rescues a taxpayer who was trying to rely on the wrong
exclusionary rule. Watts v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-103 (5/18/09). The taxpayer was
injured in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist, but her insurance company denied
coverage under one of the two policies issued to the taxpayer and her husband, relying on anti-
stacking provisions in the contracts. Eventually, as a result of the settlement of a class action suit
against her automobile insurance company, she received a damage award. Both the taxpayer and
the IRS argued the case on the basis of the applicability of § 104(a)(2). Judge Gale held that
because the damage award was not received with respect to "tort or type rights," it was not
excludable under § 104(a)(2). However, notwithstanding the taxpayer's apparent failure to raise
the argument the damages were excludable under § 104(a)(3) as an amount received through
accident or health insurance for personal injuries or sickness. To be eligible to receive damages
the taxpayer was required to have been (1) insured under multiple insurance policies purchased
from the same company with uninsured motorist coverage, (2) injured through the fault of an
uninsured motorist, and (3) denied payment under one of the policies while receiving payment
under another. These prerequisites establish that the taxpayer received the settlement payment
"through" accident insurance, or under such a policy, for purposes of § 104(a)(3). Judge Gale
rejected the IRS's argument that because the class action lawsuit involved numerous claims
beyond those premised on personal injury (e.g., breach of contract, breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, fraud, etc.) and sought compensatory damages, treble damages, punitive
damages, and interest, and because the settlement agreement did not expressly allocate any
portion of the payment to personal injury and the taxpayer executed a general release of all
claims, the taxpayer did not receive the payment "for" personal injury. The determining factor in
his decision was that the taxpayer's eligibility to receive a portion of the settlement fund
depended upon her showing that she had not been fully compensated for her injuries.
6. Even if the cop's CPA might have acted stupidly, the cop wasn't
penalized for an erroneous exclusion of a damage award. Longoria v Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2009-162 (7/2/09). Judge Gustafson held that no portion of a $156,667 settlement award
in an employment discrimination suit by a [Puerto Rican] New Jersey state trooper was
excludable under § 104(a)(2), even though the taxpayer suffered physical injuries as a result of
acts of discrimination, because the complaint in the discrimination suit did not allege that he had
suffered any physical injuries as a result of discrimination during his employment. No penalties
were assessed, however, because the taxpayer reasonably relied on the erroneous advice of a
CPA in excluding the award from gross income.
& Should this case reach the Supreme Court, a "wise Latina"
would see that complete justice is done for Mr. Longoria.
7. Tax free mortgage principal paydowns. Rev. Rul. 2009-19, 2009-28
I.R.B. 111 (6/23/09). The Federal government's Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan
helps homeowners who have defaulted, or are at risk of default, on their mortgages by providing
certain incentive payments to lenders/investors on the behalf of homeowner's that make timely
payments on modified loans that reduce the principal balance on the homeowner's mortgage
loan. This revenue ruling holds that the payments are excludable from the homeowner's income
under the general welfare exclusion.
8. Treasury proposes to reverse a principle established in a Supreme
Court decision that the government won. REG-127270-06, Damages Received on Account of
Personal Physical Injuries or Physical Sickness, 74 F.R. 47152 (9/15/09). The Treasury has
published proposed regulations [Prop. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)] under § 104(a)(2) to reflect
amendments to § 104 enacted since the current regulations were promulgated and certain judicial
decisions. The proposed regulations provide that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion applies to personal
physical injuries or physical sickness. Emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or
physical sickness. However, the proposed regulations provide that damages for emotional
distress attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excludable under § 104(a)(2).
Under the proposed regulations, the term damages means an amount received (other than
workers' compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action, or through a settlement
agreement entered into in lieu of prosecution. Notably, the proposed regulations eliminate the
requirement in the current regulations that to be excludable under § 104(a)(2) the damages must
be "based upon tort or tort type rights." Thus, damages for physical injuries may qualify for
exclusion under § 104(a)(2) even though the injury giving rise to the damages is not defined as a
tort under state or common law. The reason for the change was the Treasury Department's
concern that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the tort type rights test in United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), limiting the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to damages for personal injuries
for which the full range of tort-type remedies is available, could precluded an exclusion under
§ 104(a)(2) for redress of physical personal injuries under a "no-fault" statute that does not
provide traditional tort-type remedies.
* Taxpayers may apply the proposed regulations to amounts
paid pursuant to a written binding agreement, court decree, or mediation award entered into or
issued after September 13, 1995 and received after August 20, 1996.
9. The out of pocket cost of compromising consumer debt is not
deductible. Melvin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-199 (9/8/09). The taxpayers owed
Chase Manhattan Bank $13,084 on a consumer credit cards, and Chase agreed to accept $4,579
to settle the debt. The taxpayers paid a third party (Arbitronix) 25 percent of the $8,505 savings,
or $2,126 to negotiate the compromise. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that the taxpayers
recognized COD income in the amount of the cancelled debt. The "[taxpayers] received goods
and services (and cash advances) on credit; when Chase relieved them of their corresponding
obligation to pay, petitioners without question received an 'accession to income."' The court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that under § 61(a)(12) itself only the net benefit of the debt
cancellation was includable in gross income - that is they should have been allowed to offset
their "phantom' income" with the "loss" they suffered when they paid the fee. Judge Halpern
held that § 61 (a)( 12) "manifestly does not provide for any kind of deduction." The taxpayers did
not argue for a deduction under § 162 because they acknowledged that the amount was not paid
with respect to a business and they did not argue for a § 212 deduction because they were in the
AMT.
C. Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation Homes
D. Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses
1. The deduction for state and local property taxes is only semi-itemized for
2008. We bet this one becomes a permanent fixture in the annual extenders bill until it becomes
permanent. Section 63(c)(1)(C), added by the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, adds the
"real property tax deduction" as a component of the standard deduction, effective only for
taxable years beginning in 2008. The amount of the deduction is the lesser of (1) the amount the
taxpayer could claim as a state and local real property tax deduction under § 164(a)(1) if he
itemized his deductions, or (2) $500 ($1,000 in the case of a joint return).
a. Congress extends another microscopic and complicating tax
deduction. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended through 2009 the
Code § 63(c)(1)(C) above-the-line deduction for a limited amount of real property taxes, The
amount of the deduction is the lesser of (1) the amount the taxpayer could claim as a state and
local real property tax deduction under § 164(a)(1) if he itemized deductions, or (2) $500
($1,000 in the case of a joint return). The provision originally was effective only for 2008.
2. Helping entry-level homebuyers invest in the bear housing market.
Code § 36, added by the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, provides a refundable credit for
a "first-time homebuyer" who purchases a principal residence on or after 4/9/08, and before
1/1/09. The amount of the credit is the lesser of 10 percent of the purchase price or $7,500
($3,750 in the case of a married individual filing a separate return). If two or more unmarried
persons purchase a principal residence together, the total amount of the credit will be allocated
among them as prescribed by the IRS. The credit is phased out over the modified adjusted
income range of $75,000 to $95,000 ($150,000 to $170,000 in the case of a joint return). A
person qualifies as a "first-time homebuyer" if neither the person nor the person's spouse (if any)
owned a principal residence at any time during the three-year period ending on the date of
purchase of the credit-generating residence. The credit is not available if the taxpayer purchased
the property from a related person or acquired it by gift, or if the taxpayer's basis in the property
is determined under § 1014. (Persons are related for this purpose if they are related for purposes
of § 267 or § 707, except that the family of an individual under § 267(c)(4) is limited for this
purpose to his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants.) The credit is also not available: (1) if a
credit under § 1400C (relating to first-time homebuyers in the District of Columbia) has ever
been allowable to the taxpayer, (2) if the taxpayer's financing is from tax-exempt mortgage
revenue bonds, (3) if the taxpayer is a nonresident alien, or (4) if the taxpayer disposes of the
residence or ceases to use it as his principal residence before the close of the taxable year.
0 The amount of the credit is recaptured ratably over the 15-
year period beginning with the second taxable year following the taxable year in which the credit-
generating purchase was made. For example, if a taxpayer properly claimed a credit of $7,500 for a
purchase in 2008, the recapture amount would be $500 in 2010, with another $500 recapture amount
in each of the next 14 years. Thus, the credit actually functions as an interest-free loan from the
government to the taxpayer. If, prior to the end of the 15-year recapture period, a taxpayer disposes
of the credit-generating residence or ceases to use it as his principal residence, the recapture of any
previously unrecaptured credit is accelerated. In the case of a sale of the principal residence to an
unrelated person, the recapture amount is limited to the amount of gain (if any) on the sale. There is
no recapture (either regular or accelerated) after the death of a taxpayer, and there is no accelerated
recapture following an involuntary conversion of a residence if the taxpayer acquires a new principal
residence within the next two years. If a credit-generating residence is transferred between spouses
or incident to a divorce, in a transaction subject to § 1041, any remaining recapture obligation is
imposed solely on the transferee.
Although the credit is ordinarily allowed with respect to the
year in which the credit-generating purchase occurred, a taxpayer purchasing a home in 2009 (before
July 1) may elect to treat the purchase as having been made in 2008, for the purpose of claiming the
credit on his 2008 tax return. If the election is made, the first year of the recapture period will be
2010, rather than 2011.
a. The homebuyer credit started out as an interest-free loan, but
now it's outright free money from the federal government. Section 1006 of the 2009
ARRTA amended Code § 36(h) to extend the life of the first-time homebuyer credit through
November 30, 2009, and to increase the amount of the credit to $8,000 for 2009. It also amended§ 36(f) to eliminate the recapture of the credit for a home purchased in 2009, unless the home is
sold or ceases to be the taxpayer's principal residence within 36 months of the date of purchase.
3. Stimulating sales in Texas, Florida, Washington, Nevada, Wyoming,
Alaska and South Dakota (and maybe Tennessee and New Hampshire). The Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended through 2009 the § 164(b)(5) itemized deduction
for state sales taxes (optionally in lieu of income taxes in those states that have both sales and
income taxes).
4. Making children more affordable. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 added Code § 24(d)(4), which provides that for 2008 (and only for
2008) the ceiling on the refundable child credit is 15 percent of the excess of earned income over
$8,500 rather than $10,000 (indexed for post-2000 inflation). Because the 2008 inflation
adjusted $10,000 amount would have been $12,050, this provision increases by $532.50 the
refundable amount.
5. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act, extends several credits and adds a few new twists.
a. Section 205 adds a new credit, under § 30D, for qualified electric
drive motor vehicles. The credit amount is $2,500 plus $417 for each kilowatt hour of traction
battery capacity in excess of 4 kilowatt hours (the minimum required for obtaining the credit).
The credit is limited to $7,500 for vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds, $10,000 for
vehicles weighing between 10,000 and 14,000 pounds, $12,500 for vehicles weighing between
14,000 and 26,000 pounds, and $15,000 for those electric plug-in SUVs in excess of 26,000
pounds. The credit begins to phase out after the first 250,000 vehicles are sold.
b. Section 302 extends the § 25C 10 percent credit (limited to $500 in
a lifetime) for nonbusiness energy saving property to property placed in service in 2009. The
provision contains several changes to the definitions of qualified energy property.
6. There's no constitutional right to deduct the cost of sexless procreation by
a healthy man. The expenses of obtaining eggs from anonymous egg donors, and of the
gestational carriers in whom the eggs - after being fertilized with taxpayer's semen - were
implanted, were not deductible. Magdalin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-293 (12/23/08).
The court (Judge Wherry) held that the costs of taxpayer's fathering two children by use of two
egg donors and two gestational carriers were not § 213 medical expenses because taxpayer was
medically able to father children, and had previously fathered twins with his ex-wife, born
through natural processes and without the use of in vitro fertilization. Because (1) there was no
causal relationship between an underlying medical condition or defect - taxpayer's sperm count
and motility were found to be within normal limits - and the taxpayer's expenses, and (2) the
expenses at issue were not incurred for the purpose of affecting a structure or function of the
taxpayer's body, the expenses were not "medical care" as defined in § 213(d). Judge Wherry
rejected the taxpayer's argument that "it was his civil right to reproduce, that he should have the
freedom to choose the method of reproduction, and that it is sex discrimination to allow women
but not men to choose how they will reproduce."
0 The court refused to address the question of whether the fees
would have been deductible had taxpayer suffered from a medical condition, e.g., infertility, that left
him unable to have children except by use of in vitro fertilization.
* In PLR 200318017 (1/9/03), the IRS ruled that a woman who
was unable to conceive using her own eggs and received an implanted fertilized egg was entitled to
deduct as medical expenses under § 213 her unreimbursed expenses for the egg donor fee, the
agency fee, the donor's medical and psychological testing, the insurance for post-procedure donor
assistance, and the legal fees for preparation of the egg donor contract.
* This case has no Da Vinci Code implications.
7- A little help for the auto industry, but it's probably not enough.
Section 1008(b) of the 2009 ARRTA added Code § 164(b)(6) to allow taxpayers who do not
elect to deduct state and local general sales taxes under § 164(b)(5) to deduct state and local
sales and excise taxes paid on the purchase of new cars, light trucks, motorcycles, and
recreational vehicles in 2009. The deduction is available only with respect to the first $49,500 of
the purchase price, is phased out for taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes (with certain
modifications) in excess of $125,000 ($250,000 in the case of a joint return), and is fully phased
out when adjusted gross income (as modified) exceeds $135,000 ($270,000 in the case of a joint
return). The deduction is allowed as a deduction in computing adjusted gross income and thus is
allowable whether or not the taxpayer itemizes deductions.
8. Pennies from heaven: the "making work pay" credit. Code § 36A,
added by § 1001(a) of the 2009 ARRTA, provides individuals a refundable tax credit for 2009,
and only for 2009, equal to 6.2% of earned income. The maximum credit is $400 for a single
individual and $800 for married taxpayers filing a joint return. The credit amount is reduced (but
not below zero) by two percent of taxpayer's adjusted gross income (with certain limited
modifications relating to foreign income) in excess of $75,000 for single taxpayers, or in excess
of $150,000 for married couples filing jointly. A taxpayer who is claimed as a dependent by
another taxpayer is ineligible for the credit. The credit can be claimed through a reduction in
income tax withholding or by claiming the credit on a tax return.
a. All Social Security recipients are entitled to this payment, i.e.,
there is no income ceiling on it! Section 2201 of the 2009 ARRA (in the title called Assistance
for Unemployed Workers and Struggling Families) provides for a one-time $250 payment to
adults who were entitled to receive social security, etc. payments in any of the months of
November 2008, December 2008, or January 2009. This payment will reduce the "making work
pay" credit.
9. "Go forth and propagate." More kids, more EITC. Section 1001(a) of
the 2009 ARRTA added Code § 32(b)(3) to increase the EITC credit rate for taxpayers with
three or more children to 45 percent of earned income up to $12,570 for taxable years 2009 and
2010. The Act also amended Code § 32(b)(2)(B) for 2009 and 2010 to increase the phase-out
threshold for joint returns to $5,000 more than the phase-out threshold for single returns (subject
to an inflation adjustment in 2010).
a. Viva Viagra! More stimulating of propagation. Section 1004 of
the 2009 ARRTA amended Code § 24(d) to allow the child tax credit to be refundable to the
extent of 15 percent of the taxpayer's earned income in excess $3,000 for 2009 and 2010.
10. Credit for weatherproofing your house. Code § 25C, added to the Code
by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 and amended significantly by § 1121 of the 2009
ARRTA, provides a nonrefundable credit for certain expenditures to improve the energy
efficiency of a taxpayer's principal residence. As amended, the credit is available for property
placed in service in 2006, 2007, or 2009 (but not for property placed in service in 2008). In the
case of "qualified energy efficiency improvements" (QEEIs), the credit equals 30 percent of the
cost of the improvements (10 percent for years before 2009). A QEEI is any energy efficient
building component (i.e., insulation, exterior windows and doors, certain coated metal roofs, and
asphalt roofs with cooling granules) satisfying criteria established by the 2000 International
Energy Conservation Code, if the original use of the component commences with the taxpayer
and the component is expected to remain in use for at least five years. The other category of
credit-eligible costs is "residential energy property expenditures" (REPEs). REPEs are
expenditures for the following types of property, if they are installed in the taxpayer's principal
residence and satisfy energy efficiency standards to be promulgated by the Treasury Department
pursuant to detailed statutory instructions: (1) main air circulating fans, (2) natural gas, propane
or oil furnace or hot water boilers, and (3) "energy efficient building properties" (electric heat
pump water heaters; electric heat pumps; geothermal heat pumps; certain air conditioners; water
heaters using natural gas, propane, or oil; and stoves burning biomass fuel). (The §25C credit is
not available for geothermal heat pumps placed in service in 2009. Instead, a credit is available
under §25D.) For REPEs the credit amount is established by schedule: the first $50 of the cost of
a main air circulating fan, the first $150 of the cost of a natural gas, propane, or oil furnace or hot
water boiler, and the first $300 of the cost of any item of energy-efficient building property. For
years prior to 2008, there was a lifetime limit of $500 on the aggregate credits a taxpayer could
claim under § 25C, of which no more than $200 could be based on expenditures for windows.
Section 1121(a) of the 2009 ARRTA amended § 25C(b) to eliminate the lifetime limit and
replace it with an aggregate limit of $1,500 for 2009 and 2010.
11. Enlisting the tax Code to help stop funding both sides in the war on
terror: Credit for generating power at home. Code § 25D, added by the Energy Tax
Incentives Act of 2005, and modified by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 and by the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, provides a nonrefundable credit for certain
expenditures on residential energy-efficient property. Qualifying property is of five types: (1)
solar electric property (which uses solar energy to generate electricity), (2) solar water heating
property, (3) fuel cell property (which converts a fuel into electricity using electrochemical
means), (4) small wind energy property (which uses a wind turbine to generate electricity for a
residence), and (5) geothermal heat pump property (which uses the ground or ground water to
heat or cool a residence). The property must be installed in a dwelling unit located in the United
States and used by the taxpayer as a residence (principal residence, in the case of fuel cell
property). Expenditures allocable to a swimming pool or hot tub are not eligible for the credit.
The credit equals 30 percent of qualifying expenditures. For years prior to 2009, the credit was
subject to annual ceilings (on the credit amount, not on credit-eligible expenditures) of $2,000
for solar electric property, $2,000 for solar water heating property, $500 per half kilowatt of
capacity of fuel cell property, $500 per half kilowatt capacity (but not more than $4,000 in total)
of small wind energy property, and $2,000 for geothermal heat pump property.
a. As amended by § 1122(a)(1) of the 2009 ARRTA, Code § 25D(b)
provides that, for taxable years beginning after 12/31/08, there are no ceilings except the $500
ceiling on fuel cell property. The credit may be claimed against the AMT as well as the regular
income tax, and unused credit amounts may be carried forward. The credit is available only for
property placed in service before 2017.
12. We guess DOMA doesn't apply to domiciles. Notice 2009-12, 2009-6
I.R.B. 446 (1/15/09). This notice explains how to allocate the § 36 first-time homebuyer credit
between unmarried co-purchasers of a principal residence. Any reasonable method is allowed
when two unmarried individuals purchase a first home as tenants in common. Under some
circumstances a full $7,500 credit can be obtained even where one buyer would not qualify for
any amount of credit under the phaseout rules, if both contribute to purchase and both are first-
time home buyers.
13. This CCA on deductible home mortgage interest will break a lot of hearts
in California - almost as many as the voters broke in November 2008. CCA 200911007
(11/24/08; released 3/13/09). This CCA addressed the amount of interest that was deductible as
"qualified residence interest" under § 163(h)(3)(A) when a residence encumbered by a purchase
money mortgage of more than $1 million is co-owned by two unmarried taxpayers both of whom
are obligated on the mortgage and for both of whom the residence is the principal residence. The
CCA holds that the $1 million ceiling on "acquisition indebtedness," as defined in§ 163(h)(3)(B), applies on a residence-by-residence basis as well as on a taxpayer-by-taxpayer
basis. Its reasoning is as follows.
Under § 163(h)(3)(B)(1), acquisition indebtedness is defined, in relevant part, as
indebtedness incurred in acquiring a qualified residence of the taxpayer - not as
indebtedness incurred in acquiring taxpayer's portion of a qualified residence.
The entire amount of indebtedness incurred in acquiring the qualified residence
constitutes "acquisition indebtedness" under § 163(h)(3)(A)(I). In this case, the
amount of indebtedness incurred in acquiring [the residence] exceeds $1,000,000.
However, under § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), the amount treated as acquisition
indebtedness for purposes of the qualified residence interest deduction is limited
to $1,000,000 of total, "aggregate" acquisition indebtedness. This is evident from
the parenthetical in § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
0 The CCA addressed only the tax consequences of one of the
co-owners - the one who originally had owned the property in fee simple and was solely obligated
on the mortgage and who subsequently conveyed an undivided ownership interest to a second
person who also became obligated on the mortgage. The CCA concluded that the interest deductible
by the taxpayer in question was to be determined by multiplying the amount of interest the taxpayer
paid by a fraction: $1,000,000 divided by the amount of mortgage. Thus, for example, if the amount
of the mortgage were $1,500,000 and the taxpayer paid $75,000 of interest, the amount of the
taxpayer's interest deduction would be $50,000, i.e., $75,000 x ($1,000,000 + $1,500,000).
* Many practitioners and tax professors had asserted prior to
the issuance of this CCA that they assumed that unmarried co-owners could each deduct mortgage
interest on $1 million of acquisition indebtedness, thus permitting deduction of interest on a $2
million mortgage on a home they owned in common. At least two of us believe that the reasoning
and conclusion of the CCA limiting to $1 million the amount of "acquisition indebtedness" that can
be taken into account collectively by all of the owners of the residence likely is correct; the third of
us lives in California. A careful reading of the statutory language indicates that because
§ 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) omits any reference to a "taxpayer," it limits to $1 million the aggregate amount
of "acquisition indebtedness" that maybe taken into account in determining the amount of "qualified
residence interest" with respect to all of the taxpayers that might reside in that residential unit. If it
does not do so, and each taxpayer who resides in the residence, is an owner, and is obligated on the
"acquisition indebtedness" mortgage should be entitled to deduct interest paid on up to $1 million of
acquisition indebtedness, then on a joint return each of the husband and wife, who are separate and
distinct taxpayers (see, e.g. Frahm v Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-351), would be entitled to
deduct interest on up to $1 million of "acquisition indebtedness." But the statute clearly does not
contemplate that result, as evidenced by the limitation on the deduction to the interest on $500,000
of acquisition indebtedness by married taxpayers who file separately. The parenthetical indicates,
even though it does not expressly state, that a husband and wife who each own a one-half interest in
the residence and are jointly and severally liable on the mortgage can deduct interest on up to only
$1 million of acquisition indebtedness. An interpretation of the statute that applies the $1 million
ceiling on "acquisition indebtedness," as defined in § 163(h)(3)(B), on both a residence-by-residence
basis, and on a taxpayer-by-taxpayer basis avoids this "marriage penalty" that would otherwise arise.
E. Divorce Tax Issues
1. A child who is not a dependent is a dependent for some purposes. Rev.
Proc. 2008-48, 2008-36 I.R.B. 586 (8/18/08). If a child of parents who are divorced, legally
separated, or living apart at all times for the last 6 months of the calendar year: (1) receives over
one-half of the child's support from the parents, (2) is in the custody of one or both parents for
more than one-half of the calendar year, and (3) is qualified as a qualifying child or qualifying
relative of one of the parents, the child will be treated as a dependent of one or both parents for
purposes of (1) the exclusions of § 105 for medical expense insurance reimbursements, (2) § 106
for employer provided health coverage, (3) the definition of covered employees under§ 132(h)(2)(B) for purposes of certain excluded fringe benefits, (4) qualifying payments from
Archer Medical Savings Accounts (§ 220(d)(2)), and (5) qualifying payments from Health
Savings Accounts (§ 223(d)(2)), whether or not the custodial parent has released the claim for
exemption with respect to the child under § 152(e)(2). (However, absent the filing of a release,
only the custodial parent is entitled to claim a dependency exemption with respect to a child.)
a. Refining the definition of qualifying child and tightening (very
modestly) eligibility for the child credit. The Fostering Connections to Success and
Increasing Adoptions Act, § 501, amended the definition of a qualifying child to add
requirements that a qualifying child must not have filed a joint return with a spouse (other than
to claim a refund) [§ 152(c)(3)(A)] and must be younger than the claimant [§ 152(c)(1)(D)]. In
addition, if the parents fail to claim their child as a dependent, another taxpayer must have a
higher gross income than either of the parents in order to claim the child [§ 152(c)(4)(C)].
Finally, § 24(a) was amended to limit the child credit to taxpayers eligible to claim the child as a
dependent under § 151.
2. So what's this otherwise mundane reviewed case really about?
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 15 (12/15/08) (reviewed 13-2-0). In what at first blush
appears to be a mundane case, the Tax Court in a reviewed opinion by Judge Goeke held that
amounts paid to the taxpayer from her former spouse's military retirement pay, pursuant to a
QDRO based on community property rights, were includible in the payee spouse's gross income.
* The real issue, which the majority ducked, but on which
Judge Holmes wrote a comprehensive concurring opinion (with which Judge Halpern agreed) was
whether the case should have been decided on the merits, as the majority so decided it, or whether
the taxpayer ought to have been collaterally estopped as argued by the Commissioner. The taxpayer
had previously litigated and lost the identical issue for an earlier year in an S case. Judge Holmes's
exhaustive analysis concluded that collateral estoppel principles should attach to issues previously
litigated in an S case if collateral estoppel would have attached if the earlier case had been a regular
case.
F. Education
1. Congress extends the [paltry] deduction for college tuition, and adds
ridiculous complexity. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended through
2009 Code § 222, which allows an above-the-line deduction for up to $4,000 of qualified tuition
and expenses for higher education for a taxpayer with AGI of $65,000 or less ($130,000 or less
for a joint return), or up to $2,000 for a taxpayer with AGI greater than $65,000 ($130,000) but
not greater than $80,000 ($160,000) through 2008. The provision, which was added in 2004, had
been scheduled to expire after December 31, 2007. In addition, the Act amended § 222 to
disallow the qualified tuition deduction to any taxpayer for 2008 and 2009 if in the absence of
the alternative minimum tax the taxpayer would have a lower tax liability for that year if he
elected the Hope or Lifetime Learning credit with respect to an eligible individual instead of thequalified tuition deduction. q We have no idea how to explain this new limitation. We
would need to plug the numbers into Turbo Tax and just believe the answer it spits out.
2. Stimulating increases in college tuition. Section 1004(a) of the 2009
ARRTA added Code § 25A(i) to increase the Hope Scholarship Credit for 2009 and 2010 to the
sum of(1) 100 percent of the first $2,000 of tuition, fees and course materials, and (2) 25 percent
of the next $2,000, paid during the taxable year. The maximum credit is $2,500. The temporarily
increased credit has been named the "American Opportunity Tax Credit." In addition to
increasing the amount of the credit, the 2009 ARRTA extends the availability of the credit to the
first four years of post-secondary education (in lieu of the prior two-year rule), and adds "course
materials" to the expenses eligible for the credit (previously only tuition and fees had been
eligible). Thus, for 2009 and 2010, the credit can be claimed with respect to a student with
respect to whom the credit already had been claimed for two years. The revised credit can be
claimed against the alternative minimum tax. Forty percent of the allowable credit is refundable,
unless the taxpayer is a child subject to the § 1(g) "kiddie tax." The American Opportunity Tax
Credit is phased out for taxpayers with adjusted gross income in excess of $80,000 ($160,000 for
married couples filing jointly) under the same formula as the Hope Scholarship Credit.
3. A little stimulus for Apple, HP, Dell, Microsoft, etc. Section 1005(a) of
the 2009 ARRTA amended Code § 529(e)(3)(A) to include as qualified expenses, amounts paid
or incurred in 2009 or 2010 for computer technology or equipment (including intemet access and
related services) used by the beneficiary during the time the beneficiary is enrolled at an eligible
institution. Expenses for computer software designed for sports, games, or hobbies do not qualify
"unless the software is predominantly educational in nature" - whatever that might mean.
G. Alternative Minimum Tax
1. Making the world safe from the. AMT, one year at a time. The Tax
Increase Prevention Act of 2007 provided another one-year "patch" for the AMT. The 2007
exemption amounts are $44,350 for unmarried taxpayers and $66,250 for married taxpayers
filing joint returns, and $33,125 for married taxpayers filing separately. The Act also extended to
2007 the special rule in §26(a)(2) allowing the otherwise nonrefundable personal credits to offset
the AMT (after taking into account the foreign tax credit).
a. Congress, save us from the AMT! Amen, again only for a year
at a time. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 provided yet another one-year
patch for the AMT.
* The exemption amount for 2008 is increased to $46,200 for
unmarried taxpayers and to $69,950 for married taxpayers filing joint returns ($34,975 for married
taxpayers filing separately). (Because of the inflation adjustments in § 59(j) the lower ceiling on the
AMT kiddie tax exemption amount for 2008 will be the sum of the child's earned income plus
$6,400.)
* The rule allowing nonrefundable credits (e.g., the dependent
care credit, the credit for the elderly and disabled, the adoption credit, the child tax credit, the credit
for interest on certain home mortgages, the HOPE Scholarship and Lifetime Learning credits, the
credit for savers, the credit for certain nonbusiness energy property, the credit for residential energy
efficient property, and the D.C. homebuyer's credit) to offset the AMT also was extended to 2008.
* The refundable credit rules also were modified. First, the
refundable credit includes the § 53(f(2) AMT credit for 2008 and 2009 of 50 percent of the
aggregate amount of the interest and penalties paid by the taxpayer before October 3, 2008, as a
result of failure to report AMT liability resulting from application of the § 56(b)(3) treatment of
ISOs requiring taxation under § 83 for AMT purposes. Second, the $5,000 minimum allowable
credit was eliminated. Third, as amended, § 53(e) provides a refundable credit amount for a tax year
in an amount (not in excess of the long-term unused minimum tax credit for the tax year) equal to
the greater of (1) 50% of the long-term unused minimum tax credit for the tax year (instead of 20
percent under prior law), or (2) the AMT refundable credit amount (if any) for the taxpayer's
preceding tax year (determined without regard to the increased AMT refundable credit amount
allowed under § 53(f)(2)). [The change of 20% to 50% means that the long-term unused minimum
tax credit can be claimed over a two-year period rather than a five-year period.] Fourth, the AGI
phase-out was eliminated.
• New §53(f)(1) abates any underpayment of tax outstanding
on October 3, 2008, that is attributable to the application of the § 56(b)(3), requiring taxation of ISOs
under § 83 for AMT purposes, for any taxable year ending before January 1, 2008, as well as any
interest or penalty with respect to such underpayment. Any outstanding AMT liability that has been
abated under § 53(f)(1) cannot be taken into account in computing the AMT credit.
2. Whittling away yet more at the original purpose of the AMT: Why not just
rename it the "special tax on blue state taxpayers with kids." Code § 57(a)(5)(vi), added by
§ 1503(a) of the 2009 ARRTA, provides that interest on private activity bonds issued in 2009
and 2010 will not be treated as a tax preference item for AMT purposes; if the bond is issued in
one of those years the interest will be tax-exempt for purposes of the AMT (as well as for regular
tax purposes) even though the interest is received after 2010.
VI. CORPORATIONS
A. Entity and Formation
1. To check the box 75 days is extended to 3 years and 75 days. Rev.
Proc. 2009-41, 2009-39 I.R.B. __ (9/3/09). Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1) provides that an election by
an unincorporated entity to be taxed as an association is effective on a date specified in the
election on Form 8832, or on the date the form is filed if no date is specified. The effective date
cannot be more than 75 days before or twelve months after the date on which the Form 8832 is
filed. Under Reg. § 301.7701-3(d)(1), an election affecting a foreign entity is relevant when its
classification affects the tax liability of any person for federal tax or information purposes. The
revenue procedure extends the provisions for relief provided in Rev. Proc. 2002-59, 2002-2 C.B.
615, to include both an election with respect to newly electing entities and a change in an
existing. The revenue procedure provides for an application to an IRS service center for relief
from failure to timely file the form 8832 for up to three years and 75 days after the effective date
of the election. Relief is available if the entity can establish reasonable cause for its failure to
timely file its Form 8832, the application includes a completed Form 8832, and all tax returns
affected by the election have been filed consistently with the elected status. The revenue
procedure also provides that relief may be sought by an entity not eligible for relief under the
terms of the revenue procedure by filing a request for a letter ruling that includes a statement that
all required tax and information returns have been timely filed as if the entity classification
election had been in effect on the effective date requested.
B. Distributions and Redemptions
1. Section 162(k)'s bite is as loud as its bark. Ralston Purina Co. v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 4 (9/10/08). Ralston Purina claimed a deduction under § 404(k) for
payments made to its ESOP in redemption of Ralston Purina preferred stock owned by the ESOP
to fund distributions to employees terminating participation in the ESOP. The Commissioner
argued the redemption payments were not deductible under either § 404(k)(1) or (5), or
alternatively that deduction was barred by § 162(k). The Tax Court, in a unanimous reviewed
opinion by Judge Nims, held that because Ralston Purina's payments were "in connection with
the redemption of its own stock," § 162(k) applied to disallow the deduction. The Tax Court
refused to follow the contrary opinion on almost identical facts in Boise Cascade Corp. v. United
States, 329 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2003). In Boise Cascade the Ninth Circuit interpreted the phrase
"in connection with" to include only expenses that have their origin in a stock redemption
transaction, excluding expenses that have their origin in a "separate, although related,
transaction." The Tax Court previously had rejected the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of
the phrase "in connection with" in Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 345 (1994),
and did so again in Ralston Purina. The court rejected Ralston Purina's argument that because
the payments were an applicable dividend under 404(k), the transaction was excepted from the
application of § 162(k) under § 162(k)(2)(A)(ii). The Tax Court reasoned that the entire
transaction potentially deductible as an applicable dividend under § 404(k) - payment from the
corporation to the ESOP and the distribution to the ESOP participants - must also pass muster
under § 162(k), and that the 'otherwise allowable' deduction was disallowed because the
payment was 'in connection with' a repurchase of stock.
* This is the same result reached in Conopco, Inc. v. United
States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5296 (D. N.J. 7/18/07). Conopco, Inc. was affirmed, 572 F.3d 162, 104
A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5315 (3d Cir. 7/13/09). The court held that assuming that Conopco's payments
were applicable dividends under § 404(k)(1) - an issue that it did reach - "where a corporation
makes payment to an ESOP trust in redemption of its stock, the otherwise allowable § 404(k)(1)
deduction for an applicable dividend inevitably involves an 'amount paid or incurred by a
corporation in connection with the reacquisition of its stock' and is therefore barred by § 162(k)(1)."
a. The dog food corporation precedent wasn't the people's food
corporation's best friend. General Mills v. United States, 554 F.3d 727, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-
589 (8th Cir. 1/26/09). General Mills claimed a deduction under § 404(k) for payments made to
its ESOP in redemption of General Mills stock owned by the ESOP to fund distributions to
employees terminating participation in the ESOP. In a very brief opinion, the court (Judge
Benton) held that §162(k) barred the deduction for the "applicable dividend" otherwise
allowable under § 404(k). The court followed the Tax Court's decision in Ralston Purina Co. v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 4 (9/10/08), and refused to follow the contrary opinion in Boise
Cascade Corp. v. United States, 329 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2003), because it disagreed with the
reasoning of Boise Cascade.
2. The Tax Court is bearish on Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch & Co. v.
Commissioner, 120 T.C. 12 (1/15/03). In 1986 and 1987 Merrill Lynch structured several
transactions to sell certain assets of first-tier and second-tier subsidiaries and not only eliminate
any tax on the gains, but to create losses. To take advantage of the interaction of the consolidated
return regulations and § 304 [before the promulgation of Reg. § 1.1502-80(b), rendering § 304
inoperative in consolidated returns], Merrill Lynch caused the subsidiaries holding the assets to
drop the assets to be retained into new lower level subsidiaries [in § 351 transactions], following
which the new subsidiaries were sold cross chain to other Merrill Lynch subsidiaries. The sales
proceeds were then distributed to its parent by the subsidiary to be sold, and that subsidiary was
then sold. The plan was that the cross-chain sale would be recharacterized as a dividend under
§ 304, which would result in a basis increase under Reg. §§ 1.1502-32 and -33 [as then in effect]
in the stock of the subsidiaries to be sold. The IRS did not contest that § 304 applied, but
responded that the "distributions" coupled with the sales of the subsidiaries outside the group
were part of a firm and fixed plan by the subsidiaries that were sold outside the group to dispose
of the stock of the lower tier subsidiaries that had been sold cross chain. Therefore, even after
applying § 304 the distributions were treated as amounts received in a redemption under
§ 302(b)(3) [applying Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954)]. The Tax Court (Judge
Marvel) held that under the principles of Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974), a
firm and fixed plan existed with respect to every such sale and held for the IRS.
The record establishes that on the dates of the cross-chain sales, petitioner had
agreed upon, and had begun to implement, a firm and fixed plan to completely
terminate the target corporations' ownership interests in the issuing corporations
(the subsidiaries whose stock was sold cross-chain). The plan was carefully
structured to achieve very favorable tax basis adjustments resulting from the
interplay of section 304 and the consolidated return regulations, and the steps of
the plan were described in detail in written summaries prepared for meetings of
Merrill Parent's board of directors. As described in those written summaries, the
cross-chain sales of the issuing corporations' stock and the sales of the target
corporations were part of the same seamless web of corporate activity intended by
petitioner to culminate in the sale of the target corporations outside the
consolidated group.
a. As is the Second Circuit, which affirmed the Tax Court. 386
F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 9/28/04). On appeal Merrill Lynch argued for the first time that the proceeds of
the cross-chain sales should be treated as § 301 dividends, even if the actual and constructive
ownership interest in the subsidiary corporation that was sold was completely terminated,
because Merrill Lynch retained a constructive ownership interest in the purchased subsidiaries
for purposes of § 302(b)(3). The Second Circuit remanded the case for consideration of this
issue.
b. Now the Tax Court is bearish on Bank of America (as well as
on Ken Gideon and Marty Ginsburg). 131 T.C. No. 19 (12/30/08). On remand, the taxpayer
argued that because its ownership interest in the issuing corporations was not completely
terminated within the meaning of § 302(b)(3), it properly reported sales proceeds as dividends.
The taxpayer's argument went as follows: (1) Immediately before the cross-chain sales, the
acquiring corporation was a wholly owned subsidiary; (2) under the § 318 attribution rules,
ownership of the issuing corporations was also attributed to it its ownership of their parent; and
(3) after the sale of the subsidiaries' former parent [the seller in the cross-chain sale], the
taxpayer continued constructively to own 100 percent of the stock of the issuing corporations
through its ownership of the acquiring corporations. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) rejected the
taxpayer's argument and agreed with the Commissioner that the rules in §§ 302 and 304 "apply
only to the shareholder who, in exchange for stock, actually receives the proceeds of a cross-
chain sale. The position that the section 302(b) tests may be applied to a shareholder who
indirectly or constructively holds stock but has neither transferred any stock nor received the
proceeds of the stock sale cannot be reconciled with the language and structure of section
304(a)(1)." The subsidiary-parent that was sold by the taxpayer was the only "person" who
transferred any stock to the acquiring subsidiary corporations in the cross-chain sales, and it was
the only shareholder that received property from the acquiring corporations in exchange for
stock in the issuing corporations. Consequently, it was the only shareholder whose interest in the
issuing corporations should be tested under § 302(b)(3). Because its interest in the issuing
corporations was completely terminated upon its sale outside of the affiliated group, the
redemption was a distribution in exchange for stock.
3. Every share of stock is a separate item of property and the results of
(almost) every Subchapter C transaction should be determined with respect to the consideration
received in regard to each share. REG-143686-07, The Allocation of Consideration and
Allocation and Recovery of Basis in Transactions Involving Corporate Stock or Securities, 74
F.R. 3509 (1/21/09). The Treasury and IRS have published proposed regulations under §§ 301,
302, 304, 351, 354, 356, 358, 368, 861, 1001, and 1016 regarding the recovery of stock basis in
(1) § 301 distributions and transactions that are treated as § 301 distributions, (2) sale and
exchange transactions to which § 302(a) applies (including certain aspects of reorganization
exchanges. The proposed regulations also provide the method for determining gain realized
under § 356 and make a number of clarifying, but nonsubstantive, modifications to the rules for
determining stock basis under § 358 resulting from a reorganization. The core principal
underlying the rules is that each share of stock is a separate unit of property that can be sold or
exchanged and the results of a transaction should be determined with respect to the consideration
received in regard to each share.
* Section 301 distributions - A § 301 distribution is received
on a pro rata, share-by-share basis with respect to the class of stock upon which the distribution is
made. Prop. Reg. § 1.301-2. A distribution that is not a dividend under §§ 301(c)(1) and 316 can
result in gain with respect to some shares of a class while other shares have unrecovered basis. (This
is consistent with the holding in Johnson v. United States, 435 F.2d 1257 (4th Cir. 1971).)
* Dividend equivalent redemptions - The same basis recovery
rules that apply to §301 distributions apply to redemptions that do not qualify under § 302(a) and (b)
("dividend-equivalent redemptions") and § 304 transactions that are taxed under § 301. Prop. Reg.
§§ 1.302-5(a); 1.304-2. A dividend equivalent redemption results in a pro rata, share-by-share
distribution to all shares of the redeemed class held by the redeemed shareholder immediately before
the redemption. The term "redeemed class" means all of the shares of that class held by the
redeemed shareholder. Only the basis of shares of the redeemed class may be reduced before gain is
realized. Dividend equivalent redemptions can produce gain with respect to some shares while other
shares have unrecovered basis.
* Basis adjustments in dividend equivalent redemptions if less
than all of the shares of a single class held by the taxpayer are redeemed - If less than all of the
shares of a class of stock held by the taxpayer are redeemed, the redeemed shareholder is treated as
exchanging in a tax-free reorganization all of the shares in the class owned before the redemption for
the number of shares held after the redemption transaction. Prop. Reg. § 1.302-5(2). Reg. § 1.358-2
applies to preserve the basis of the shares in the shareholder's remaining shares. Thus, a dividend
equivalent redemption is generally treated in the same manner, and its results are the same as, a §
301 distribution in which no shares were cancelled.
* Example - A owns all 100 shares of the common stock (the
only class) of X Corporation. At different times, A acquired 50 shares for $100 (block 1) and 50
shares for $200 (block 2). The corporation, which has no earnings and profits, redeems all of A's
block 2 shares for $300. Under §§ 302(d) and 301, the redemption proceeds are treated as a recovery
of basis. The distribution of property is applied on a pro rata, share-by-share basis with respect to
each of the shares in the redeemed class owned by A before the redemption. Thus, A recognizes a
$50 capital gain on block 1 ($150-100) under § 301(c)(3) and has $50 of basis remaining in block 2
($150-200). To reflect the actual number of shares held by A after the redemption, A's shares in the
redeemed class, including the shares actually surrendered, will be treated as exchanged in a
recapitalization under section 368(a)(1)(E). A's basis in the 50 recapitalized shares is determined
under Reg. § 1.358-2. Thus, A has 25 shares with a zero basis (attributable to block 1) and 25 shares
with a basis of $50 (attributable to block 2).
0 Basis recovery in dividend equivalent redemptions in which
the taxpayer surrenders all of its shares in a single class - If all of the shares of a single class held
by a shareholder are redeemed in a dividend equivalent redemption, under Prop. Reg. § 1.302-
5(a)(3), the unrecovered basis is treated as a deferred loss that can be used by the shareholder when
(1) the conditions of §§ 302(b)(1), (2), or (3) are satisfied, or (2) when all the shares of the issuing
corporation (or its successor) become worthless under § 165(g). [The current rules in Reg.§1.302-
2(c) that permit unrecovered basis in the redeemed shares to shift to other shares would be revoked.]
* Dividend equivalent reorganization exchanges - If boot is
received in a reorganization that qualifies under § 368, the proposed regulations provide that the
overall reorganization exchange is taken into account in determining whether a particular exchange
in which boot is received is dividend equivalent. For example, if a shareholder exchanges one class
of stock for stock and boot and exchanges another class of stock solely for boot, the effect of the
overall exchange is considered in determining whether each particular exchange is dividend
equivalent. If the boot received in the exchange is a dividend equivalent, an exchange of a class of
stock solely for boot is an exchange to which § 302(d), and thus § 301, rather than § 356(a)(2),
applies. However, the boot is treated as received pro rata, on a share-by-share basis, with respect to
each share in the class. If both stock and boot are received with respect to a surrendered class (or
classes) of stock and the boot is dividend equivalent, all of the consideration received in the
exchange is treated as received pro rata (by value) with respect to all surrendered shares in the class.
Prop. Reg. §§ 1.354-1(d); 1.356-1(b). However, economically reasonable designations between
classes of stock or securities (as opposed to within a class) generally will be recognized.
0 Redemptions given sale or exchange treatment by § 302 -
The proposed regulations do not change the rule that in a § 302(a) redemption, a shareholder who
owns shares of stock with different bases can decide whether to surrender high basis shares, low
basis shares or any combination thereof, as permitted by Reg. §1.1012-1(c). The acquiring
corporation shall take a cost basis in the stock of the issuing corporation that it acquires under§ 1012. If § 304 applies and the sale of issuer stock is treated as a sale or exchange, rather than as a
§ 301 distribution, the basis and the holding period of the common stock of the acquiring corporation
that is treated as redeemed will be the same as the basis and holding period of the stock of the
issuing corporation actually surrendered.
* Reorganization exchanges resulting in sale or exchange
treatment - If boot received in a reorganization is not a dividend equivalent, § 302(a) applies to the
extent shares are exchanged solely for boot. A shareholder can elect to surrender high basis shares,
low basis shares or any combination thereof in a non-dividend equivalent redemption, a shareholder
engaging in a reorganization exchange in which the boot is not dividend equivalent can designate the
shares with respect to which the boot was received and the amount of boot received with respect to
each share, provided that the terms of the exchange are economically reasonable. Prop. Reg. §
1.354-1(d)(1). If solely boot is received with respect to a share, the shareholder will recognize gain
or loss with respect to that share pursuant to § 302(a), and § 356(a)(1) will not apply. Nor will §
356(c) deny the loss. Prop. Reg. § 1.354-1(d)(2).
* Section 351 exchanges - Prop. Reg. § 1.351-2(b) would
provide that the amount of gain recognized under § 351(b) as a result of the receipt of boot, is
determined by allocating the fair market value of each category of consideration received by a
transferor among the transferred properties in proportion to each property's relative fair market
value. This is the approach of Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140. Prop. Reg. § 1.358-2(g) provides as
a general rule that in a § 351 exchange, the aggregate basis of the property transferred (as adjusted
for gain and boot) is allocated among all of the shares of stock received in proportion to the fair
market values of each share of stock. However, under Prop. Reg. § 1.358-2(g), if a shareholder
transfers stock and other property, the separate bases will be preserved in the § 358 basis of the stock
received in the exchange, provided that no liabilities are assumed in the exchange.
4. Does this case mean an "accidental" benefit conferred on a corporate
shareholder is not a constructive dividend? Cox Enterprises Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2009-134 (6/9/09). A member of Cox Enterprises affiliated group transferred the assets
of a television station to a partnership in exchange for a majority interest in the partnership; two
family partnerships, the partners of which were family members of three trusts that together held
a 98 percent majority interest in Cox Enterprises contributed cash to the partnership and received
minority interests. The IRS asserted that under § 311 (b), the Cox Enterprises group recognized
income on the constructive transfer to the trusts of a portion of the partnership interest it received
in exchange for the assets because the partnership interest received by the Cox Enterprises group
member. that transferred the assets was worth $60.5 million less than the value of the transferred
assets. The Commissioner's theory was that the Cox Enterprise group had constructively
distributed a dividend of an economic portion of its partnership interest to the shareholder trusts
by transferring to family partnerships 'for the benefit of the shareholder trusts. On the
taxpayer's motion for summary judgment, for purposes of the motion, the $60.5 million disparity
was between the value of the assets and the value of the partnership interest it received in return
was admitted. Judge Halpern found that the undisputed facts established that Cox Enterprises'
primary purpose was not to provide an economic benefit to them and, derivatively, to the
shareholder trusts. In summarizing the applicable case law, he quoted Gilbert v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 60, 64 (1980): "'[T]ransfers between related corporations can result in constructive
dividends to their common shareholder if they were made primarily for his benefit and if he
received a direct or tangible benefit.' If the benefit to the shareholder is 'indirect or derivative in
nature, there is no constructive dividend."' Applying this legal standard to his factual conclusion,
there was not a constructive dividend to the shareholder trusts, even though an economic benefit
was conferred on the beneficiaries of the shareholder trusts. Judge Halpern found the transfer of
the television station to the partnership had a business purpose and that because a gratuitous
transfer of assets would have violated the board of directors' fiduciary duty, a purpose to make a
gratuitous transfer could not be assumed to exist merely due to the value disparity. Accordingly,
no gain was recognized under § 311(b). Judge Halpern rejected the Commissioner's argument
that to find a constructive dividend "it is only necessary to establish that appreciated assets left
the corporate solution ***, for the benefit of its Shareholder Trusts, to establish that there has
been a distribution with respect to [the] Shareholder Trusts' stock to which section 311 applies."
5. Reducing E&P for nondeductible expenses. Rev. Rul. 2009-25, 2009-38
I.R.B. 365 (9/4/09). Interest paid by a corporation on a loan to purchase a life insurance policy
on an individual for which a deduction has been disallowed under § 264(a)(4) reduces earnings
and profits for the taxable year in which the interest would have been allowable as a deduction
but for its allowance under § 264(a)(4). It does not further reduce earnings and profits when the
death benefit is received under the life insurance contract.
C. Liquidations
D. S Corporations
1. Short-term beneficial treatment for charitable contributions through an S
corporation teaches why you shouldn't make future charitable contributions of appreciated
property through an S corporation unless the law changes. Rev. Rul. 2008-16, 2008-11 I.R.B.
585 (3/17/08). If an S corporation made a charitable contribution of appreciated property during
a taxable year beginning after 12/31/05, and before 1/1/08, the shareholder's deduction may not
exceed the sum of: (1) the shareholder's pro rata share of the fair market value of the contributed
property over the contributed property's adjusted tax basis, and (2) the amount of the § 1366(d)
loss limitation amount that is allocable to the contributed property's adjusted basis under Reg.
§ 1.1366-2(a)(4). Any disallowed portion of the contribution retains its character and is carried
over.
a. The Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2007 added § 1366(d)(4),
which provides, in effect, that the basis limitation rule of § 1366(d)(1) does not apply to the
amount of deductible appreciation in the contributed property in taxable years beginning after
12/31/05, and before 1/1/08.
b. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 amended § 1367(a)(2) to
provide that the decrease in shareholder basis under § 1367(a)(2)(B) by reason of a charitable
contribution of property is the amount equal to the shareholder's pro rata share of the adjusted
basis of such property in taxable years beginning after 12/31/05, and before 1/1/08.
c. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended
through 2009 the application of § 1366(d)(4).
0 Absent further statutory change, charitable contributions
made by S corporations in subsequent taxable years are subject to the law in existence prior to these
amendments [i.e., stock basis will be reduced by the full amount of the deduction]. The IRS and
Treasury Department are considering issuing guidance on the treatment of charitable contributions
made by S corporations in subsequent taxable years.
2. Proposed regulations restrict the use of open account debt to increase
basis and deduct losses. REG-144859-04, Section 1367 Regarding Open Account Debt, 72 F.R.
18417 (4/12/07). Prop. Reg. § 1.1367-2(a), (c)(2), (d), & (e), Ex.6, would limit open account
debt from an S corporation to a shareholder to debt not evidenced by written instruments for
which the principal amount of aggregate advances, net of repayments, does not exceed $10,000
at the close of any day during the S corporation's taxable year. The proposed regulations will
reverse the result in Brooks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-204 (8/25/05), which allowed an
S corporation shareholder to borrow money from a bank, advance the funds to the shareholder's
S corporation which increased basis and allowed loss deductions, receive payment of the debt in
the subsequent taxable year, repay the bank, then at the end of the year again borrow funds to
avoid gain on release from the low basis debt and deduct further losses. Thus the taxpayer was
able to create endless deferral of gain. The preamble to the proposed regulations indicates that
the purpose of the open account debt provisions is administrative simplicity. Whenever advances
not evidenced by written instruments exceed $10,000, the indebtedness will be treated as a
separate indebtedness for which payments and advances are separately determined for purposes
of basis and gain recognition on repayment.
a. Regulations are now final, with relaxing modifications. T.D.
9428, Section 1367 Regarding Open Account Debt, 73 F.R. 62199 (10/20/08). The final
regulations adopt a $25,000 aggregate principal threshold amount per shareholder for open
account debt. Generally, this determination is to be made at the end of the taxable year - with
exceptions for dispositions of shareholder debt and termination of a shareholder's interest (for
which the determination is to be made immediately before the event).
3. Gitlitz by analogy? "Not," says the Tax Court. Nathel v. Commissioner,
131 T.C. No. 17 (12/17/08). Prior to 2001, the taxpayer had claimed losses passed-though from
an S corporation in an amount that exceeded his stock basis but which were properly allowable
under § 1366(d)(1)(B) because there were outstanding loans to the corporation from the
taxpayer-shareholder. The taxpayer's basis in the loans to the corporation was reduced under
§ 1367(d)(2)(A) to $112,547. In 2001 the corporation paid $649,775 on the loan, which
exceeded the taxpayer's $112,547 basis in the loan by $537,228. Later in 2001, pursuant to a
restructuring of the ownership of the S corporation and two other corporations owned by the
taxpayer, his brother, and a third party (which left the taxpayer with no ownership in the
corporation), the taxpayer made a capital contribution of $537,228 to the S corporation, which
equaled the amount by which the loan repayment exceeded the taxpayer's basis in the debt. The
consideration for the contribution was the assumption by another shareholder of the taxpayer's
obligation on guarantees of loans from banks to the corporation. In calculating the gain realized
upon receipt of the loan repayment, the taxpayer treated the capital contribution as income under
§ 1366(a)(1) to the S corporation, although excludable income under § 118, and therefore as
restoring or increasing under § 1367(b)(2)(B) his bases in the outstanding loans before
repayment (rather than increasing his stock basis), thus eliminating any gain. Relying on Gitlitz
v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206, 216 (2001), the taxpayer argued that because § 118 excludes
capital contributions from the gross income of an S corporation, capital contributions are
"permanently excludible" and are thus "tax-exempt income" under Reg. § 1.1366- l(a)(2)(viii),
and that as such it is included as an item of the S corporation's income to for purposes of§ 1366(a)(1) and the resulting § 1367 basis adjustments. The Tax Court (Judge Swift) rejected
the taxpayer's argument and upheld the deficiency.
By attempting to treat petitioners' capital contributions to [the corporation] as
income to [the corporation], [taxpayers] in effect seek to undermine three cardinal
and longstanding principles of the tax law: First, that a shareholder's
contributions to the capital of a corporation increase the basis of the shareholder's
stock in the corporation; ... sec. 1. 118-1, Income Tax Regs.; second, that equity
(i.e., a shareholder's contribution to the capital of a corporation) and debt (i.e., a
shareholder's loan to the corporation) are distinguishable and are treated
differently by both the Code and the courts ... ; and third, that contributions to the
capital of a corporation do not constitute income to the corporation; sec. 118; ...
sec. 1. 118-1, Income Tax Regs.
We do not believe that the Gitlitz holding or the provisions of subchapter S,
namely sections 1366(a)(1), 1367(a)(1)(A), and 1367(b)(2)(B), should be
interpreted to override these three longstanding principles of tax law.
0 Reg. § 1.118-1 provides that "if a corporation requires
additional funds for conducting its business and obtains such funds through *** payments by its
shareholders *** such amounts do not constitute income." Thus, shareholder capital contributions
are not treated as items of income to an S corporation under § 1366(a)(1) and are not taken into
account in calculating the "net increase" under § 1367(b)(2)(B) for the purpose of restoring or
increasing a shareholder's tax basis in loans a shareholder made to an S corporation. Such capital
contributions are not "tax-exempt income" under § 1366(a)(1) nor under Reg. § 1.1366- 1(a)(2)(viii)
and do not restore or increase the bases in shareholder loans under § 1367(b)(2)(B).
4. Disregarded QSub is still a bank subject to reduced interest
deductions for interest incurred to carry tax-exempt obligations. Vainisi v. Commissioner,
132 T.C. No. 1 (1/15/09). Sections 291(a)(3), (e)(1)(B), and 265(b)((3) disallow interest
deductions of a financial institution incurred to carry tax-exempt obligations, but allow an 80
percent deduction for interest on tax-exempts acquired after 12/31/82, and before 8/7/86, and for
certain qualified tax exempt obligations as defined in § 265(b)(3)(B). Section 1361 allows
certain financial institutions to elect to be treated as an S corporation, and further allows an S
corporation to treat a financial institution as a qualified S corporation subsidiary (QSub). Under
§ 1361(b)(3)(A), a QSub is not treated as a separate corporation except as provided in
regulations. Reg. § 1.1361-4(a)(3) provides that in the case of a bank that is an S corporation or a
QSub of an S corporation, any special rules applicable to banks will apply to an S corporation or
a QSub that is bank. The court (Judge Foley) held that under these provisions the limitations of
§ 291(a)(3) are applicable to interest deductions claimed by a parent S corporation for interest
expense generated by the S corporation's QSub bank. The court also held that Reg. § 1.1361-
4(a)(3) is consistent with the enactment of § 1361 (b)(3)(A) and its legislative history.
5. Suspending the built-in gains tax to goose the economy by
encouraging disinvestment in business assets. Section 125 1(a) of the 2009 ARRTA amended
Code § 1374 to exempt an S corporation from the built-in gains tax for taxable years beginning
in 2009 and 2010 if the seventh taxable year in the recognition period preceded the 2009 and
2010 tax years. This rule applies separately for property acquired from C corporations in
carryover basis transactions.
6. Poof A formerly unincorporated entity can move directly to S
corporation status. Rev. Rul. 2009-15, 2009-21 I.R.B. 1035 (5/7/09). When an unincorporated
entity taxed as a partnership becomes a corporation for federal tax purposes, the corporation is
eligible to elect to be taxed as an S corporation effective for its first taxable year as a
corporation. Additionally, the corporation will not be deemed to have an intervening short
taxable year in which it was a C corporation. These results occur whether: (1) the entity is an
unincorporated entity classified as a partnership that both (a) elects under Reg. § 301.7701-
3(c)(1)(i) to be treated as a corporation, and (b) elects under § 1362(a) to be taxed as an S
corporation, with both elections effective on the same date; or (2) the entity is an unincorporated
entity classified as a partnership that both (a) converts into a corporation under a state law
formless conversion statute, and (b) elects under § 1362(a) to be taxed as an S corporation, with
both elections effective on the same date.
7. Roth IRA is not an eligible S corporation shareholder. Taproot
Administrative Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 9 (9/29/09). The taxpayer S
corporation's sole shareholder was a custodial Roth IRA account. Eligible S corporation
shareholders as defined in § 1361 include individuals, estates, certain specifically designated
trusts and certain exempt organizations. With an effective date after the year involved in this
case, § 1361(c)(2)(A)(iv) was enacted to allow a bank whose stock is held by an IRA or Roth
IRA to elect S corporation status. Reg. § 1.1361-1(e)(1) provides that a person for whom S
corporation stock is held by a nominee, guardian, custodian or agent is deemed to be the S
corporation shareholder. However, in Rev. Rul. 92-73, 1992-2 C.B. 224, the IRS ruled that a
trust that qualifies as an IRA is not a permitted S corporation shareholder. Declaring the issue as
one of first impression, and indicating that under Skidmore deference to revenue rulings depends
upon their persuasiveness, the court (Judge Wherry) agreed with the IRS's rationale in the ruling
that IRAs are not eligible S corporation shareholders because the beneficiary of the IRA is not
taxed currently on the trust's share of corporate income unlike the beneficiary of a custodial
account or the grantor of a grantor trust who is subject to tax on the pass-through corporate
income. (The income of the corporation owned by a Roth IRA would never be subject to tax.)
E. Reorganizations
1. Continuity of interest is satisfied when the target corporation's
creditors get stock in the acquirer. T.D. 9434, Creditor Continuity of Interest, 73 FR 75566
(12/12/08). In 2005 the Treasury Department published proposed regulations describing the
circumstances in which a corporation's creditors will be treated as holding a proprietary interest
in a target corporation immediately before a potential reorganization. REG-163314-03, Proposed
Rules, Transactions Involving the Transfer of No Net Value, 70 F.R. 11903-01 (3/10/05). These
regulations have been finalized with only minor modifications and clarifications, and they apply
for continuity of interest purposes both within and outside of bankruptcy proceedings. The
regulations adopt the holding in Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179
(1942), that a transfer of assets pursuant to which creditors of a bankrupt concern became the
controlling stockholders of a new corporation provided the requisite continuity of interest for a
reorganization. The preamble notes extending the reorganization rules to reorganizations of
insolvent corporations outside of bankruptcy is consistent with Congress's intent to facilitate the
rehabilitation of troubled corporations. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(6) describes the circumstances in
which creditors of a corporation generally, and which creditors in particular, will be treated as
holding a proprietary interest in a target corporation immediately before a potential
reorganization. In general, the regulation adopts the standard for reorganizations under
§ 368(a)(1)(G) recommended in the Senate Finance Committee Report to the Bankruptcy Tax
Act of 1980. Claims of the most senior class of creditors that receive a proprietary interest in the
issuing corporation and claims of all equal classes of creditors (the senior claims) and all junior
claims represent proprietary interests in the target corporation. The value of proprietary interests
in the target corporation represented by the senior claims is calculated with reference to the
average treatment for all senior claims. The value of a senior claim's proprietary interest in the
target is determined by multiplying the fair market value of the creditor's claim by a fraction, the
numerator of which is the fair market value of the proprietary interests in the issuing corporation
that are received in the aggregate in exchange for the senior claims, and the denominator of
which is the sum of the amount of money and the fair market value of all other consideration
(including the proprietary interests in the issuing corporation) received in the aggregate in
exchange for such claims. The value of the proprietary interest in the target corporation
represented by a junior claim is the fair market value of the junior claim. Thus, there is 100
percent continuity of interest if each senior claim is satisfied with the same ratio of stock to
nonstock consideration and no junior claim is satisfied with nonstock consideration. Where only
one class of creditors receives stock, more than a de minimis amount of acquiring corporation
stock must be exchanged for the creditors' proprietary interests relative to the total consideration
received by the insolvent target corporation, its shareholders, and its creditors, before the stock
will be counted for purposes of continuity of interest.
2. Some rules designed to trace basis in an era of paper stock certificates
no longer work. Notice 2009-4, 2009-2 I.R.B. 251 (12/12/08). This notice explains the guidance
that the IRS contemplates issuing regarding the determination of the transferred basis in stock
that has been acquired in a § 368(a)(1)(B) reorganization. Rev. Proc. 81-70, 1981-2 C.B. 729,
which provided guidelines for surveying surrendering shareholders to determine the basis of
Target stock and sampling and estimation procedures to address administrative burdens and
shareholder nonresponsiveness is outdated because at the time Rev. Proc. 81-70 was published,
most stock was registered stock, but now stock of public companies is primarily held in street
name, often with several tiers of nominee owners, each subject to confidentiality.
F. Corporate Divisions
1. "Hot stock" cools off in a DSAG. T.D. 9435, Guidance Regarding the
Treatment of Stock of a Controlled Corporation Under Section 355(a)(3)(B), 73 FR 75946-01
(12/25/08). The Treasury has promulgated Temp. Reg. § 1.355-2T(g), dealing with the "hot
stock" rule of § 355(a)(3)(B) to conform to the 2006 amendments of § 335(b)(3), creating the
"SAG" rules, which treat a corporation's SAG [separate affiliated group] as a single corporation
for purposes of determining whether the active trade or business requirements of § 355 have
been met. Section 355(a)(3)(B) provides that stock of a controlled corporation that has been
acquired by the distributing corporation in a taxable transaction within the five year period
preceding distribution to stockholders otherwise qualifying under § 355 will be treated as boot
taxable to the stockholders. Generally speaking, the temporary regulations provide that the hot
stock of § 355(a)(3)(B) rule does not apply to any acquisition of stock of controlled where
controlled is a DSAG [separate affiliated group of the distributing corporation] member at any
time after the acquisition (but prior to the distribution of controlled). Transfers of controlled
stock owned by DSAG members immediately before and immediately after the transfer are
disregarded and are not treated as acquisitions for purposes of the hot stock rule. (Prop. Reg.§ 1.355- 3(b)(1)(ii) would apply a similar rule for purposes of the ATB requirement.) The
temporary regulations also incorporate the exception of former Reg. § 1.355-2(g), which
provides that the hot stock rule does not apply to acquisitions of controlled stock by distributing
from a member of the affiliated group (as defined in Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(4)(iv)) of which
distributing was a member. The regulations generally apply to distributions occurring after
December 15, 2008, but there are a number of transition rules. Taxpayers also may elect to apply
the regulations to distributions made after May 17, 2006.
a. REG-150670-07, Guidance Regarding the Treatment of Stock of a
Controlled Corporation Under Section 355(a)(3)(B), 73 F.R. 75979 (12/1508). The Temporary
Regulations are also published as proposed regulations.
G. Affiliated Corporations and Consolidated Returns
1. The "single entity" theory of consolidated returns only goes so far
when it conflicts with the actual rules. Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d
2008-7365 (N.D. I11. 12/22/08). Brunswick acquired the stock of Bayliner Marine and Sea Ray in
December 1986 and made a § 338(g) election (at a time when pre-TRA 1986 § 337 shielded gain
recognition and § 338 provided a tax-free basis step up). Brunswick claimed a refund on the
ground that the § 168 ACRS deductions with respect to the stepped-up basis should have been
computed by applying the half-year convention to Brunswick's taxable year (a calendar year),
because it was the parent of the group filing the consolidated return on which the depreciation
deductions were reported. Brunswick argued that United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United
States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001) requires that all tax items be considered at the consolidated group
level, not the subsidiary level. The government took the position that the half-year convention
for computing first year § 168 ACRS deductions should be determined with reference to
Bayliner Marine's and Sea Ray's short taxable years, beginning the day after the election and
ending on December 31th. The court agreed with the government, concluding that Reg.
§§ 1.1502-11(a)(1) and 1.1502-12 provide that the separate taxable income of each member of
the consolidated group, including depreciation deductions, must be computed, with certain
exceptions not relevant on the facts of the case, on the subsidiary level. Looking at the subsidiary
level, New Bayliner and New Sea Ray had short taxable years. This means that under
§ 168(f)(5), they must prorate their depreciation deductions in computing their separate taxable
incomes that are included on Brunswick's consolidated return. Thus, the short taxable years of
"New Bayliner" and "New Sea Ray" were the relevant tax years, not Brunswick's taxable year.
The court also rejected, as "inconsistent with the statutory scheme" Brunswick's argument that
under § 338, it, not New Bayliner and New Sea Ray, was the purchaser of the subsidiaries assets
in the deemed sale and purchase.
2. Are "new and more precise mechanics" synonymous with "ever-more
complicated"? REG-107592-00, Consolidated Returns; Intercompany Obligations, 72 F.R.
55139 (9/28/07). The IRS has proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.1502-13(g) with respect to the
treatment of obligations between members of a consolidated group. Reg. 1.1502-13(g) applies to
-three types of transactions: (1) transactions in which an obligation between a group member and
a nonmember becomes an intercompany obligation - for example, the purchase by a
consolidated group member of another member's debt from a nonmember creditor or the
acquisition by a consolidated group member of stock of a nonmember creditor or debtor
(inbound transactions); (2) transactions in which an intercompany obligation ceases to be an
intercompany obligation - for example, the sale by a creditor member of another member's debt
to a nonmember or the deconsolidation of either the debtor or creditor member (outbound
transactions); and (3) transactions in which an intercompany obligation is assigned or
extinguished within the consolidated group (intragroup transactions). The proposed regulations
"adopt new and more precise mechanics" for the application of the deemed satisfaction-
reissuance model to intragroup and outbound transactions. The following sequence of events to
occur immediately before, and independently of, the actual transaction: (1) the debtor is deemed
to satisfy the obligation for a cash amount equal to the obligation's fair market value; and (2) the
debtor is deemed to immediately reissue the obligation to the original creditor for that same cash
amount. The parties are then treated as engaging in the actual transaction but with the new
obligation. With respect to inbound transactions, the IRS and the Treasury Department have
concluded that the mechanics of the deemed satisfaction-reissuance model and its application
produce appropriate results and, therefore, no change has been proposed.
a. Finalized with various clarifications! T.D. 9442, Consolidated
Returns; Intercompany Obligations, 72 F.R. 55139 (1/5/09). The proposed regulations have been
finalized without any significant change in the basic framework of the rules. Some of the anti-
abuse rules have been modified. The final regulations also clarify that the routine modification
exception applies to a deemed exchange of intercompany debt for intercompany debt that occurs
under Reg. § 1.1001-3 as a result of an assumption transaction. The final regulations also clarify
that an exception for certain § 351 nonrecognition exchanges is available for transactions in
which a debtor's obligation is assumed. An exception also applies to exchanges to which both
§§ 332 and 337(a) apply in which no amount is recognized by either the creditor or debtor
member.
3. Modernizing the "controlled group" definition regulations. T.D. 9451,
Guidance Necessary to Facilitate Business Election Filing; Finalization of Controlled Group
Qualification Rules, 74 F.R. 25147 (5/26/09). This Treasury decision has finalized Prop. Reg.
§ 1.1563-1, REG-161919-05, 71 F.R. 76955 (12/22/06), with no substantive changes. Temp.
Reg. § 1.1563-1T has been removed. Amendments to § 1563(a) in 2004 expanded the definition
of a brother-sister controlled group to a group of corporations if five or fewer persons who are
individuals, estates, or trusts own stock more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than 50 percent of the total value of shares of all
classes of stock of each corporation, taking into account the stock ownership of each such person
only to the extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such corporation. Prior
to the 2004 amendments, the definition also required the same five or fewer taxpayers to own at
least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at
least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of each corporation (the 80
percent requirement). The revised regulation reflects the elimination of the 80 percent
requirement from the § 1563(a)(2) definition of a brother-sister controlled group. The regulations
also clarify an S corporation is treated as a component member of a controlled group only to the
extent that a particular tax, and thus a particular tax benefit item to which § 1561 (a), applies. In
addition, as amended, the regulations refer generically to the tax benefit items listed in § 1561(a)
rather than refer specifically to those items by listing and describing each one. Each component
member of a controlled group must annually file a form (Form 1120, Schedule 0) with its tax
return indicating whether or not an apportionment plan is in effect, and any change is made to
the group's apportionment of its § 1561(a) tax benefit items from the previous year. The new
regulations also provide ministerial changes to facilitate e-filing.
4. A controlled corporation is not a controlled corporation, except when
it is controlled. REG-13505-07, Clarification of Controlled Group Qualification Rules, 74 F.R.
49829 (9/28/09). Section 1563(a) defines groups of controlled corporations based on ownership
of voting control and value of stock in parent-subsidiary and brother-sister controlled groups (or
a combination). Section 1563(b) excludes certain controlled corporations from being treated as
component members, including, among others, a corporation that was a member of the group for
less than half of the days of a testing period, foreign corporations that do not have effectively
connected income. Section 1561(a) limits the component members of a controlled group to one
application of certain benefits and limitations, such as one bite at the taxable income brackets of
§ 11. In addition, some provisions, such as § 41 which provides a credit for increased research
expenditures, treat the members of a controlled group as a single corporation. Controlled group
for these purposes is defined by reference to § 1563(a). The preamble to the proposed regulation
states that some taxpayers have taken the position that the limitation of § 41 and similar
provisions is applicable only to component members of a controlled group. The proposed
regulation would add § 1.1563-1(a)(1)(ii) to provide that in determining whether a corporation is
included as a member of a controlled group, § 1563(b) would not be taken into account. The IRS
indicates its belief that the provision is supported by clear statutory language.
H. Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
1. Can't the IRS spell FANNIE MAE and FREDDIE MAC when $5
trillion is at stake? Notice 2008-76, 2008-39 I.R.B. 768 (9/7/08). Sections 1117(a) and (b) of
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289 (2008), authorize the
Treasury Department to purchase obligations and other securities issued by FANNIE MAE and
FREDDIE MAC - described in the notice as "certain entities" to protect the names of the guilty
parties. The IRS and Treasury will issue regulations under § 382(m) that will provide that
notwithstanding any other provision of the Code or the regulations, for purposes of § 382, with
respect to a corporation as to which there was such an acquisition, the term "testing date" (as
defined in Reg. § 1.382-2(a)(4)) will not include any date on or after the date on which the
United States (or any agency or instrumentality thereof) acquires stock or an option to acquire
stock in the corporation. The regulations will apply on or after 9/7/08. Thus, the bailout of
FANNIE MAE and FREDDIE MAC will not trigger an ownership change invoking the § 382
limitations on NOLs..
0 Various media outlets attribute the substance of the
provisions of the notice to Henry Paulson, who is reported to have ordered the IRS to issue the
notice. See http://www.cfo.com/article.cfin/l 2079734/c_12079931 ?f-home_todayinfmance
2. Who needs Congress to legislate billions of tax benefits via loss
carryovers from failing banks which have undergone ownership changes? Notice 2008-83, 2008-
42 I.R.B. 905 (10/1/08). Taxpayers which have acquired failing banks will not be limited by
§ 382(h) in their deductions for losses on loans or bad debts. Under this notice, these losses
"shall not be treated as a built-in loss or a deduction that is attributable to periods before the
[ownership] change date." This notice applies whether the acquirer is a private investor
(including another bank) or is the Treasury.
a. Congress tells Treasury and the IRS, "You can't do that, but
we can grandfather what you did. So there, take this." Section 1261 of 2009 ARRTA, an
uncodified provision, generally voided Notice 2008-83 for ownership changes occurring after
1/16/09. However, Notice 2008-83 will be applied to (1) any ownership change occurring on or
before 1/16/09, and (2) any ownership change that occurs after 1/16/09, if the change (a) is
pursuant to a written binding contract entered in to on or before 1/16/09, or (b) was described on
or before that date in a public announcement or in a filing with the SEC required by reason of the
ownership change.
3. Again, who needs Congress to permit continued use of loss carryovers
of corporations whose toxic paper is acquired by Treasury? Notice 2008-100, 2008-44 I.R.B.
1081 (10/15/08). This notice provides guidance on the application of § 382 to loss corporations
whose financial instruments are acquired by Treasury as part of the Capital Purchase Program
pursuant to EESA. Under this program, Treasury will acquire preferred stock and warrants from
qualifying financial institutions. This notice specifies that Treasury will not be treated as a 5
percent shareholder for this purpose.
a. Notice 2009-14, 2009-7 I.R.B. 516 (2/2/09). This Notice amplifies
and supersedes Notice 2008-100, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1081, regarding the [non]application of § 382
to corporations the stock or options of which are acquired by the Treasury Department under the
Troubled Asset Relief Program. This guidance is optional for taxpayer use, and is focused on
treatment of debt, preferred stock, common stock, warrants, and redemption of stock held by the
Treasury Department. Any capital contributions made by the Treasury pursuant to TARP
programs will not be considered to have been made as part of a plan the principal purpose of
which was to avoid or increase any § 382 limitation.
b. Section 1262 of the 2009 ARRTA added new Code § 382(n),
which provides that the § 382 limitations on NOLs do not apply to certain ownership changes
under a restructuring plan which (1) is required under a loan agreement or a commitment for a
line of credit entered into with the Treasury Department under the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, and (2) is intended to result in a rationalization of the costs,
capitalization, and capacity with regard to the manufacturing workforce of, and suppliers to, the
taxpayer and its subsidiaries. This waiver of § 382 does not apply, however, to an ownership
change if, immediately after the ownership change, any person (other than a VEBA under
§ 501(c)(9)) owns either fifty percent or more of the total combined voting power or value of the
stock of the old loss corporation. Related persons (as defined in §§ 267(b) or 707(b)) and persons
who are members of a group acting in concert (§ 382(n)(3)(B)) are treated as a single person.
The waiver of § 382 does not apply to a subsequent ownership change, unless that ownership
change also is described in the preceding sentence. Section 382 is effective for ownership
changes occurring after 2/17/09.
c. Notice 2009-38, 2009-18 I.R.B. 901 (4/14/09). This notice
amplifies and supersedes Notice 2009-14 to provide guidance to corporate issuers with respect to
Treasury's acquisition of instruments pursuant to the following EESA programs: (I) the Capital
Purchase Program for publicly-traded issuers (Public CPP); (ii) the Capital Purchase Program for
private issuers (Private CPP); (iii) the Capital Purchase Program for S corporations (S Corp
CPP); (iv) the Targeted Investment Program (TARP TIP); (v) the Asset Guarantee Program; (vi)
the Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program; (vii) the Automotive Industry
Financing Program; and (viii) the Capital Assistance Program for publicly-traded issuers (TARP
CAP).
4. Help! Stop me before I give away any more money without
congressional action. Notice 2008-101, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1082 (10/15/08). This notice specifies
that TARP funds received by banks for "troubled assets" will not be treated as "the provision of
Federal financial assistance" within the meaning of § 597. That Code section requires that
"Federal financial assistance shall be properly taken into account by the institution from which
the assets were acquired."
VII. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Formation and Taxable Years
1. I.R. 2008-110 (9/25/08). The IRS is considering the issue of guidance
regarding technical termination of publicly traded partnerships under § 708(b) resulting in
multiple taxable years of an affected partnership due to transfers of more than 50 percent of a
partnership's capital and profits interests in a 12-month period.
B. Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and Outside Basis
1. Partnership debt for equity swaps. Holy Asymmetry! The partners
have COD income but the creditor doesn't have a loss deduction. REG-164370-05, Section
108(e)(8) Application to Partnerships, 73. F.R. 64903 (10/31/08). As amended by the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, § 108(e)(8) provides that for purposes of determining COD income
of a partnership, if debtor partnership transfers a capital or profits interest to a creditor in
satisfaction of either recourse or nonrecourse partnership debt the partnership is treated as having
satisfied the debt with an amount of money equal to the fair market value of the interest. Any
COD income recognized under § 108(e)(8) passes through to the partners immediately before the
discharge. Prop. Reg. § 1.108-8 would provide that for purposes of § 108(e)(8), the fair market
value of a partnership interest received by the creditor is the liquidation value of that debt-for-
equity interest, if: (1) the debtor partnership maintains capital accounts in accordance with Reg.
§ 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iv), (2) the creditor, debtor partnership, and its partners treat the fair market
value of the debt as equaling the liquidation value of the partnership interest for purposes of
determining the tax consequences of the debt-for-equity exchange, (3) the debt-for-equity
exchange is an arm's-length transaction, and (4) subsequent to the exchange, neither the
partnership redeems nor any person related to the partnership purchases the creditor's
partnership interest as part of a plan that has as a principal purpose the avoidance of COD
income by the partnership. If these conditions are not satisfied, all of the facts and circumstances
are considered in determining the fair market value of the debt-for-equity interest for purposes of
applying § 108(e)(8). Prop. Reg. § 1.721-1(d) would provide nonrecognition of loss in a debt-
for-partnership interest exchange in which the liquidation value of the partnership interest is less
than the outstanding principal balance of the debt. The creditor's basis in the partnership is
determined under § 722. However, the proposed regulations provide that § 721 does not apply to
the transfer of a partnership interest to a creditor in satisfaction of a partnership's indebtedness
for unpaid rent, royalties, or interest on indebtedness (including accrued original issue discount).
In addition, the proposed regulations do not supersede the gain recognition rules of § 453B
regarding dispositions of installment obligations. The proposed regulations will be effective
when final regulations are published in the Federal Register.
2. Rip Van Winkle awakened. After 23 years Treasury has proposed
regulations under § 706(d). REG-144689-04, Determination of Distributive Share When a
Partner's Interest Changes, 74 F.R. 17119 (4/13/09). Section 706(d)(1), originally enacted in
1976 and amended in 1984, provides that in any taxable year in which there is a change in a
partner's interest, each partner's distributive share of partnership items shall be determined under
a method prescribed by regulations to take into account the partners' varying interests during the
year. Pre-1976 regulations, Reg. § 1.706-(1)(c)(2), mandated the use of the interim closing of the
books method, unless the partnership elected a proration method. The proposed regulations
would adopt these rules under the current statutory provision. The proposed regulation would
require the partnership to split the taxable year into segments representing periods before and
after a partner's interest has changed then allocate partnership items under either method to the
various segments. Although the proposed regulations would apply to a change in a partner's
interest attributable to a disposition of a partners entire interest or a partial interest, the proposed
regulations would not apply to changes in allocations of partnership items among
contemporaneous partners that satisfy the allocation rules of § 704(b), provided that a
reallocation is not attributable to a capital contribution to the partnership or a distribution of
money or property that is a return of capital. The proposed regulations would also provide safe
harbors for changes in the interests of partners in a service partnership under a reasonable
method that complies with § 704(b) for taking into account varying interests during the year, and
for publically traded units of a publically traded partnership that uses a semi-monthly
convention. The proposed regulations would be applicable to partnership taxable years beginning
after the date of publication of final regulations, but not before taxable years beginning after
December 31, 2009.
C. Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership and Partners
1. Careful capital accounts and tax accounts are necessary to avoid
recognition of gain. Robertson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-91 (4/29/09). The
taxpayers, husband and wife, were 51 and 49 percent partners in an automobile engine repair and
restoration business operated as an LLC. The LLC incurred debt to finance land and building
acquisitions and operating expenses. The partnership returns were prepared late by a tax return
preparer who was under investigation by the IRS. The returns were filed late. The preparer died
after the returns were filed and the preparer's landlord disposed of the preparer's records,
including the records of the taxpayers' LLC. With respect to a sale of the partnership assets,
followed by distributions of money, the IRS asserted deficiencies claiming that the taxpayers had
no basis in their partnership interests to offset distributions in one year, and that proceeds on the
sale of partnership assets in a second year resulted in capital gain. The court (Judge Goeke)
determined that the taxpayers failed to establish their partnership basis with adequate records,
although the court indicated that the taxpayers' testimony was honest.
0 The court also held that reliance on the return preparer for
timely filings did not relieve the taxpayers of their obligations to timely file returns and imposed late
filing penalties under § 665 1(a)(1). However, the court found that the taxpayers reasonably relied on
the preparer to accurately report their income and rejected proposed negligence penalties under
§ 6662.
2. Layers within the partnership mixing bowl need comment. Notice
2009-70, 2009-34 I.R.B. 255 (8/12/09). Sections 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 require recognition of
built-in pre-contribution gain with respect to property contributed to a partnership on a
distribution of contributed property to a non-contributing partner, or other property to the
contributing partner, within seven years of the contribution. Regulations proposed in 2007
providing that in an assets-over partnership merger, the seven-year clock begins anew with
respect to built-in gain or loss with respect to property transferred from a merged partnership to
the continuing partnership (the surviving partnership whose members own 50% or more of the
partnership interests), but the clock dates back to the date of initial contribution with respect to
pre-merger gains and losses, creating layers of old and new built-in gains and losses. The
proposed regulations adopted the position of Notice 2005-15, 2005-1 C.B. 527, which was
withdrawn after complaints that the Notice was inconsistent with existing regulations.
Commentators raised numerous questions regarding application of the proposed regulations and
the examples, including problems with respect to application of the proposed regulations to
tiered partnerships. The IRS has again asked for comments on the proposed regulations,
addressing, among other things, whether additional events allowing revaluation of partnership
property should be included in Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f), how to provide for partnership
allocation of depreciation and other items among different layers, and how to deal with specified
issues in tiered partnerships. Comments are requested by 2/22/10.
D. Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers
1. Too many factors, proposed regulations on disguised sale of a
partnership interest are withdrawn. Ann. 2009-4, 2009-8 I.R.B. 597 (2/20/09). The IRS
withdraws proposed regulations § 1.707-7 (2004). Section 707(a)(2)(B) provides that that a
contribution by a partner in connection with a related distribution will under regulations be
treated as a disguised sale. Regulations proposed in 2004 would have expanded that concept to
provide that a transfer of money or property, including an assumption of liabilities, to a
partnership by a "purchasing partner" in connection with a related distribution to a "selling
partner" would be treated as a purchase and sale of a partnership interest rather than a
contribution and distribution. The latter transaction results in lower or no recognition by the
selling partner. The proposed regulations would have applied a multiple factor test to identify a
disguised sale of a partnership interest. The Tax Court in Colonnade Condominium, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 793 (1988), adopted a more elegant approach with an examination of
whether there is an adjustment in partnership capital accounts reflecting a contribution and
distribution, or whether there is simply a shift in the ownership of unchanged partnership capital.
The announcement indicates only that the Treasury Department and the IRS have considered
written comments regarding the proposed regulations and will continue to study the matter and
may issue guidance in the future. In the meantime, determinations whether a contribution and
related distribution constitute a sale of a partnership interest will be based on case law and the
legislative history to § 707(a)(2)(B).
E. Inside Basis Adjustments
1. Intervenor is not allowed to demand that an FPAA be remanded to
the IRS for an explanation of its views. Austin Investment Fund LLC v. United States, 103
A.F.T.R.2d 2009-607 (Fed. Cl. 1/6/09). In a refund action filed by an LLC through its tax
matters partner, LLC members sought to intervene with a motion to remand the case back to the
IRS for an explanation of the IRS position to support the adjustments made in the FPAA. The
court denied the motion pointing out that in cases seeking readjustment of partnership items in
an FPAA the court makes a de novo determination of all partnership items. Rewriting the FPAA
to include a statement of reasons would be unnecessary. In addition, the court indicated that the
intervenors cited no authority for their claim that the FPAA was required to be re-written to
comply with the Administrative Procedures Act.
F. Partnership Audit Rules
1. The wrong form letter gives these partners two-bites at litigating their
Son-of-BOSS shelter. JT USA LP v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 7 (10/6/08). The taxpayers
("the Gregorys") sold their business producing motocross and paintball accessories for a large
capital gain. The business was in a family partnership in which the taxpayer husband and wife
held both direct and indirect partnership interests (interests as members of an LLC that was a
member of the partnership being audited). The Gregorys were indirect partners, through both an
S Corporation and a partnership, in a Son-of-Boss partnership. Just before the statute of
limitations expired, The IRS issued a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment
(FPAA) to the partnership and its partners without ever having provided to the partners a
§ 6223(a) notice that a partnership level proceeding was commencing. The IRS also sent a form
letter notifying the partnership that under § 6223(e)(2) the partners could elect into the TEFRA
partnership proceedings. The form letter was the wrong form letter, but the Gregorys responded
and elected out as indirect partners but asked to have the "partnership items of the Direct Partner
treated as partnership items." Because there was no advance notice of an audit, but the received
notice before the time to challenge the adjustments proposed by the FPAA had run, the default
rule of § 6223(e)(3), not § 6223(e)(2), applied, and any partner entitled to receive notice had the
right to opt out and not the right to opt in. By the time the partnership engaged in the Son-of-
Boss transaction to which the FPAA proposed adjustments related, the Gregorys' only interest
was held as indirect partners. Thus, if the election had been valid, the Gregorys would not be
subject to any deficiency proceedings because any items that become nonpartnership items under
§ 6223(e) are subject to the standard deficiency procedures of §§ 6211 through 6216, see
§ 6230(a)(2)(A)(ii), and the IRS has one year from the time a partner's partnership items become
nonpartnership items to send a notice of deficiency to that partner, see §§ 6229(f)(1), and the
§ 6503(a) election was made more than one year before the Tax Court proceeding. The Tax
Court (Judge Holmes) held that the Gregorys were allowed to make separate elections as direct
and indirect partners and that their elections to opt out as indirect partners were valid. The
Gregorys' elections to "opt in" in their capacity as direct partners had no effect because the'
default rule dictates the same result under § 6223(e)(3); a partner is bound by the TEFRA
proceedings unless a proper election is made to opt out.
2. Who's the partner is not a partnership item. Sands v. United States, 84
Fed. Cl. 209 (10/9/08). Robert Sands, one of four equal partners in a limited partnership,
transferred partnership interests to four charitable remainder unitrusts. The partnership sold stock
and claimed substantial losses. In an FPAA issued to the partnership the IRS reduced the
partnership's asserted basis in the sold stock which resulted in a partnership capital gain. The
IRS also sought to allocate the recognized gain to Sands by claiming that the transfers of
partnership interest to the charitable remainder trusts were economic shams. The court (Judge
Hewitt) held that the identity of a partner is not a partnership item subject to determination in a
TEFRA partnership proceeding. The court dismissed Sands as the filing partner in the
proceeding and substituted the charitable remainder trusts. Nonetheless, the court refused to
refund Sand's deposit as a filing partner.
3. Whether it's a partnership is a partnership item. Petaluma FX
Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 9 (10/23/08). Petaluma was formed to invest in
foreign currency options trading. The investor partners contributed offsetting long and short
foreign currency options on 10/10/00. The investor partners increased their partnership bases for
the premiums of the long options, but did not offset basis to reflect a reduction of liabilities for
the short options. The investors withdrew from the partnership on 12/12/00, claiming a high
basis in distributed property. The property was sold for a loss on 12/26/00. In the FPAA issued
to the partnerships, the IRS claimed that the partnership should be disregarded, and that even if
the investors formed a partnership, the partnership had no business purpose other than tax
avoidance and lacked economic substance. In granting summary judgment to the IRS, the court
(Judge Geoke) held that whether a partnership exists, and whether the partnership has a business
purpose or lacks economic substance, are partnership items as described in Reg.
§ 301.6231(a)(3)-l (a) over which the court has jurisdiction in a partnership proceeding. The
court noted that because determination whether a partnership is a sham or lacks economic
substance underlies all of the partnership's purported tax items, the determination fits "squarely"
within the regulations identification of partnership items.
0 The court rejected the partnership's argument that because
sham treatment requires an examination of all of the facts and circumstances, including the intent of
individual partners, the determination must be made at the partner level. Since the partnership
indicated that it would not contest the determination on other than the jurisdictional grounds, the
court issued summary judgment for the IRS that the partnership was disregarded.
a The determination of the partners' outside basis in this case
was also treated as a partnership item because, once the partnership was disregarded, no partner-
level determinations were necessary. The court also held that it had jurisdiction to determine
accuracy related penalties attributable to the determination that the partnership should be
disregarded.
* Finally, the court rejected the taxpayer's attempt to challenge
valuation understatement penalties on the merits because of the taxpayers' stipulations in the case,
but indicated that the taxpayers could challenge the penalties in a refund action.
4. Natty Bumppo wouldn't have signed that extension agreement.
Leatherstocking 1983 Partnership v. Commissioner, 296 Fed. Appx. 171, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-
6695 (2d Cir. 10/20/08) (per curiam), rev"g T.C. Memo. 2006-164 (8/14/06). The Second Circuit
held that - inasmuch as the IRS knew that the tax matters partner had been placed under criminal
investigation - the tax matters partner was laboring under a conflict of interest and could not
provide the IRS with consents that bound the underlying partners and partnership. This was so
even though the IRS had not misled the partners about the extent of the criminal conduct of the
tax matters partner.
5. Treasury Regulations defining defenses to penalties that may be
raised in partnership proceeding are valid. New Millennium Trading, L.L.C. v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 18 (12/22/08). In a TEFRA partnership proceeding, the
determination of all partnership items is binding on the partners and may not be re-determined in
another proceeding. Section 6221 provides for determination of penalties at the partnership level
and the court may consider reasonable cause defenses of the partnership. Section 62 30(c)1)(C)
provides that a partner may contest the imposition of penalties in a claim for refund, which
includes under § 6230(c)(4) the assertion of partner-level defenses to the penalties. Temp. Reg.
§§ 301.6221-IT(c) and (d) provides that partner level defenses to penalties imposed at the
partner level, including the reasonable cause exception of § 6664(c), can only be determined
through separate refund actions. On summary judgment, the Tax Court (Judge Goeke) rejected
an individual partner's argument that the temporary regulations cannot be applied to deprive the
Tax Court of jurisdiction to consider the partner's reasonable cause defense to penalties, and
upheld the validity of the regulations. The court observed that nothing in §§ 6221 or 6226(f)
grants jurisdiction to consider partner-level defenses and that the partner's remedy under
§ 6230(c)(4) is to assert partner-level defenses in a refund claim. The court also opined that the
regulations do not misinterpret the requirement of § 6664(c)(1) that no penalty may be imposed
under §§ 6662 or 6663 if it was shown that there was reasonable cause. The court reached this
conclusion by applying the deference rule of Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984), and noting that the Court of Appeals to which the case is
appealable [the D.C. Circuit] has indicated that IRS regulations are to be given Chevron
deference.
a. Different judge, same result. Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2009-121 (5/27/09). In another Son-of-Boss tax shelter proceeding,
the court (Judge Beghe) treated accuracy-related penalty defenses as affected items determinable
only in an individual partnership proceeding and upheld the validity of temporary regulations.
The court also rejected the IRS motions in limine to declare the shelter opinion of Curtis, Mallet-
Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP an opinion by a shelter promoter on which the partner could not rely
for penalty protection holding that the issue was to be determined in the partnership proceeding.
In addition, the court granted the IRS motion to reject the expert report of Stuart Smith on the
grounds that the report consisted of legal discussion and argument.
0 In a lengthy afterword, Judge Beghe questioned the wisdom
of dividing partner and partnership items into separate proceedings in these tax shelter cases and
observes that the division creates complex logistical problems at great cost to judicial economy and
attorney resources. Judge Beghe also notes that the IRS and Treasury have proposed regulations that
would allow the IRS to convert partnership items to nonpartnership items and allow a single
proceeding - but only for listed transactions.
6. William Strunk Jr. & E.B. White, The Elements of Style, help identify
the statute of limitations as a partnership item. Keener v. United States, 551 F.3d 1358, 103
AFTR 2d 2009-364 (Fed. Cir. 1/8/09). The taxpayers invested in tax shelters promoted by
AMCOR in the mid-I 980s. In a partnership audit procedure, following issuance of an FPAA, the
partnership entered into a settlement agreement with the IRS that allowed a percentage of
ordinary deductions, but provided that the IRS may assert additional tax liability against
individual partners plus interest. Subsequently the IRS assessed additional tax plus penalties
against the taxpayers, which they paid in full. In their refund claim the taxpayer's asserted that
the statute of limitations had expired on the IRS' assessment of tax. The Federal Circuit (Judge
Prost) affirmed the finding of the Court of Federal Claims that it lacked jurisdiction to determine
the refund claims because application of the statute of limitations is a partnership item as defined
in § 6231(a) subject to determination in the TEFRA proceeding. Section 6231(a) defines a
partnership item as "any item required to be taken into account for the partnership's taxable year
under any provision of subtitle A." The taxpayer argued that the statute of limitations, provided
for under subtitle F, is not a partnership item under this definition. Referring to the elements of
style, the court concluded that the restrictive phrase "subtitle A" modifies the words that
immediately precede it, "taxable year," and not the words "partnership item." In citing Strunk &
White, the court followed Prati v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 422, 101 AFTR 2d 2008-1778
(2008). The court added that Reg. § 301.6631(a)(3)-1(b), which includes as a partnership item
any determination of the amount, timing, and characterization of items, is a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory ambiguity that is entitled to deference under Chevron, US.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The court also rejected the taxpayer's
claim for refund of additional interest penalties imposed on tax motivated transactions, holding
that a determination that characterizes a partnership transaction as a sham is a partnership item.
7. Reverse TEFRA: Partnership items from listed transactions are to be
treated as nonpartnership items. REG-138326-07, Tax Avoidance Transactions, 74 F.R. 7205
(2/13/09). The TEFRA audit rules originally were enacted to allow the IRS to address issues in
the large tax shelter partnerships of the 1970s with a single partnership level proceeding rather
than multiple proceedings involving the same issue against numerous partners. Many of the
recent abusive tax shelter transactions are structured to provide tax benefits to a single individual
through a labyrinth of partnerships and trusts. Proposed regulations §§ 301.6231(c)-3 and
301.6231-9 would permit the IRS to notify a taxpayer that a partnership item attributable to a
listed transaction from an indentified partnership will be treated as a nonpartnership item, and
thus not subject to the TEFRA partnership audit rules. The proposed regulations would only
apply to transactions that are identified as a listed transaction under Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) prior
to the date the IRS notifies the taxpayer that the taxpayer's partnership items related to the listed
transaction will be treated as a nonpartnership item. The IRS would determine whether an item
would be treated as a nonpartnership item on a partnership-by-partnership and partner-by-partner
basis. The determination may include an item that passes through more than one partnership. In
the case of an indirect partner who holds an interest in a listed transaction through a lower-tier
partnership, the notification may identify only the lower-tier partnership. The determination
would not apply to items from partnerships not attributable to a listed transaction, which will
remain partnership items. Items attributable to listed transactions would remain partnership items
unless the IRS notifies the taxpayer that the item will be treated as a nonpartnership item.
Notification will apply to all partnership items from identified partnerships for all taxable years
that ended before the date of the notice and all items attributable to that partnership that are
related to a listed transaction. When finalized, the proposed regulations would apply to any
taxable period ending on or after 2/13/09, the date of publication of the proposed regulations.
8. River City Ranches v. Commissioner, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1088 (9th Cir.
2/26/09), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2007-171 (7/2/07). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the tax court holding
that that the six year statute of limitations for fraud was applicable and that the sheep breeding
partnerships at issue were sham partnerships lacking economic substance, which justified
increased interest penalties under § 6621(c). The Tax Court had also held that an asserted
conflict of interest between the tax matters partner and the other partners did not invalidate
waiver of the statute of limitations by the tax matters partner.
9. Thou shall not be allowed a jury trial to challenge an FPAA
assessment. RCL Properties, Inc. v. United States, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1784 (D. Colo.
4/14/09). The partnership's tax matters partner deposited an assessed deficiency as required by
§ 6226(e) and filed a civil action for recovery of the tax. The taxpayer filed a motion requesting
a jury trial. The court (Judge Babcock) noted that under 28 U.S.C. § 2402, civil actions against
the United States must be tried without a jury. An exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) allows
jury trials in cases for the recovery of any "internal revenue tax." However, § 6226(e)(3)
provides that a deposit for jurisdictional purposes is not treated as the payment of tax.
Jurisdiction in § 6226 action is provided under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(e), and is thus not within the
exception allowing jury trials of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
10. Release from debt to restore negative capital account is a partnership
item. Bassing v. United States, 563 F.3d 1280, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1780 (Fed. Cir. 4/16/09).
Affirming the Court of Federal Claims, the court (Judge Bryson) held that the release of one
partner's obligation to restore a capital account deficit is a partnership item. The taxpayer was
one of two general partners and also held limited partner interests in a real estate development
partnership. The partnership agreement required the taxpayer to restore his capital account
deficit. The partnership entered into agreements with its principal creditor to settle outstanding
liabilities and liquidate. At the same time the partnership entered into an agreement with the
taxpayer, who was insolvent, to discharge the taxpayer's deficit restoration obligation. The
taxpayer reported the discharge as short-term capital gain on a deemed sale of his partnership
interest. Subsequently the taxpayer filed an amended return treating the forgiveness of his deficit
restoration obligation as cancellation of indebtedness income that was excluded under
§ 108(a)(1)(B) because of his insolvency. The court held that the taxpayer's refund action filed
in the Court of Federal Claims was barred by § 7422(h), which prohibits refund actions
attributable to partnership items as defined in § 6231(a)(3). The court reasoned that a capital
account deficit is determined under the partnership capital account maintenance rules, based on
partnership accounting rules. See Reg. § 301.6231(a)(3)-l(b). The release of a debt to restore a
negative capital account is also a partnership item because the enforceability of the item is also
determined under the partnership capital account maintenance rules so that release of the debt
would be treated as cancellation of debt for the partnership. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(3)-1(a). The
court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the tax treatment of the discharge of the deficit
restoration obligation was an individual, non-partner issue that has no impact on the partnership
or other partners. The purpose of the TEFRA audit rules is served by consistent treatment of
capital account deficits for both co-general partners.
11. Partner's outside basis in a tax-shelter partnership is a partner item.
Napoliello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-104 (5/18/09). The taxpayer invested in a Son-
of-Boss transaction involving digital foreign currency items. The IRS issued an FPAA to the
taxpayer as a notice partner. In the uncontested partnership proceeding it was determined that the
partnership was a sham that lacked economic substance, that transactions entered into by the
partnership should be treated as transacted directly by the partners, and that purported losses
claimed on disposition of distributed property with an enhanced basis should be disallowed. The
IRS assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer based on the partnership items. The Tax Court
had held in Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 9 (10/23/08), that the
determination of whether a partnership was a sham that will be disregarded for Federal tax
purposes is a partnership item. The court (Judge Kroupa) agreed with the IRS that the partner's
basis in distributed securities from the sham partnership is an affected item subject to
determination in the partnership proceeding, and not subject to re-determination in the partner-
level deficiency proceeding. Because the amount of any loss with respect to the partner's
disposition of securities distributed from the partnership required a factual determination at the
partner level, the court held that it had jurisdiction in the partner deficiency proceeding to
proceed under normal deficiency procedures. The court thus proceeded to determine that the
taxpayer claimed loss on the sale of the distributed securities was disallowed, that the taxpayer's
basis in the securities was their direct cost rather than an exchange basis from the partnership
interest, and that the taxpayer was not allowed to deduct transaction costs attributable to the
investment. The Tax Court also held that the FPAA gave the taxpayer fair notice of the IRS
claims.
12. Gateway Hotel Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-128
(6/4/09). Over the IRS objection, the taxpayer partnership was permitted to substitute as a tax
matters partner a new partner who was not a partner during the years subject to TEFRA
partnership audit. The court (Judge Goeke) concluded that the fact that the tax matters partner's
tax liability will not be affected by the proceeding does not disqualify the substitution. The court
observed that, "[t]he tax matters partner's importance derives from his role as a fiduciary serving
on behalf of the other partners, and 'His personal interest, if any, is beside the point."' (Quoting
from Computer Programs Lambda, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 198, 205 (1987).)
13. A Notice of Deficiency relating to partner level loss limitation rules
need not wait for a FPAA. Meruelo v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 18 (6/9/09). Judge Vasquez
held that application to a partner of the loss limitation rules of §§ 704(d) and 465 are affected
items that require a partner-level determination. A notice of deficiency to a partner based on the
application, of the loss limitation rules of §§ 704(d) and 465 was not issued prematurely and was
valid, even though IRS had neither issued a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment
for the partnership nor accepted the partnership's return as filed for the year. The Tax Court had
jurisdiction over the petition.
a. But a notice of deficiency is not proper while the partnership
case is still pending. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-112 (5/21/09).
The court (Judge Kroupa) granted a motion by the IRS to dismiss a Notice of Deficiency for lack
of jurisdiction. The IRS issued a NOD to the parent of an affiliated group disallowing losses
claimed from a limited partnership investment and imposing accuracy related penalties. The
deficiencies arose from partnership items and affected items reflected in a FPAA in a partnership
level proceeding that was not yet concluded. The court rejected the. taxpayer's argument that its
basis in the partnership must be determined in the year of a contribution of a note to the
partnership, which is not the year at issue in the FPAA, and therefore the basis is not a
partnership item or affected item in the year subject to the partnership proceeding. The court
concluded that the partner's basis in contributed property is a partnership item subject to
determination in the partnership proceeding.
14. The assessment of a deficiency doesn't have to be on the computer
tape if it's manually processed. Williams v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-158 (6/30/09).
The statute of limitations under § 6229(a) for assessment of a deficiency attributable to a
partnership item or an affected item is three years after the later of the date on which a
partnership return is filed, the last day for filing the partnership return. If an FPAA is mailed to
the tax matters partner the limitations period is suspended for the time in which a court action
may be brought, or if a court action is brought, until the court action becomes final plus one year
thereafter. The taxpayer asserted that assessment statute expiration dates (ASED) had expired
and that the computerized account transcripts did not indicate the assessment until after the
ASED. The court (Judge Cohen) concluded that testimony from IRS personnel was credible to
establish that the assessments were issued manually and that the computer coding lagged the
actual issue of the assessment. In addition, since the assessment was dated by August 15, within
the AESD, the fact that the notice of assessment was only postmarked on August 21 (after the
AESD) did not invalidate the assessment.
15. Reasonable cause defense to the gross valuation misstatement penalty is
not a partnership item, and by the way, Son of Boss transactions lack economic substance as a
matter of law. Clearmeadow Investments, LLC v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 509, 103 A.F.T.R.
2d 2009-2786 (6/17/09). Granting summary judgment to the government, the court held that the
reasonable cause defense of § 6664(c)(1) to § 6662 accuracy related and substantial
misstatement penalties is a partner level defense not subject to the Federal Claims Court's
jurisdiction in a TEFRA partnership proceeding. The court rejected the taxpayers' argument that
its jurisdiction to consider partnership level penalties under § 6662 empowers the court to
address reasonable cause defenses asserted by a partner. Notwithstanding contrary language in
Klamath Strategic Investment Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 103 A.F.T.R. 2d
2009-2220 (5th Cir. May 15, 2009), the court points out that Reg. § 301.6221-1(d) and Temp.
Reg. § 301.6221-lT(c)-(d) specifically describe the reasonable cause defense as a partner level
defense that may not be asserted in a partnership proceeding. The court also rejected the
taxpayer's argument that although Reg. § 1.752-6 applied retroactively to reduce basis by the
amount of contingent liability in the Son-of-Boss transaction, the entity used by the taxpayers
was not a partnership but a "multi-member disregarded entity." (The taxpayers were fortunate
that the court did not impose a frivolous argument penalty on this.) The court imposed a 40
percent § 6662 penalty.
The taxpayers - whether providently or not - conceded both
the retroactivity of Reg. § 1.752-6 and the lack of economic substance in their transaction.
16. The assessment of a deficiency doesn't have to be on the computer
tape if it's manually processed. Williams v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-158 (6/30/09).
The statute of limitations under § 6229(a) for assessment of a deficiency attributable to a
partnership item or an affected item is three years after the later of the date on which a
partnership return is filed, the last day for filing the partnership return. If an FPAA is mailed to
the tax matters partner the limitations period is suspended for the time in which a court action
may be brought, or if a court action is brought, until the court action becomes final plus one year
thereafter. The taxpayer asserted that assessment statute expiration dates (ASED) had expired
and that the computerized account transcripts did not indicate the assessment until after the
ASED. The court (Judge Cohen) concluded that testimony from IRS personnel was credible to
establish that the assessments were issued manually and that the computer coding lagged the
actual issue of the assessment. In addition, since the assessment was dated by August 15, within
the AESD, the fact that the notice of assessment was only postmarked on August 21 (after the
AESD) did not invalidate the assessment.
17. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5460 (Fed. Cir.
7/30/09). Following Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), the Federal Circuit
(Judge Schall, 2-1) held that "omits from gross income an amount properly includable therein" in§ 6501(e)(1)(A) does not include an overstatement of basis. Accordingly, the six-year statute of
limitations on assessment did not apply - the normal three year period of limitations applied.
Judge Newman dissented.
18. Overstated basis in an abusive tax shelter is a substantial omission
from gross income that extends the statute of limitations. Highwood Partners v.
Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 1 (8/13/09). The taxpayers invested through partnerships in foreign
currency digital options contracts designed to increase partnership basis and generate losses
marketed by Jenkins and Gilchrist (Son of Boss and miscellaneous other names). After
expiration of the three-year statute of limitations, the IRS issued an FPAA to the partnership
based on the six-year statute of §6501(e)(1) applicable if there was a greater than 25 percent
omission of gross income on each partner's or the partnership's return. The court (Judge Goeke)
held that the digital options contracts produced § 988 exchange gain on foreign currency
transactions, which, under the regulations, are required to be separately stated. The long and
short positions of the options contracts were treated as separate transactions. Thus, failure to
report the gain on the short position, not offset by losses on the accompanying stock sale,
represented an omission of gross income. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that
because the IRS asserted that the options transactions should be disregarded in full, there can be
on omission of gross income from the disregarded short position. Finally, the court refused to
apply the adequate disclosure safe harbor of § 6501 (e)(1)(A)(ii) because the taxpayer's netting of
the gain and loss from the long and short positions was intended to mislead and hide the
existence of the gain and did not apprise the IRS of the existence of the gain.
a. But Judge Haines has a different view of overstated basis.
Beard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-184 (8/11/09). In a basis offset deal involving
contributions of long and short positions in Treasury notes contributed to S corporations, the
court (Judge Haines) granted summary judgment to the taxpayer holding that the basis
overstatement attributable to the short sale was not an a substantial omission of gross income.
Because the transaction involved Treasury notes, there were no § 988 issues involved. This
holding is consistent with Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-
2712 (9th Cir. 6/17/09); and Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5190
(Fed. Cir. 7/30/09).
b. And the IRS loses again. Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-195 (9/1/09). The court (Judge Wherry), again following
Bakersfield Energy Partners LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207 (2007), granted summary
judgment to the taxpayer holding that a basis overstatement is not a substantial omission from
gross income that triggers the six year extended statute of limitations under § 6229.
c. The IRS gets the upper hand with temporary regulations. T.D.
9466, Definition of Omission from Gross Income (9/24/09). Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1T
and 301.6501 (e)- I T, both provide that for purposes of determining whether there is a substantial
omission of gross income, gross income as it relates to a trade or business includes the total
amount received from the sale of goods or services, without reduction for the cost of goods sold,
gross income otherwise has the same meaning as under § 61(a). The regulations add that, "In the
case of amounts received or accrued that relate to the disposition of property, and except as
provided in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, gross income means the excess of the amount
realized from the disposition of the property over the unrecovered cost or other basis of the
property. Consequently, except as provided in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, an understated
amount of gross income resulting from an overstatement of unrecovered cost or other basis
constitutes an omission from gross income for purposes of section 6229(c)(2)."
19. Partnership audit rules extend the statute of limitations. Curr-Spec
Partners L.P. v. Commissioner, 2009-2 U.S.T.C. 50,578, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5249 (5th Cir.
8/11/09). Section 6501(a) provides a three-year statute of limitations for assessing tax
deficiencies. Section 6229(a) provides that the period for assessing a deficiency attributable to a
partnership item shall not expire until three years after the later of the date a partnership return or
the due date for the partnership return. The IRS issued an FPAA disallowing claimed partnership
losses four years after the partnership return was filed, and assessed deficiencies against the
partners for years into which the losses were carried forward. The assessment to individual
losses disallowing the loss carryforwards were within the three-year statute of limitations
applicable to the partners' returns. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court holding that
§ 6229(a) does not establish an independent three-year statute of limitations with respect to
partnership items, but merely extends the limitations period of § 6501(a). Thus, assessment of a
deficiency against partner's whose individual return remains open is not barred by any limitation
period in § 6229(a).
20. Basis in a closed year is a partnership item that may be redetermined
in an FPAA for an open year. Wilmington Partners L.P. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-
193 (8/26/09). The IRS issued an FPAA for the partnership's 1993 year that was closed without
adjustment. In an FPAA issued for 1999, the IRS determined that the partnership's basis in a
reset note contributed in 1993 was zero. The court (Judge Kroupa) held that nothing in TEFRA
prevents the court from considering events in a closed year to determine the proper adjustments
for a docketed year. The court also held that the basis of the contributed note was a partnership
item in the closed year of contribution, and remained a partnership item in each subsequent year.
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the fact that § 6228(a)(5) expressly empowers
the court to look back at non-docketed items as an offset to an administrative adjustment
requested by a tax matters partner under § 6227, does not bar the court from looking at the facts
of a non-docketed year in another matter.
21. Filing a refund claim before paying the $150 million, rather than paying
first, filing second, left the taxpayer out the $150 million on procedural grounds. Ackerman v.
Commissioner, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5830 (D. D.C. 8/18/09). Following a TEFRA partnership
proceeding, the IRS notified the taxpayers of the resulting adjustments to their tax liability -
over $150 million. Within the required sixty days of receiving the notices, the taxpayers filed
administrative refund requests to which the IRS never responded. Subsequently they filed the
refund suit. However, the taxpayers did not pay the deficiency until after the administrative
refund request was filed. The government argued that § 6230(c) requires that the taxes be paid in
full before the administrative refund request is filed, while the taxpayers argued that under
§ 6230(c) - unlike under § 7422, which governs refund claims generally - it is not necessary
to pay the taxes in full before the administrative refund request is filed, but merely before the suit
is filed. The court held that, as argued by the government, for the court to have jurisdiction, the
taxes must be paid in full before the administrative refund request is filed. The court found the
long line of cases imposing the "pay first" rule under § 7422 to be controlling. The court further
held that even though accuracy related penalties resulting from the partnership adjustments were
partner-level items, § 6230(c) - and not § 6511- nevertheless controlled the period for filing a
refund claim. Thus, the taxpayer's refund claim was untimely because it was not filed within 60
days. The suit was dismissed.
22. Be careful what you stipulate to. LKF X Investments, LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-192 (8/25/09). The IRS issued a notice of final administrative
adjustment (FPAA) to the taxpayer partnership asserting that a LLC taxed as a partnership that
was used to invest in market-linked deposit transactions (another form of abusive shelter using
contingent offsetting payments to generate losses) should be disregarded for tax purposes and
that the investors had zero basis in their partnership interest. In the partnership proceeding the
parties contested the Tax Court's jurisdiction to consider disregard of the partnership and the
partners' bases as partnership items and stipulated that if the court determined that it had
jurisdiction the parties would not contest the determinations made in the FPAA other than
whether the valuation misstatement penalty imposed under § 6662 applies to any underpayment
resulting from the adjustments in the FPAA. The court (Judge Marvel) granted summary
judgment to the IRS holding that a determination whether a partnership is a sham, lacks
economic substance, or otherwise should be disregarded is a partnership item, following its prior
decision in Petaluma FXPartners, LLC v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 9 (2008). The court also
held that when a partnership is disregarded for Federal income tax purposes, the court has
jurisdiction in the TEFRA proceeding to determine that the partners have zero outside basis. The
court added that when the taxpayer stipulates that it would not contest an issue other than on
jurisdictional grounds, the court will treat the issue as conceded. Finally, the court also held that
where the partnership is disregarded and the partners' outside basis is zero the court hadjurisdiction to determine as partnership items the applicability of accuracy related and valuation
misstatement penalties under § 6662. The court rejected that taxpayer's assertion that the
valuation misstatement penalty in inapplicable because it was attributable to disregard of the
partnership rather than an erroneous valuation.
23. In a Son-of-Boss litigation the Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine
partner level deficiencies related to affected items. Hiding the loss through additional pass-
throughs justifies taxpayer level determinations. Desmet v. Commissioner, 2009-2 U.S.T.C.
50,639, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009- (6th Cir. 9/17/09). The taxpayers formed a partnership in a
Son-of-Boss transaction, then transferred their partnership interests to an S corporation. In the
TEFRA partnership proceeding, which became final, the IRS determined that the partnership's
basis in distributed property was zero. Rather than directly assessing tax against the taxpayers as
computational adjustments resulting from the FPPA under § 6230(a)(1), the IRS sent notices of
deficiency related to affected items that require partner level determinations under § 6230(a)(2).
The taxpayers asserted that the IRS was required to assess the tax directly because no additional
partner level determinations were necessary and that the statute of limitations had run on the
assessment of individual deficiencies. Affirming the Tax Court, the court concluded that the
partnership proceeding determined only that the partnership was required to reduce its basis on
account of its contingent obligation to close the short sale leg of the Son-of-Boss transaction.
The partnership proceeding did not address the taxpayers' claimed losses through their S
corporation. The S corporation's loss was not addressed in the FPAA. The S corporation's loss
arose from the sale of distributed stock, which could not be determined from the FPAA. Thus,
the court held that the IRS was empowered to bring individual level proceedings to resolve
issues regarding the losses passed-through from the S corporation. The court also rejected the
taxpayers' assertion that the procedure allows duplicative proceedings contrary to the purpose of
the TEFRA partnership provisions.
G. Miscellaneous
1. Publicly traded partnerships that are treated as partnerships are to include
partnerships in the business of marketing carbon dioxide or transporting alternative fuels. The
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], the Energy Improvement and
Extension Act, §§ 116 and 208, amending § 7704(d)(1)(E). Publicly traded partnerships that
derive income from investment, activities, real estate and natural resources are excepted from the
requirement that a publicly traded partnership be taxed as an association. The definition of
qualifying income is expanded to include income derived from the marketing of industrial source
carbon dioxide and income derived from the transportation and storage of alternative fuels
(biodiesel, alcohol, etc.).
0 As promised, under pending climate control legislation there
will be no tax on the inhalation of oxygen; only the exhalation of carbon dioxide will be taxed.
2. LMSB asserts that the § 118 exclusion does not apply to partnerships.
LMSB-04-1007-069, 2007 TNT 202-16 (10/18/07), reaffirming LMSB-04-1106-016 (10/28/06).
The § 118 exclusion from income for nonshareholder contributions to the capital of a corporation
does not apply to partnerships. The directive contains the following admonition, "This Directive
is not an official pronouncement of law, and cannot be used, cited, or relied upon as such."
a. LMSB reiterates this position in a coordinated issue paper for
all industries. LMSB-04-1008-051, 2008 TNT 225-14 (11/18/08). The IRS has advised that a
partnership or any other non-corporate entity cannot use § 118(a) or any common-law
"contribution-to-capital" doctrine to exclude from gross income amounts received from persons
other than an owner of the entity.
* This is a Tier I issue for litigation purposes, and it arises
because of the prevalence of tax increment financing by municipalities.
3. Windheim v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-136 (6/10/09). A Canadian
resident who received legal title to a partnership interest from his father (now deceased) was held
not to be the beneficial owner of the partnership interest for federal tax purposes. The taxpayer
was involved in disputes with his mother and sister over control of family assets. The partnership
issued K-Is in the taxpayer's name in care of his mother. A Canadian trial court had held that
disbursements by Toronto Dominion Bank of partnership distributions to the taxpayer's mother
were negligent, but that decision was reversed by a higher court holding that the bank was not
liable to the taxpayer. A New York court had awarded the taxpayer's mother a constructive trust
over the partnership proceeds. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the taxpayer had no
economic benefit from the partnership interest and was thus not a partner subject to tax on
partnership income.
VIII. TAX SHELTERS
A. Tax Shelter Cases
1. Notice 2000-44. Baby BOSS is a fraud too! Notice 2000-44, 2000-36
I.R.B. 255 (8/11/00). "Artificial" capital losses generated by baby BOSS transactions will not be
allowed. (Note that Notice 99-59, 1999-52 I.R.B. 761, advised taxpayers that losses from
"BOSS" product transactions are not properly deductible.)
* Scheme #1: The taxpayer purports to borrow at a premium
interest rate. For example, a lender gives the taxpayer $3,000 and the parties treat the stated principal
amount of the loan as only $2,000, with the remaining $1,000 that must be repaid representing
interest. The taxpayer contributes the loan proceeds into a partnership, which assumes the liability,
and uses the proceeds to purchase an investment asset worth $3,000. The taxpayer/partner takes the
position under §§ 705(a)(2), 722, and 752(b) that his basis in his partnership interest is $1,000 [the
$3,000 cash contribution minus the $2,000 assumed liability], even though the value of the
partnership interest is zero. The taxpayer then sells the partnership interest for a nominal amount,
claiming a $1,000 capital loss. [Everyone apparently ignores the $1,000 discrepancy between the
cash proceeds of the loan and the $2,000 "principal amount," which has to produce income to
someone sometime.] This short sale variant is also the so-called BLIPS strategy.
* Scheme #2: The taxpayer simultaneously purchases a call
option and writes an offsetting call option, both of which are then contributed to a partnership. The
taxpayer takes the position that the basis of the partnership interest equals the basis of the purchased
call option, unreduced by the liability associated with the written call option, i.e., that the partnership
did not assume a liability when it took responsibility for the written call option. The taxpayer then
uses this artificially high basis to claim a capital loss on the sale of his partnership interest. [Compare
Rev. Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131, holding that a partnership's short sale of securities creates a
liability.] This offsetting option variant is also the so-called COBRA strategy.
* Notice 2000-44 disallows the losses [under §§165(a) and (c)]
produced by both of these baby BOSS transactions as artificial, citing, in the case of individuals, Fox
v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 1001 (1984), holding that §165(c)(2) requires a primary profit motive for a
loss from a particular transaction is to be deductible. T.C. Memo 1988- 570, in which the
government won a summary judgment that commodities straddles were shams despite not having
offered evidence of the taxpayers' offsetting gains. The notice also cites Reg. §1.702-2 [the
partnership anti-abuse rules]. The government also is reexamining the partnership basis rules.
* Compound indicia of criminal tax fraud? The government
believes that the Baby BOSS transactions were not being individually reported on schedule D, but
instead have been buried in grantor trusts. For example, an individual taxpayer with an unrealized
capital gain contributes both the appreciated assets and the baby BOSS partnership interest into a
grantor trust, which sells both, and the individual reports only the net gain or loss from the grantor
trust's transactions on his return, rather than breaking out gains and losses separately, as is required
[by Reg. § 1.671-2]. Treasury Department officials suggest that criminal penalties might apply to this
kind of reporting, which willfully conceals the facts.
0 Changes coming to tax shelter disclosure rules. The
recently proposed corporate tax shelter disclosure rules will be changed by dropping of the
requirement that a shelter be marketed to a corporation to trigger the requirement that a promoter
maintain a customer list. Under the amended regulations, a customer list would have to be
maintained for a shelter that is exclusively peddled to individuals, provided threshold amounts of
fees and tax savings are met.
2. Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T. Fighting duplication and acceleration of losses
through partnerships before June 24, 2003. T.D. 9062, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68
F.R. 37414 (6/24/03). Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T provides rules, similar to the rules applicable to
corporations in § 358(h), to prevent the duplication and acceleration of loss through the
assumption by a partnership of a liability of a partner in a nonrecognition transaction. Under the
temporary regulations, if a partnership assumes a liability, as defined in § 358(h)(3), of a partner
(other than a liability to which § 752(a) and (b) apply) in a § 721 transaction, after application of§§ 752(a) and (b), the partner's basis in the partnership is reduced (but not below the adjusted
value of such interest) by the amount of the liability. For this purpose, the term "liability"
includes any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment, without regard to whether the
obligation is otherwise taken into account for Federal tax purposes. Reduction of a partner's
basis generally is not required if: (1) the trade or business with which the liability is associated is
transferred to the partnership, or (2) substantially all of the assets with which the liability is
associated are contributed to the partnership. However, the exception for contributions of
substantially all of the assets does not apply to a transaction described in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2
C.B. 255 (or a substantially similar transaction).
* The temporary regulations purport to be effective for
transactions occurring after 10/18/99 and before 6/24/03. The cases which held them to be
retroactively effective include: Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1882
(N.D. Ill. 3/27/07), affid, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2/7/08); and Maguire Partners - Master
Investments, LLC v. United States, 103 A.F.T.R2d 2009-763, 2009-1 U.S.T.C. 50,215 (C.D. Calif.
2/4/09). The cases which held them not to be retroactively effective include: Klamath Strategic
Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 7/20/06), afd in part,
vacated in part, and remanded, 2009-1 U.S.T.C. 50,395 (5th Cir. 5/15/09); Sala v. United States,
552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 4/22/08); Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States, 82 Fed.
Cl. 636 (Fed. Cl. 7/31/08); and Murfam Farms LLC v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5700
(Fed. Cl. 7/30/09).
3. Klamath. District Court upholds BLIPS tax shelter on taxpayer's
partial summary judgment motion. Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States,
440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 7/20/06). The court (Judge Ward) held that the premium portion
of the loans received from the bank in connection with the funding of the instruments contributed
to a partnership was a contingent obligation, and not a fixed and determined liability for
purposes of § 752. The transaction was entered into prior to the release of Notice 2000-44, 2000-
2 C.B. 255, which related to Son-of-BOSS transactions. Judge Ward held that a regulation to the
contrary, Reg. § 1.752-6 (see T.D. 9062), was not effective retroactively, and was therefore
invalid as applied to these transactions. Judge Ward held that there was clear authority existing
at the time of the transaction that the premium portion of the loan did not reduce taxpayer's basis
in the partnership.
a. Klamath on the merits: It does not work because it lacks
economic substance, but no penalties. The authorities discussed in the Holland & Hart and
Olson Lemons opinions provide "substantial authority." Klamath Strategic Investment Fund,
LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 1/31/07). The transactions lacked
economic substance because the loans would not be used to provide leverage for foreign
currency transactions, but no penalties were applicable because taxpayers passed on a 1999
investment and they thought they were investing in foreign currencies and the tax opinions they
received that relied on relevant authorities set forth in the court's earlier opinion provided
"substantial authority" for the taxpayers' treatment of their basis in their partnerships.
b. On government motions, Judge Ward refuses to vacate partial
summary judgment decision on the retroactivity of the regulations under § 752, and he
permits the deduction of operational expenses, despite his earlier finding that the
transactions lacked economic substance, because the taxpayers had profit motives. Klamath
Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-2001 (E.D. Tex. 4/3/07).
First, Judge Ward held that even though the loans lacked economic substance, they still existed,
and thus the partial summary judgment on the non-retroactivity of the regulations under § 752
was not premised on invalid factual assumptions. Second, he held that the existence of profit
motive for deduction of operational expenses was based on the purposes of Nix and Patterson -
and not on the motives of Presidio, the managing partner of the partnership.
c. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 568 F.3d 537,
103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-2220, 2009-1 U.S.T.C. 50,395 (5th Cir. 5/21/09). In ruling unfavorably
on the taxpayers' cross-appeal that the transaction lacked economic substance, the Fifth Circuit
(Judge Garza) stated:
The economic substance doctrine allows courts to enforce the legislative
purpose of the Code by preventing taxpayers from reaping tax benefits from
transactions lacking in economic reality. See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States,
454 F.3d 1340, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2006). As the Supreme Court has recognized,
taxpayers have the right to decrease or avoid taxes by legally permissible means.
See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596 (1935).
However, "transactions[ ] which do not vary control or change the flow of
economic benefits[ ] are to be dismissed from consideration." See Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476, 60 S. Ct. 355, 84 L. Ed. 406 (1940). In a more recent
pronouncement, the Supreme Court held that "[w]here ... there is a genuine
multiple-party transaction with economic substance which is compelled or
encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent
considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have
meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights
and duties effectuated by the parties." Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583-84.
The law regarding whether a transaction should be disregarded as lacking
economic reality is somewhat unsettled in the Fifth Circuit, and a split exists
among other Circuits. The Fourth Circuit applies a rigid two-prong test, where a
transaction will only be invalidated if it lacks economic substance and the
taxpayer's sole motive is tax avoidance. See Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985). The majority view, however, is that
a lack of economic substance is sufficient to invalidate the transaction regardless
of whether the taxpayer has motives other than tax avoidance. See, e.g., Coltec,
454 F.3d at 1355; United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014,
1018 (11th Cir. 2001); ACMPartnership v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir.
1998); James v. Comm'r, 899 F.2d 905, 908-09 (10th Cir. 1990). We have
previously declined to explicitly adopt either approach. See Compaq, 277 F.3d at
781-82 (finding that the transaction in question had both economic substance and
a legitimate business purpose, so it would be recognized for tax purposes under
either the minority or majority approach).
We conclude that the majority view more accurately interprets the
Supreme Court's prescript in Frank Lyon. The Court essentially set up a
multifactor test for when a transaction must be honored as legitimate for tax
purposes, with factors including whether the transaction (1) has economic
substance compelled by business or regulatory realities, (2) is imbued with tax-
independent considerations, and (3) is not shaped totally by tax-avoidance
features. See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583-84. Importantly, these factors are
phrased in the conjunctive, meaning that the absence of any one of them will
render the transaction void for tax purposes. Thus, if a transaction lacks economic
substance compelled by business or regulatory realities, the transaction must be
disregarded even if the taxpayers profess a genuine business purpose without tax-
avoidance motivations. ***
The evidence clearly shows that Presidio and NatWest designed the loan
transactions and the investment strategy so that no reasonable possibility of profit
existed and so that the funding amount would create massive tax benefits but
would never actually be at risk. Regardless of Patterson and Nix's desire to make
money, they entered into transactions controlled by Presidio and NatWest that
were not structured or implemented to make a profit. This particular situation
highlights the logic of following the majority approach to the economic substance
doctrine, because the minority approach would allow tax benefits to flow from
transactions totally lacking in economic substance as long as the taxpayers
offered some conceivable profit motive. In cases such as the instant one, this
approach would essentially reward a "head in the sand" defense where taxpayers
can profess a profit motive but agree to a scheme structured and controlled by
parties with the sole purpose of achieving tax benefits for them. We therefore
agree with the district court that since the loan transactions lacked economic
substance, they must be disregarded for tax purposes.
In ruling unfavorably on the government's appeal of the non-
imposition of penalties, the Judge Garza concluded:
The TEFRA structure enacted by Congress does not permit a partner to
raise an individual defense during a partnership-level proceeding, but when
considering the determination of penalties at the partnership level the court may
consider the defenses of the partnership. See New Millennium Trading, LLC v.
Comm'r, 131 T.C. No. 18 (2008). Though Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6221-1T(d)
lists the reasonable cause exception as an example of a partner-level defense, it
does not indicate that reasonable cause and good faith may never be considered at
the partnership level. Several courts have found that a reasonable cause and good
faith defense may be considered during partnership-level proceedings if the
defense is presented on behalf of the partnership. See Santa Monica Pictures v.
Comm 'r, T.C. Memo 2005-104, 89 T.C.M. 1157, 1229-30 (2005) (considering the
reasonable cause and good faith defense asserted by the partnership to determine
whether accuracy-related penalties should apply); See also Stobie Creek
Investments, LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 703-04, 717-21 (2008)
(considering the reasonable cause defense at the partnership level). Here,
reasonable cause and good faith were asserted on behalf of Klamath and
Kinabalu, by the current managing partners. Accordingly, we hold that the district
court did not err in considering the defenses.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on a reasonable cause defense. See
Montgomery v. Comm.'r, 127 T.C. 43, 66 (2006). The most important factor is the
extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess his proper liability in light of all the
circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b). Reliance on the advice of a
professional tax adviser does not necessarily demonstrate reasonable cause and
good faith; rather, the validity of this reliance turns on "the quality and objectivity
of the professional advice which they obtained." Swayze v. United States, 785
F.2d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 1986). The district court found that Patterson and Nix
sought legal advice from qualified accountants and tax attorneys concerning the
legal implications of their investments and the resulting tax deductions. They
hired attorneys to write a detailed tax opinion, providing the attorneys with access
to all relevant transactional documents. This tax opinion concluded that the tax
treatment at issue complied with reasonable interpretations of the tax laws. At
trial, the Partnerships' tax expert concluded that the opinion complied with
standards established by Treasury Circular 230, which addresses conduct of
practitioners who provide tax opinions. Overall, the district court found that the
Partnerships proved by a preponderance of the evidence that they relied in good
faith on the advice of qualified accountants and tax lawyers.
The Government argues only that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the reasonable cause and good faith defense; it has not alleged error in
the substance of the district court's finding that Patterson and Nix acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith. Therefore, having concluded that the district
court had jurisdiction to consider this defense, we affirm the district court's
conclusion that no penalties should apply.
0 Finally, Judge Garza remanded for reconsideration the district
court's allowance of deductions for expenses and held that the district court was without jurisdiction
to order a refund.
4. Sala. Interest is suspended under § 6404(g) because of the absence of
fraud. Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Colo. 5/1/07). If an individual files a
timely return (including extensions) and the IRS has not sent the taxpayer a notice of additional
liability (e.g., a math error notice of deficiency), including an explanation of the basis for the
liability, within one year following the later of (1) the due date of the return (without regard to
extension), or (2) the date on which the taxpayer filed the return, § 6404(g)(1) suspends the
accrual of interest for the period beginning one year after the due date (or filing, if applicable) of
the return. Interest resumes running twenty-one days after the IRS sends a notice to the taxpayer.
Section 6404(g) does not apply at all if an underpayment is due to fraud. In this case, the district
court held that the fraud exception to § 6404(g) does not apply to a deficiency from a tax shelter
transaction ["Baby BOSS"] that lacked economic substance, unless the government shows that
the taxpayer engaged in some act of concealment or misrepresentation. Even though the taxpayer
entered into the transaction knowing that it was a listed transaction [Notice 2000-44], and
knowing that it would not be registered with the IRS in order to conceal his participation,
because taxpayer relied on a "more likely than not opinion" by R.J. Ruble that the tax results of
the transaction would be upheld, the taxpayer acted in good faith and the government could not
prove that the taxpayer had fraudulent intent. Summary judgment was entered for the taxpayer.
a. Was it a "qualified amended return"? Sala v. United States, 99
A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1709 (D. Colo. 5/30/07). On plaintiff s motion for partial summary judgment,
Judge Babcock held that the amended 2000 return filed by Sala on 11/18/03 was possibly not a
"qualified amended return" because the date that the IRS notified KPMG that it was under a
§ 6700 examination was 10/17/03. The resolution of this issue depended upon the scope of the
§ 6700 examination at the time the amended return was filed, and an issue of fact existed that
precluded summary judgment. The court refused to stay the case pending the availability of
testimony from Sala's KPMG accountant, Tracie Henderson, and from R.J. Ruble, both of whom
indicated they would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights, because the delay would be
substantial and would prejudice Sala.
b. Sala v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5097 (D. Colo.
7/3/07). Judge Babcock reiterated his holding that there is an issue of fact as to whether the
11/18/03 amended return was a qualified amended return.
c. District Court holds for the taxpayer on the merits in an
options transaction for which R.J. Ruble provided the tax opinion. Sala v. United States, 552
F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 4/22/08). The District Court (Judge Babcock) held that taxpayer was
entitled to a $60 million ordinary loss on 24 long and short currency options entered into in
November 2000 as part of a Deerhurst Program, in which the options were contributed to a
partnership. The basis of that partnership interest was increased by the cost of the long options
but was not reduced by the contingent liability on the short options under Helmer v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-160 (1975). This was based upon Judge Babcock's finding of
fact that the long and short options were separate instruments for tax purposes. The court found
that the regulations issued in 2003, Reg. § 1.752-6, retroactive to October 1999, which contained
an "exception to the exception" for transactions described in Notice 2000-44, exceeded
Treasury's authority. Judge Babcock held that the regulations were not legislative because the
"exception to the exception" was not comparable to the rules for corporations described in
§ 358(h). Judge Babcock concluded that the corporate rules were only "to prevent acceleration or
duplication of losses," which were not involved in the transactions described in Notice 2000-44.
He refused to follow Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008).
* Judge Babcock analyzed the complex transaction under the
step transaction doctrine and found the doctrine inapplicable.
0 He found the losses deductible under § 165(c)(2) because
they were incurred in a transaction entered into for profit, which was to be determined at the time
taxpayer entered into the transaction, and not in hindsight. In this, Judge Babcock credited Sala's
testimony that "he expected his investment in Deerhurst to be profitable above and beyond the
expected tax loss .... "
& He found the taxpayer was "an extremely cautious investor
who invested a great deal of time and energy carefully researching and choosing his investments"
and that he had a business purpose other than tax avoidance for structuring his investment as he did.
* Judge Babcock further held that Sala's amended return filed
on 11/18/03 was a "qualified amended return" because KPMG had not been contacted regarding
Deerhurst prior to that date, although it had been previously contacted regarding transactions similar
to Deerhurst.
d. Government motion on 6/10/08 for new trial based upon
affidavit given in connection with decision not to prosecute investment manager. Andrew J.
Krieger, a key witness for the taxpayer, stated in an affidavit dated 5/22/08 that a portion of the
testimony he gave at deposition was false, in that there was no "test period" for an "investment
program" but merely an effort to obtain tax savings. 2008 TNT 114-15. The motion was opposed
by the taxpayer because Krieger gave his affidavit only after the government granted him
immunity from prosecution by executing a non-prosecution cooperation agreement in connection
with a criminal investigation unrelated to this case, i.e., the Coplan criminal case pending in the
Southern District of New York. 2008 TNT 130-62, 7/1/08.
e. Government motion for new trial denied. 251 F.R.D. 614, 102
A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5292 (7/18/08). Judge Babcock denied the motion, holding that the evidence
submitted by the government was not new. He stated, "Rather than implying diligence, the
timing of this 'new' evidence instead implies a deliberate attempt on the part of the Government
to further delay and derail this case for tactical gain."
5. Maguire Partners. Maguire Partners - Master Investments, LLC v.
United States, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 103 A.F.T.R2d 2009-263, 2009-1 U.S.T.C. 50,215 (C.D.
Calif. 2/4/09). Two individuals, through various entities, in late 2001 entered into call options
spreads, i.e., they sold short call options to AIG via an Arthur Andersen tax strategy and
purchased offsetting long call options and promissory notes from the same company; the options
were European options, with an Asian-style feature, in that they were to be exercised on a
particular date based upon the average value of a REIT basket over a 90-day period. The
partnerships received the long options and notes and assumed the short options. In finding for the
government, the court (Judge Walter) held that the evidence demonstrated that the transactions
did not have economic substance because the individuals received no economic benefit, other
than an increase in basis, from the transactions. The court also held that the evidence
demonstrated that the individuals were motivated by the increased basis and not by any
purported hedging benefit. The court held that, under both the step transaction doctrine and the
substance-over-form doctrine, the individuals' actual cost basis was the original amount of their
investment - not the increased basis reported by the partnerships, because they had no downside
exposure, and only an extremely remote possibility of receiving a return. Judge Thomas further
held that the obligation created by the short option is a liability for purposes of § 752, or
alternatively, it had to be taken into account under Reg. § 1.752-6 which applies retroactively.
He further found that the individuals had been placed on notice by Notice 2000-44, issued in
August 2000.
* The court also held that the partnerships made a gross
valuation misstatement under § 6662, citing in support the fact that one of the individual's
partnerships reported an increase in its capital account equal to 67 times the actual economic outlay
that the individual paid for the transaction.
6. Samueli. A Twenty First Securities tax shelter bites the dust. Samueli
v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 4 (3/16/09). The taxpayer entered into a tax shelter transaction
planned by Twenty First Securities (of Compaq fame), a simplified explanation of which is as
follows. In October, 2001, the taxpayer purchased fixed-income securities (Freddie Mac
principal strips) from a broker on a margin loan (the broker was entitled to hold the securities as
collateral for the margin loan) and then "lent" the securities to the broker. The standard form
agreement allowed the taxpayer to terminate the transaction and receive identical securities from
the broker by giving notices on any business day, but an addendum overrode that provision and
provided that the "loan" of the securities would terminate on January 15, 2003, or at the
taxpayer's election on July 1 or December 2, 2002. The taxpayer purchased the securities for
$1.64 billion, but immediately "lent" the securities to the broker and received cash "collateral" of
$1.64 billion, which he used to repay the margin loan. The loan contracts provided that the
taxpayer was entitled to receive all interest, dividends, and other distributions attributable to the
securities, but that the taxpayer was obligated to pay the broker a variable rate fee for use of the
$1.64 billion cash collateral. In December, 2002, the taxpayer paid the broker $7.8 million of
"interest" on the $1.64 billion cash collateral, which was relent to the taxpayer (secured by the
securities, which had increased in value). The transaction terminated on January 15, 2003 and
the broker was obligated to pay the taxpayer $1.69 billion to purchase the securities in lieu of
transferring them to the taxpayer. The taxpayer was simultaneously obligated to pay the broker
$1.68 billion, which reflected repayment of the $1.64 billion cash collateral, plus accrued but
unpaid variable rate fees, but the amounts were offset and the broker paid the taxpayer $13.6
million. The taxpayer reported a $50 million long term capital gain and deducted $33 million of
interest (cash collateral fees). Judge Kroupa held that the purported loan transaction did not
satisfy the requirements of § 1058. To qualify as a loan of securities under § 1058, the loan
agreement must (1) provide for the return to the lender of identical securities; (2) require
payments to the lender equal to all interest, dividends, and other distributions on the securities
during the period of the loan, and (3) not reduce the risk of loss or opportunity for gain of the
transferor of the securities in the securities transferred. If any of these conditions is not satisfied,
the purported loan will be treated as a realization event. Because the taxpayer could demand
return of the securities only on three specified dates, and not at any time during the term of the
loan, he could not sell the securities to realize a gain at any and all times that the possibility for a
profitable sale arose. Thus, the taxpayer's opportunity for gain with respect to the transferred
securities transferred was reduced. Judge Kroupa rejected the taxpayer's argument that because
the taxpayer had not surrendered all opportunity to realize a gain with respect to the securities
that the third condition prerequisite to qualifying for loan treatment under § 1058 had been
satisfied. The statutory test for disqualification does not require completely elimination of the
benefits of ownership, but merely a reduction. As a result, the "loan" of the securities in 2001
was treated as a sale on which no gain was realized (because the basis and amount realized were
identical), and the "repayment" of the securities to the taxpayer in 2003 was treated as a
repurchase followed by a resale to the broker on which a $13.5 million short term capital gain
was realized. Furthermore, the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct the cash collateral fees paid as
interest in connection with the purported securities lending arrangement because no debt existed.
The cash transferred in 2001 represented the proceeds of the first sale and not collateral for a
securities loan. Thus, no "cash collateral" was outstanding during the relevant years on which
the claimed collateral fees could accrue.
a. If at first you don't succeed, try again on procedural grounds;
however, an amended return is not an administrative adjustment request. Samueli v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 16 (5/18/09). The taxpayers were ten percent partners in a tax
shelter partnership. Partnership level deductions claimed by the taxpayers were disallowed in
Samueli v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 4 (3/16/09), a partnership level determination. The
taxpayers asserted that deficiencies assessed against them were not partnership items because of
amended returns filed by the taxpayers for the year at issue. Section 6227 allows a partner to file
an Administrative Adjustment Request (AAR) on behalf of the partner, which allows a separate
determination of an item as a non-partner item. The court (Judge Kroupa) held that the
taxpayer's amended return was not an administrative adjustment request. The request must
follow the form required in Reg. § 301.6627(d)-i, which requires that a taxpayer file a partner
AAR on a form prescribed - Form 8082, Notice of Inconsistent Treatment or Administrative
Adjustment Request (AAR) - and in accordance with the form's instructions, which require the
taxpayer to explain in detail on the form the reasons for the AAR reported on the form. The
taxpayer is required to file the original form with the taxpayer's amended income tax return and a
copy of the form with the service center where the partnership files its tax return. The court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that because the amended return contained all of the
information required on Form 8082 for an AAR, it constituted an AAR. The taxpayer's claim
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
7. New Phoenix. Not so heavenly BLISS. A Son of Boss transaction by
any other name still stinks. New Phoenix Sunrise Corporation v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.
9 (4/9/09). In this Paul Daugerdas, Jenkens & Gilchrist structured deal named BLISS (Basis
Leveraged Investment Swap Spread), New Phoenix Sunrise Corporation (Phoenix) purchased
two pairs of digital option contracts in a transaction designed to eliminate $10 million of capital
gain realized on an asset sale by a corporate subsidiary included on the taxpayer's consolidated
return. The long portion of the options was purchased from Deutsche Bank AG for an initial
payment of $10.631 million plus two additional payments of $63 million each. The short option
was sold to Deutsche Bank for an initial payment of $10.369 million and two additional
payments of $63.066 million. Only the $138,750 difference between the purchase and sales
prices changed hands. The digital options called for offsetting payments based on the USD/JPL
price with a variance in the options of only 0.00002 (2 Pips). Phoenix contributed the purchased
and sold options to a general partnership for a 99% interest. The 1% partner was a dominant
shareholder in Phoenix. Phoenix claimed a basis in its partnership interest in the amount of the
cost of the purchased long option. Phoenix also claimed that its liability on the short position of
the sold option was a contingent liability that did not reduce its basis in the partnership.
Thereafter, the partnership acquired shares of Cisco stock for $149,958. After the options
expired, the partnership distributed the Cisco stock to Phoenix. Phoenix claimed a basis in the
Cisco stock equal to its partnership interest basis (§ 732) and a $10 million loss on its subsequent
sale of the Cisco stock. In an exceedingly well written opinion, the court (Judge Goeke), rejected
the claimed loss on several grounds:
* The taxpayer did not suffer a real economic loss. "The loss
claimed as a result of the stepped-up basis in the Cisco stock was purely fictional."
* The BLISS transaction had no realistic possibility of earning
a profit. Deutche Bank's control as the calculation agent for the option contracts empowered it to
assure that the market rate chosen for the closing of the options would never trigger the so-called
"sweet spot" under which the investor would earn substantial profits.
a The transaction lacked economic substance. The court stated:
Absent the benefit of the claimed tax loss, there was nothing but a cash flow that
was negative for all relevant periods-the "hallmark" of an economic sham" as
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held. Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 435 F.3d at 602 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co. v. United States, 326 F.3d
737, 742 (6th Cir. 2003). Such a deal lacks economic substance. Id. Because we
find that the transaction at issue lacked economic substance, we do not consider
Mr. Wray's and Capital's profit motive in entering into the transaction. Id. at 605;
... Pursuant to the aforementioned cases, the BLISS transaction must be ignored
for Federal income tax purposes. Accordingly, the overstated loss claimed as a
result of the sale of the CISCO stock is disregarded, as is the flowthrough loss
from Olentangy Partners.
* The court disallowed a $500,000 deduction for fees paid to
Jenkins Gilchrist for the tax opinion and structuring the transaction. The fees were not incurred in
the production of any income against which a deduction is allowable.
* The court also sustained a 40 percent gross valuation penalty
under § 6662(e) and (h), holding that the undervaluation penalty is applicable to overstated basis.
The court also indicated that the § 6662(d) substantial understatement of tax and the § 6662(c)
negligence penalties were applicable. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that it reasonably
relied on the Jenkins and Gilchrist tax shelter opinion. Since the penalties are not additive, only the
gross valuation penalty was imposed.).
8. Retroactive application of the partnership contingent liability
regulation rejected again. Murfam Farms L.L.C. v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R2d 2009-5700
(Fed. Cl. 7/30/09). The court (Judge Damich) granted the taxpayers' motion for partial summary
judgment in a COBRA tax shelter case (COBRA is a Son of Boss digital options shelter under
another name) declaring that Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T may not be applied retroactively. The court
held that retroactive application of the temporary regulation was barred by the prohibition of
§ 7805(b)(1) on retroactive application of regulations because it was not issued pursuant to a
congressional grant of authority. The court further opined that the retroactive application of the
regulation was not authorized by § 309(c) of the 2000 Act because the abuse it sought to prevent
was not the same type of abuse that § 358(h) was designed to prevent, i.e., it "was not to combat
the inflation of basis - artificial or otherwise - rather, to preclude the acceleration and/or
duplication of losses."
9. The Second Circuit reverses a taxpayer victory in a self-liquidating
partnership note transaction, in which the lion's share of income was allocated to a tax-
indifferent party, on the ground that the tax-indifferent Dutch banks were not really equity
partners. TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 11/1/04), rev 'd, 2006-2
U.S.T.C. 50,442 (2d Cir. 8/3/06) ("Castle Harbour").
a. Castle Harbour L District court opinion: The court found that
the creation of Castle Harbour, a Nevada LLC, by General Electric Capital Corp. subsidiaries
was not designed solely to avoid taxes, but to spread the risk of their investment in fully-
depreciated commercial airplanes used in their leasing operations. GECC subsidiaries put the
following assets into Castle Harbor: $530 million worth of fully-depreciated aircraft subject to a
$258 million non-recourse debt, $22 million of rents receivable, $296 million of cash, and all the
stock of another GECC subsidiary that had a value of $0. Two tax-indifferent Dutch Banks
invested $117.5 million in Castle Harbour Under the LLC agreement, the tax-indifferent partner
was allocated 98 percent of the book income and 98 percent of the tax income.
* The book income was net of depreciation and the tax income
did not take depreciation into account [because the airplanes were fully depreciated]. Depreciation
deductions for book purposes were on the order of 60 percent of the rental income for any given
year.
* Scheduled distributions in excess of book income would have
resulted in the liquidation of the investment of the Dutch banks in eight years, with the Dutch banks
receiving a return of approximately nine percent, with some "economically substantial" upside and
some downside risk. Castle Harbour was terminated after five years because of a threatened change
in U.S. tax law, but during that period about $310 million of income was shifted to the Dutch banks
for a tax saving to the GECC subsidiaries of about $62 million.
* Query whether § 704(b) was properly applied to this
transaction?
* This appears to be a lease-stripping transaction in which the
income from the lease was assigned to foreign entities while the benefits of ownership were left with
a domestic entity.
0 The court (Judge Underhill) held that satisfaction of the
mechanical rules of the regulations under § 704(b) transcended both an intent to avoid tax and the
avoidance of significant tax through agreed upon partnership allocations. In this partnership, 2
percent of both operating and taxable income was allocated to GECC, a United States partner, and
98 percent of both book and taxable income was allocated to partners who were Dutch banks. The
Dutch banks were foreign partners who were not liable for United States taxes and thus were
indifferent to the U.S. tax consequences of their participation in the partnership. Because the
partnership had very large book depreciation deductions and no tax depreciation, most of the
partnership's taxable operating income, which was substantially in excess of book taxable income,
was allocated to the tax-indifferent foreign partners, even though a large portion of the cash receipts
reflected in that income was devoted to repaying the principal of loans secured by property that
GECC had contributed to the partnership. The overall partnership transaction saved GECC
approximately $62 million in income taxes, and the court found that "it appears likely that one of
GECC's principal motivations in entering into this transaction - though certainly not its only
motivation - was to avoid that substantial tax burden." The court understood the effects of the
allocations and concluded that "by allocating 98% of the income from fully tax-depreciated aircraft
to the Dutch Banks, GECC avoided an enormous tax burden, while shifting very little book income.
Put another way, by allocating income less depreciation to tax-neutral parties, GECC was able to
"re-depreciate" the assets for tax purposes. The tax-neutrals absorbed the tax consequences of all the
income allocated to them, but actually received only the income in excess of book depreciation."
Nevertheless, the court upheld the allocations. "The tax benefits of the *** transaction were the
result of the allocation of large amounts of book income to a tax-neutral entity, offset by a large
depreciation expense, with a corresponding allocation of a large amount of taxable income, but no
corresponding allocation of depreciation deductions. This resulted in an enormous tax savings, but
the simple allocation of a large percentage of income violates no rule. The government does not -
and cannot - dispute that partners may allocate their partnership's income as they choose. Neither
does the government dispute that the taxable income allocated to the Dutch Banks could not be
offset by the allocation of non-existent depreciation deductions to the banks. And *** the bare
allocation of a large interest in income does not violate the overall tax effect rule."
0 Judge Underhill concluded:
The government is understandably concerned that the Castle Harbour transaction
deprived the public fisc of some $ 62 million in tax revenue. Moreover, it appears
likely that one of GECC's principal motivations in entering into this transaction -
though certainly not its only motivation - was to avoid that substantial tax burden.
Nevertheless, the Castle Harbour transaction was an economically real
transaction, undertaken, at least in part, for a non-tax business purpose; the
transaction resulted in the creation of a true partnership with all participants
holding valid partnership interests; and the income was allocated among the
partners in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations.
In short, the transaction, though it sheltered a great deal of income from taxes,
was legally permissible. Under such circumstances, the I.R.S. should address its
concerns to those who write the tax laws.
b. Castle Harbour II. Second Circuit opinion: The Second Circuit,
in an opinion by Judge Leval, held that the Dutch banks were not partners because their risks and
rewards were closer to those of creditors than partners. He used the facts-and-circumstances test
of Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), to determine whether the banks' interest
was more in the nature of debt or equity, and found that their interest was overwhelmingly in the
nature of a secured lender's interest, "which would neither be harmed by poor performance of
the partnership nor significantly enhanced by extraordinary profits."
* In ACM [Colgate], Judge Laro wrote a 100+ page analysis to
find that there was no economic substance to the arrangement. The next contingent payment
installment sale case in the Tax Court was ASA Investerings [Allied Signal], in which Judge Foley
wrote a much shorter opinion finding that the Dutch bank was not a partner; the D.C. Circuit
affirmed on Judge Foley's holding that the Dutch bank was not a partner. The IRS began to pick up
this lack-of-partnership argument and began to use it on examinations. Later, the Tax Court (Judge
Nims) used the economic substance argument in Saba [Brunswick], which the DC Circuit remanded
based on ASA Investerings to give taxpayer the opportunity to argue that there was a valid
partnership [which it could not do, as Judge Nims found on remand]. Even later, the D.C. Circuit
reversed the District Court's Boca [Wyeth, or American Home Products] case based upon this lack-
of-partnership argument - even though Cravath planned Boca carefully so that if the Dutch bank
was knocked out, there would still be a partnership - based upon its ASA Investerings and Saba
findings on appeal that there was no partnership. Now we have Judge Leval of the Second Circuit
adopting the lack-of-partnership argument that Judge Foley used allegedly because he was unwilling
to perform the full-fledged economic analysis necessary to find a lack of economic substance.
c. A valid family partnership is found in the absence of a family.
On remand in Castle Harbour, the District Court found a valid partnership to have existed
under § 704(e) because the heading does not alter the clear language of a statute.
Additionally, in his contingent penalty findings, Judge Underhill stated that his 2004
taxpayer-favorable decision ipso facto means that the taxpayer's reporting position was
based upon substantial authority. TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.
Conn. 11/1/04), rev'd, 2006-2 U.S.T.C. 50,442 (2d Cir. 8/3/06), on remand, _ F. Supp. 2d
__ (D. Conn. 10/7/09). In a carefully-written opinion, Judge Underhill held that, while the
Second Circuit opinion decided that the partnership did not meet the Culbertson totality-of-the-
circumstances test, it did not address the § 704(e)(1) issue. He held that the Dutch banks did
satisfy the requirements of that paragraph, which reads:
(e) Family partnerships.
(1) Recognition of interest created by purchase or gift. - A person shall be
recognized as a partner for purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in
a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or
not such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person.
* In so holding, he relied upon well-settled law that the title of a
statute cannot limit the plain meaning of the text, and that the title is of use only when it sheds light
on some ambiguous word or phrase.
* It has sometimes been adduced that the fact that a court of
applicable jurisdiction subsequently upholds the tax treatment of a transaction should be a strong
argument for the proposition that such tax treatment was based upon substantial authority. With
respect to the applicability of penalties should he be reversed on appeal, Judge Underhill stated:
To a large extent, my holding in Castle Harbour I in favor of the taxpayer
demonstrates the substantial authority for the partnership's tax treatment of
the Dutch Banks, as does my discussion above of the Dutch Banks' interest in
Castle Harbour under section 704(e)(1). In addition, the government's arguments
against the substantial authority defense are unavailing. (emphasis supplied)
10. Government misconduct amounting to fraud does not require a showing of
prejudice to justify relief. Tax shelter investors entitled to the same deal received by the
taxpayers who cooperated with the government. Dixon v. Commissioner, 316 F.3d 1041 (9th
Cir. 1/17/03), remanding T.C. Memo. 2000-116 and T.C. Memo. 1999-101. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court finding that misconduct by IRS attorneys during the trial of test cases
[secretly allowing the deduction of attorney's fees in exchange for taxpayer cooperation]
constituted harmless error. The tax shelter was one designed and administered by Honolulu
businessman Henry Kersting, in which participants purchased stock with loans from entities
financed by two layers of promissory notes, resulting in their being able to claim interest
deductions on their individual returns. Judge Hawkins held that the taxpayers demonstrated fraud
and that a demonstration of prejudice was unnecessary. The Tax Court was directed to enter
judgment in favor of taxpayers on terms equivalent to the secret settlement agreements entered
into with the test case taxpayers who cooperated with the government.
* Three lawyers from the Houston area represented various
taxpayers. They were Henry Binder of Porter & Hedges, Michael Louis Minns, and Joe Alfred Izen,
Jr.
a. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-008 (2/3/03). This notice reminds
Chief Counsel attorneys of their obligation to adhere to the highest ethical standards in all
aspects of their responsibilities, including representation of the Commissioner before the Tax
Court. ABA Model Rules 3.3 [candor to tribunals], 3.4 [fairness to opposing party and counsel],
4.1 [truthfulness in statements to third persons], and 8.4 [misconduct] were discussed in the
notice.
b. On remand to the Tax Court, it really hits the fan for the
Commissioner - and deservedly so. The misconduct of the government lawyers involved
and the Commissioner's failure to fully disclose the misconduct to all taxpayers who had
been bound by the outcome of the Kersting project test cases infested the stipulated
decisions in all of the hundreds of cases settled in accordance with the outcome of the test
cases. Hartman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-124 (5/1/08). In a 137-page opinion, the
Tax Court (Judge Beghe) held that all of the hundreds of Kersting tax shelter cases in which
stipulated decisions had been entered and which had became final many years ago had to be re-
opened and the taxpayers' accounts had to be adjusted administratively in accordance with the
settlements received by the taxpayers in the test cases.
c. The Tax Court awards attorney's fees to Porter & Hedges
under § 6673, the tests for which are different from those for attorney's fees under § 7430.
Dixon v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 5 (3/23/09). In awarding fees of $1.1 million to Porter &
Hedges for the services and expenses of its lawyers Henry Binder and John Irvine who
represented taxpayers during the remand proceedings following the 2003 Ninth Circuit decision
without charge other than the costs, expenses, and fees that the court might require the IRS to
pay pursuant to § 6673(a)(2), the Tax Court (Judge Beghe) in a masterful opinion held that -
unlike § 7430 fees which are limited to reimbursement of the fees paid by taxpayers plus fees
which the taxpayers have incurred, i.e., for which they were personally liable - under § 6673 a
party who has "multiplied the proceedings ... unreasonably and vexatiously" has injured not
only the opposing party but also the court and counsel and is liable for fees without such
limitation "other than the requirement that the fees to be paid have been 'reasonably incurred'
because of such conduct." Judge Beghe found applicable to the § 6673 sanctioning statute the
broader definition of "incurred" in Black's Law Dictionary, which means "liabilities cast upon
one by act or operation of law, as distinguished from contract." He concluded that interest on the
fee amount was applicable because "in augmenting the award of fees and expenses with interest
equivalents, we do no more than mimic DeCastro's fee arrangement with the Thompsons."
Henry Binder died of cancer on December 15, 2006. One of
the authors recalls that Henry Binder was consumed by this case, even during the worst moments of
his final illness.
11. Transactions underlying a tax shelter are just done for grins in the real
world; you can take that to the bank, man! Hoosier homer judge grants injunctive relief to tax-
indifferent party to a tax shelter contract without requiring the plaintiff to disgorge the $20
million it pocketed for entering into the tax shelter in the first place. Hoosier Energy Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co., 588 F. Supp. 2d 919 (S.D. Ind.
11/25/08). Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative ("Hoosier Energy") was the tax
indifferent party in a sale-in/lease-out transaction of one of its generating plants for which it
received $20 million for its participation. Professor Joseph Bankman of Stanford Law School
furnished an expert opinion in affidavit form that this type of sale-in/lease-out transaction was an
abusive tax shelter, leading the court to find that the "deal was an attempt to create an
appearance of a sale but without any real economic substance." Pursuant to the documentation of
the arrangement, Hoosier Energy was required to maintain specified adequate security for its
obligation to make future lease payments, i.e., provide a credit default swap from a party with at
least an AA rating - failing which, it was required to make the agreed-upon termination payment
of $120 million to a third-party which was obligated to pay the amount to John Hancock Life
Insurance Co. ("John Hancock"). Hoosier Energy maintained this security in the form of a
guarantee from AIG and it did timely make each of its lease payments. Upon the falling of AIG's
credit rating below the contractually-required standard, Hoosier Energy sought unsuccessfully to
secure an equivalent guarantee. On Hoosier Energy's request, Chief Judge Hamilton granted an
injunction against enforcement of Hoosier Energy's obligation to make the $120 million
termination payment to the third party on the ground that the arrangement was entered into
solely for tax benefits and was somehow unenforceable against Hoover.
* Chief Judge Hamilton did state that Hoosier Energy might
some time in the future be required to give back the $20 million, but that there was no hurry about
that.
* Professor Bankman's affidavit stated that the transaction was
similar to that in AWG Leasing Trust v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Ohio 5/28/08),
supra.
a. In a later proceeding, Judge Hamilton pretends to require
Hoosier Energy to give John Hancock adequate security to cover the possibility that his
11/25/08 injunction was incorrectly issued. Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
John Hancock Life Insurance Co., 2008 WL 5216027 (S.D. Ind. 12/11/08). Judge Hamilton, in
addition to a $2 million cash bond, required Hoosier Energy "to post its own [i.e., meaningless]
undertaking to pay John Hancock up to an additional $130 million in damages it might suffer
from an improper injunction."
b. Affirmed on "temporary commercial impracticability"
grounds, but not because the transaction was an abusive tax shelter.__ F.3d __, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 20759 (7th Cir. 9/17/09). Judge Easterbrook held that John Hancock's taxes are a
matter for it to resolve with the IRS, and that "does not affect Hoosier Energy's contractual
duties." He further stated that "temporary commercial impracticability" becomes a pumpkin at
year end. On remand, the district court increased the bond substantially (10/7/09).
12. The Supreme Court enhances the sanctity of arbitration agreements.
Arthur Andersen LLP, et al. v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (5/4/09), rev'g Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-
Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 4/9/08). The respondents in this case
invested in a Son of Boss type transaction called a "leveraged option strategy." The investors
entered into an investment-management agreement with Bricolage Capital, LLC, which
contained a mandatory arbitration provision. Only Bricolage Capital was a signatory to the
agreement with the arbitration provision. The investors filed an action for fraud and malpractice
against Arthur Andersen and Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP (who provided the tax
opinion). The parties moved for a stay of the District Court action under the provisions of the
arbitration agreement. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, provides for a stay of any
action in federal court that is "referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing." 9 U.S.C.
§ 16(a)(1)(A) allows an immediate appeal from an order denying a stay. The District Court
denied the stay. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The Supreme Court (Justice Scalia) reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
0 The Court concluded that the Court of Appeals conflated
questions of the applicability of 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 16(a) with the substantive merits of the question
whether non-signatories to a written arbitration agreement possessed contract rights to arbitration
under the agreement. "The jurisdictional statute here unambiguously makes the underlying merits
irrelevant, for even utter frivolousness of the underlying request requires for a § 3 stay cannot turn a
denial into something other than 'an order... refusing a stay of any action under section 3."'
0 The Court further concluded that, in order not to award the
"petitioners a remarkably hollow victory," state law is applicable to determine whether non-
signatories to the arbitration agreement may enforce the agreement and thereby obtain a stay of
proceedings pursuant to the written arbitration agreement.
• The dissenting justices (Justice Souter joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Stevens) argued that 9 U.S.C. § 3 offers a stay only to signatories of an
arbitration agreement because "it would therefore seem strange to assume that Congress meant to
grant the right to appeal a § 3 stay denial to anyone as peripheral to the core agreement as a
nonsignatory,..."
• This opinion highlights the likelihood that the resolution of
questions regarding professional responsibility in tort law of law firms, accounting firms and the
banks involved in the promotion of the recent crop of abusive tax shelters will be shielded from
public disclosure by confidential arbitration proceedings and only known to the parties involved.
B. Identified "tax avoidance transactions."
1. A safe cove (not big enough to be a harbor) for some taxpayers in the
tax shelter war. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299 (12/1/08). This notice clarified Notice
2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730, and superseded Notice 2008-20, 2008-6 I.R.B. 406, regarding
Intermediary Transaction Tax Shelters. A transaction is treated as an Intermediary Transaction
with respect to a particular person only if that person engages in the transaction pursuant to a
plan, the transaction contains the four objective components indicative of an Intermediary
Transaction, and no safe harbor exception applies to that person.
C. Disclosure and Settlement
D. Tax Shelter Penalties, Etc.
1. The KPMG deal: the price of settling goes up dramatically. IR-2005-
83 (8/29/05). The IRS and the Justice Department announced that KPMG LLP has admitted to
criminal wrongdoing and agreed to pay $456 million in fines, restitution, and penalties as part of
an agreement to defer prosecution of the firm. Nineteen individuals, chiefly former KPMG
partners including the former deputy chairman of the firm [Jeffrey Stein], as well as a New York
lawyer [R.J. Ruble] were indicted in the Southern District of New York in relation to the "multi-
billion dollar criminal tax fraud conspiracy." Three of those indicted were partners in KPMG's
Washington National Tax group and several of those indicted were practice partners at KPMG.
a. In its post-Enron war against white collar crime, the Justice
Department's notion that what is fair against organized crime is also fair against white
collar crime receives a [temporary?] setback. Judge Kaplan finds prosecutorial misconduct
in the use of the Thompson Memorandum to prevent KPMG from continuing its
customary practice of paying attorney's fees for individuals caught up in controversy by
reason of their affiliation with the firm. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y.
6/26/06), as amended, 7/14/06. The court held that the Justice Department's Thompson
Memorandum policy [continued from the Holder Memorandum] of basing a determination of
whether a firm is "cooperating" with the government on its refusal (unless compelled by law) to
advance legal fees for affiliated individuals unless they in turn fully cooperated with the
government, as it was applied by the prosecutors in this case, was an unconstitutional
interference with defendants' ability to use resources that -absent the government's misconduct
- would be otherwise available to them for payment of attorneys' fees. The resources in question
were funds that would have customarily been received by these defendants from KPMG to pay
their attorneys.
* Judge Kaplan suggested that the constitutional violation could
be rendered harmless if the defendants could successfully force KPMG to pay their legal expenses,
and sua sponte instructed the clerk of the district court to open a civil docket number for an expected
contract claim by the defendants against KPMG for payment of their defense costs. Judge Kaplan
stated that the court would "entertain the claims pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction over this case."
The defendants subsequently filed the anticipated complaints against KPMG.
* Judge Kaplan subsequently refused to eliminate from his
opinion a statement that prosecutors in the case were "economical with the truth." He also refused to
eliminate from his opinion the names of the prosecutors involved. 2006 TNT 130-10.
b. Indictment against 13 KPMG defendants dismissed because
the government interfered with their Sixth Amendment right to secure counsel which
would have been available to them absent government interference. United States v. Stein,
495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 7/16/07). Judge Kaplan dismissed the indictment as to 13 of the
16 defendants who had been affiliated with KPMG at the time of their alleged conduct because
the U.S. Attorney's Office interfered with their ability to receive payment of their attorneys' fees
from KPMG. The government announced its intention to appeal the dismissal of the 13
defendants, and Judge Kaplan indicated his intention to proceed with the trial of the remaining
five defendants in October 2007. This trial was postponed until 2008.
c. Judge Kaplan's dismissal of the indictment against 13 former
KPMG partners was affirmed by the Second Circuit. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d
Cir. 8/28/08). In a resounding opinion, Chief Judge Jacobs agreed with Judge Kaplan's analysis
that the actions taken by KPMG to "condition[ ], cap[ ] and ultimately cease[ ]" to advance legal
fees to defendants constituted "state action" which deprived defendants of their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel because they were the result of the prosecutors' (mis?)use of the
Thompson Memorandum to overwhelmingly influence KPMG to not follow its past practice "to
advance legal fees for employees facing regulatory, civil and criminal investigations without
condition or cap" upon pain of a possible indictment of the firm.
d. The McNulty Memorandum is not much better than the
Thompson Memorandum. The Thompson Memorandum [which was based upon the Holder
Memorandum] was replaced on 12/12/06 by the McNulty Memorandum which requires threats
to prosecute entities "unless" they do something [e.g., waive attorney client privilege] or "if'
they do something [e.g., advance legal fees] to emanate from a higher level of the Justice
Department.
* The Filip Memorandum is close, but no cigar. The
McNulty Memorandum was, in turn, replaced on 8/28/08 with the Filip Memorandum, which
purportedly removes the requirements that a firm must waive attorney-client privilege and work
product protection in order to receive "cooperation credit." Instead, that determination should be
based on "whether the corporation has provided the facts about the events [which putatively
constituted misconduct]." Also, "mere" participation in a joint defense agreement is to be permitted
but such participation should not disable the firm from providing [all] relevant facts to the
government. Payment of legal fees for employees is permissible unless such payment is "used in a
manner that would otherwise constitute criminal obstruction ofjustice."
* Eric Holder has been nominated for the post of attorney
general in the Obama Administration. In the era of new politics, it is unlikely that he will receive
even half as much scrutiny as did Joe the Plumber. But see, Arlen Specter & Edwin Meese III,
"Even Businessmen Deserve a Lawyer," Wall Street Journal, 1/15/09 at A 11, which commented on
the Holder Memorandum.
2. The E&Y deal. IR-2003-84 (7/2/03). The IRS announced that it settled
Ernst & Young's potential liability under the tax shelter registration and list maintenance penalty
provisions for a nondeductible payment of $15 million. See 2003 TNT 128-1.
a . These "value ideas" did produce extraordinary results for
E&Y tax partners, but not the results they expected. United States v. Coplan. Two current
and two former partners of Ernst & Young, Robert Coplan, Martin Nissenbaum, Richard
Shapiro, and Brian Vaughn - all members of its VIPER [Value Ideas Produce Extraordinary
Results] group - were indicted on 5/30/07 in the Southern District of New York for crimes
relating to tax shelters promoted by E&Y. The shelters included CDS ("Contingent Deferred
Swap"); COBRA ("Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives"); CDS Add-On; and PICO
("Personal Investment Corporation"). 2007 TNT 105-1.
b. More defendants. 2008 TNT 35-23 (2/21/08). The indictment was
expanded to add David L. Smith, Private Capital Management, and Charles Bolton to the list of
alleged co-conspirators. Smith is alleged to have introduced the CDS strategy to E&Y and is
further alleged to have licensed the CDS transactions to Bolton and a group of Bolton companies
who implemented the transactions.
c. The four indicted members of E&Y's VIPER group were
convicted by a jury following a ten-week trial in the Southern District of New York on
5/7/09. The convictions were for conspiracy relating to four tax shelters, tax evasion relating to
clients who used a tax shelter transaction known as "CDS Add-On," obstructing the IRS, and
making false statements to the IRS. Department of Justice Press Release (5/7/09). 2009 TNT 88-
122.
* The DOJ release further noted that Bolton pleaded guilty on
1/22/09 and Smith has not been apprehended. It further noted that Peter Cinquegrani, a former
Arnold & Porter partner who provided opinion letters on E&Y tax shelters pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to commit tax fraud on 9/11/08, and Bell Six, a former E&Y employee who later went to
work for entities that implemented shelters for E&Y pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit tax
fraud on 6/14/07.
3. Jerry Cohen outsmarts the government and mitigates taxpayer
penalties. Alpha I LP v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 622 (11/25/08), motion for reconsideration
denied, 86 Fed. Cl. 126 (3/16/09). The IRS issued FPAAs that adjusted the partners' capital
gains and losses based on five theories: (1) § 752; (2) Reg. § 1.752-6 (the "retroactive
regulation"); (3) the transaction or entities were a sham or lacked economic substance; (4) Reg.
§ 1.701-2 (the partnership anti-abuse regulation); and (5) "none of the transactions of the
Partnership increases the amount considered at-risk for an activity under § 465(b)(1)." The
partners "conceded the adjustments on the ground that none of the transactions of the
partnerships increased the amount considered at-risk for any activity under § 465(b)(1) and that
the at-risk rules would disallow losses and require the partnerships and their partners to
recognize gain on the transactions as set forth in the FPAAs." In addition, the IRS asserted that
the § 6662 substantial valuation misstatement penalty should apply, but the taxpayers did not
concede that issue. Rather, the taxpayers argued that valuation misstatement penalties were
inapplicable as a matter of law because "any underpayment of tax was not 'attributable to' a
valuation misstatement, but instead would be attributable to plaintiffs' concession that [the
IRS's] adjustments were correct under [§ 465(b)(1)]." The court (Judge Hewitt) agreed with the
taxpayers and held that where adjustments are made on grounds unrelated to valuation, valuation
penalties do not apply. The court also rejected the IRS's argument the court lacked jurisdiction
to accept the taxpayer's concession because "there are not any partnership level determinations
to be made with respect to § 465." The court found that the "concession obviate[d] the need to
conduct a trial on valuation issues and therefore achieve[d] the very efficiencies and economies
that the elimination of penalties sought to encourage. ... To go behind the concession and attempt
to assign to it a specific ground would be to engage in an activity that the elimination of penalties
is intended to prevent." The court also refused to accept the IRS's argument that it should
consider on the merits the IRS's alternative grounds for the adjustments that were based on
valuation, i.e., basis, misstatements, solely for the purposes of determining the applicability of
penalties. The court agreed with the taxpayers' argument "that forcing a 'trial on alternative
grounds for adjustments plaintiffs have already conceded violates the purpose and policy behind
the valuation misstatement penalties and is simply a waste of the Court's and the parties'
resources."'
a. Taxpayers are not precluded from asserting defenses, but they
are bound by their stipulations. Alpha I LP v. United States, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 294
(Fed. Cl. 8/26/09). Taxpayers are limited to asserting defenses based on the ground under which
they made their concessions to avoid valuation penalties. A trial on penalties will not encompass
valuation misstatement penalties because the court has already held that valuation misstatement
penalties are inapplicable. Plaintiffs are not judicially estopped from asserting defenses based on
§ 465.
4. Another IRS weapon in the tax shelter war. REG-160872-04, Section
6707 and the Failure To Furnish Information Regarding Reportable Transactions, 73 F.R. 78254
(12/22/08). Prop. Reg. § 301.6707-1 would reflect the amendments to § 6707 in The American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004. A § 6707 penalty may be assessed against each material advisor
required to file a return under § 6111 who fails to file a timely return as required under Reg.
§ 301.6111-3(e) or files a return with false or incomplete information. If more than one material
advisor is responsible for filing a return under § 6111 with respect to the same reportable
transaction, a separate penalty under § 6707 may be assessed against each material advisor who
fails to timely file a return or files a return with false or incomplete information. Incomplete
information means a Form 8918, "Material Advisor Disclosure Statement" (or successor form),
filed with the IRS that does not provide the information required under Reg. § 301.6111-3(d).
Failure to timely file or the submission of false or incomplete information is intentional if (1) the
material advisor knew of the obligation to file a return, and knowingly did not timely file a
return, or (2) filed a return knowing that it was false or incomplete. The proposed regulations
provide factors that the IRS should take into account during the determination whether to rescind
all or a portion of a § 6707 penalty. The list of factors generally follows Rev. Proc. 2007-21,
2007-9 I.R.B. 613. The regulations will apply to returns the due date of which is after the final
regulations are published in the Federal Register.
5. The Tax Court does have jurisdiction to determine whether
partnership transactions were tax-motivated for penalty purposes. Keller v. Commissioner,
568 F.3d 710, 2009-1 U.S.T.C. 50,428 (9th Cir. 6/3/09), rev'g T.C. Memo 2006-166. The case
concerns the outstanding tax liabilities of 16 partners who invested in cattle partnerships that
were sold to investors as "The 1,000 lb Tax Shelter." These partnerships were part of a large
series of cattle- and sheep-breeding partnerships organized, promoted and operated by Walter J.
Hoyt III from the 1970s through the 1990s, and which have been the subject of extensive
litigation over the years. The IRS had offered a variety of settlement offers to the partners in the
partnerships at issue. When the Service sent notices of intent to levy, the partners requested
collection due process hearings and submitted offers in compromise to settle their outstanding
tax liabilities. The IRS rejected the partners' offers in compromise and, in collection due process
hearings, imposed interest under former § 6621(c) (which imposed a higher interest rate for
substantial underpayments that resulted from tax-motivated transactions). In the ensuing
litigation, the Tax Court held that the IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the offers in
compromise. The court also held that it did not itself have jurisdiction to determine whether the
partnerships' transactions were tax-motivated for purposes of former § 6621 (c).
0 The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) based its jurisdiction decision
on the fact that the question of whether the transactions were tax-motivated is a partnership item that
must be determined in partnership-level proceedings. Here, the individual partners were the parties
to the various cases being litigated, not the partnerships, so the court held that in these proceedings it
did not have jurisdiction to decide the partnership-level issue. The effect of this decision was to
leave the Service's imposition of higher interest rates under former § 6621(c) in place.
* The Ninth Circuit (Judge Rymer) agreed with the Tax Court
that the determination of whether transactions are tax-motivated is a partnership item to be
determined at partnership-level proceedings. This rule was formulated by the Ninth Circuit in River
City Ranches #1 Ltd., 401 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the partnership proceedings in
this case were completed and judgment became final before the River City Ranches decision
announced this rule.
* The Tax Court has jurisdiction in a collection due process
proceeding to decide issues relating to liability that the taxpayer has not had an opportunity to
contest (§ 6330(c)(2)(B)). Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit, in a collection due process
proceeding of a partner in a partnership, the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review the record of a
partnership-level proceeding to make a determination about a partnership level issue affecting the
partner's liability that the partner did not have an opportunity to contest. In this case, the Ninth
Circuit believed that the record from the partnership proceedings was sufficient to allow the Tax
Court to determine whether the partnership transactions were tax-motivated. The Ninth Circuit then
performed the review of the partnership proceedings itself and determined that the partnership
transactions were tax-motivated.
6. Say it ain't so, BDO. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York announced on 6/3/09 that Charles W. Bee, Jr., a former Vice-Chairman and board member
at BDO Seidman, pleaded guilty to a three-count felony information charging him with
conspiracy to defraud the United States in connection with tax shelter transactions involving
clients of his firm and of the law firm Jenkens & Gilchrist (J&G); tax evasion in connection with
a multimillion-dollar tax shelter that Bee helped sell to a client of his firm; and to giving material
false deposition testimony regarding his firm's tax shelter practice. According to the information
and statements made during his guilty plea proceeding before United States Magistrate Judge
Theodore Katz in Manhattan federal court:
From 1984 through October 2003, Bee, a Certified Public Accountant,
was a partner and became a director and Vice-Chairman of accounting firm BDO
Seidman. From 1998 through October 2000, Bee, along with the firm's CEO as
well as New York-based partner Adrian Dicker (who has previously pleaded
guilty to similar tax fraud charges) was one of the leaders of the Firm's "Tax
Solutions Group" (TSG), the activities of which were devoted to designing,
marketing and implementing high-fee tax strategies, including tax shelters, for
wealthy clients. Bee, together with other TSG partners, designed, marketed and
implemented two different types of tax shelters with the Chicago office of the law
firm Jenkens & Gilchrist and with an international bank in New York.
Bee knew that the tax shelter transactions would be allowed by the IRS
only if there was a reasonable possibility of a profit. Bee also knew that, given the
costs and fees to the clients, and the nature and duration of the transactions, the
tax shelters had no reasonable possibility of resulting in a profit. In addition, Bee
knew that the clients who purchased the tax shelter had no non-tax business
reasons for entering into the transactions, and that the fees were set as a
percentage of the tax loss sought by the clients. To make it appear that the tax
shelter clients had the requisite business purpose and that there was a possibility
of profit, Bee and his co-conspirators reviewed and approved the use of a legal
opinion letter issued by J&G that contained false and fraudulent representations
purportedly made by the clients about their motivations for entering into the
transactions. Bee and other TSG members also developed a consulting agreement
containing false and fraudulent statements to disguise the fact that the fees clients
would be charged by BDO Seidman were solely for the tax shelters. Finally, Bee
and his co-conspirators caused the clients to file false and fraudulent tax returns
incorporating the supposed tax shelter benefits. In total, the fraudulent tax shelters
implemented by Bee, BDO Seidman, J&G, and the financial institution that
assisted them, caused clients to report over $1 billion in false and fraudulent tax
losses, resulting in the evasion of over $200 million in taxes. ***
Finally, Bee admitted that in February 2005, while under oath during a
deposition in Jade Trading v. United States, a Court of Federal Claims case
involving a tax shelter sold by BDO and another promoter, he knowingly made
false material statements concerning BDO' s tax shelter practice. ***
Co-conspirator Michael Kerekes, a principal of BDO Seidman and also a
former member of BDO's TSG and Tax Opinion Committee, pleaded guilty on
February 13, 2009, to related conspiracy and tax evasion charges. Fellow co-
conspirator Adrian Dicker, a former Vice-Chairman of BDO Seidman and TSG
member, pleaded guilty on March 17, 2009, to conspiracy and evasion charges as
well.
7. Small businesses that entered into listed transactions receive three-month
delays in penalty enforcement activities to give Congress time to deal with the "unintended
consequences" of § 6707A. Letter from Commissioner Shulman to Rep. John Lewis, D-Ga.,
chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways & Means Committee, 7/6/09.
IRS will suspend collection enforcement activities until 9/30/09 on penalties under § 6707A
where the tax benefits from listed transactions were less than $100,000 for individuals or
$200,000 from other taxpayers.
0 This suspension is to permit time for the enactment of
legislation to modify the penalty amounts so that they are more in line with the tax benefits of the
transaction.
8. "Everyone's doing it" is not a legal principle. 3K Investment Partners v.
Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 6 (9/3/09). In a partnership proceeding to determine whether the
partnership reasonably relied on tax opinions in a Son-of-Boss tax shelter investment in order to
avoid § 6662 accuracy related penalties, the partnership sought discovery of all of the Son-of-
Boss tax shelter opinions and a list of firms providing opinions in order to bolster its argument
that reliance on opinions of Jenkens & Gilchrist was reasonable. In denying the discovery
motion, the court (Judge Thornton) observed that, "Petitioner's argument appears to be a variant
of the refrain, familiar to parents of teenagers, that 'Everyone's doing it.' For the same reason
that this does not constitute reasonable cause for teenagers, it would not constitute reasonable
cause for petitioner." The court held that the partnership must establish reasonableness based on
the facts of its own case. The court also rejected the partnership's argument that the undisclosed
opinions, which the court described as involving only a small subset of tax advisors, disclosed a
general consensus of tax advisors supported good faith reliance. The court also ruled that the
undisclosed tax opinions in the possession of the IRS represented confidential taxpayer
information protected from disclosure under § 6103(a).
9. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court holding that no accuracy-
related penalties applied in a Son-of-BOSS case because taxpayers were entitled to rely on tax
opinions. American Boat Company LLC v. United States, _ F.3d _ (7th Cir. 10/1/09). After
the district court held taxpayer's transaction to be invalid, but refused to uphold the
Commissioner's imposition of penalties, the government appealed the penalty issue. Judge
Kanne affirmed the district court's penalty decision, holding that taxpayer and its manager David
Jump were entitled to rely on an opinion letter from Jenkens & Gilchrist where the Son of BOSS
transaction was entered into as part of a restructuring to limit the liability of David Jump and his
family for future tug boat accidents following a near-disaster in the St. Louis harbor.
IX. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A. Exempt Organizations
B. Charitable Giving
1. More computers and books for school children. The Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extend through 2009 the application of Code § 170(e)(6),
which permits a corporation to deduct an amount equal to the lesser of (1) basis plus one-half of
the item's appreciation (i.e., basis plus one half of fair market value in excess of basis) or (2) two
times basis, for a contribution of computer software, equipment, and peripherals to educational
institutions for use in kindergarten through twelfth grade education. The equipment must be
previously unused and not more than two years old. The Act also extends § 170(e)(3)(D) which
provides a similar enhanced charitable contribution deduction for contributions of book
inventory by C corporations.
2. Judge Halpern writes a long opinion with pointed comments on
expert testimony. Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 10
(10/30/08). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that, as a precondition to using the replacement
cost approach to valuing real estate, the taxpayer must show that the property is unusual in
nature and that other methods of valuation, such as comparable sales or income capitalization,
are not applicable. The income approach to valuation is favored only where comparable market
sales are absent. On the facts, the value of the contribution of a conservation facade easement for
an historic structure on the edge of the French Quarter in New Orleans was overstated. The
accuracy-related penalty for gross overvaluation was proper because there was no good faith
investigation into the value.
3. Try again, but the kids' religious school education is still not deductible
even if the IRS made a deal with the Scientologists in 1993. Sklar v. Commissioner, 549 F.3d
1252 (9th Cir. 12/12/08). The Ninth Circuit (Judge Wardlaw) followed its prior decision
involving different taxable years (Sklar v. Commissioner (Sklar 1), 282 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2002))
and denied the taxpayers' claimed deductions of a portion of tuition and fees paid to Orthodox
Jewish Day schools for the education of their children. The taxpayers argued that deduction of a
portion of their tuition payments as charitable contributions for strictly religious services is
allowed under the closing agreement with the Church of Scientology. After convincing the
Supreme Court that fees for training and auditing sessions provided by the Church of
Scientology were paid as a quid pro quo for services rather than deductible charitable
contributions (Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989)), the IRS allowed the
individuals involved to deduct 80 percent of the fees.
0 The court held under Hernandez that tuition paid for religious
education is a payment for services that is not deductible as a charitable contribution. The court
pointed to statements in Hernandez that attempts to distinguish payments for religious benefits from
secular services would involve the court in impermissible entanglements between church and state.
* The court rejected the taxpayers' argument that 1993
amendments to §§ 170(f)(8) and 6115 (requiring reporting of the value of benefits received from
quid pro quo payments to charities) overruled the Hernandez holding that a portion of payments for
services are not allowable as a charitable contribution. Quoting from Sklar I, the court noted that
these are procedural provisions that do not revise substantive law.
* The taxpayers failed to establish that the fees and tuition
payments represented dual payments that included a portion in excess of the value of the education
benefit provided by the schools which represented a gift to the religious schools as charitable
originations.
0 Finally, the court held that the Scientology closing agreement
does not require the IRS to allow charitable contribution deductions for the taxpayers' tuition
payments. Again quoting from Sklar 1, the court expressed reservations under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment about the impact of the closing agreement that discriminates among
religions. The court also indicated concern that allowing deductions for tuition for attending
religious schools would create a preference for religion that is questionable under the Establishment
Clause. In addition, the court concluded that the tuition payments for the taxpayers' children were
not similar to the auditing, training and other qualified religious services provided by the Church of
Scientology. Thus, the taxpayers in Sklar could not assert an administrative inconsistency claim that
the IRS favored Scientologists over adherents to other religions.
4. One of Timothy McVeigh's lawyers loses again, but the consequences
are not as severe this time. Jones v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 146 (11/1/07). Leslie Steven
Jones, one of Timothy McVeigh's lawyers in the criminal proceeding stemming from the
Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing, donated to the University of Texas copies of
documents received by him from the government in the course of his representation of Timothy
McVeigh and claimed a charitable contribution deduction for the appraised value. Judge Cohen
upheld the IRS's disallowance of any deduction on the ground that under the relevant state law
(Oklahoma), the materials were not attorney work product and not being attorney work product,
the client, not the lawyer, was the owner of the materials in the case file. Because the taxpayer
"was not the legal owner of the materials, he was not legally capable of divesting himself of the
burdens and benefits of ownership or effecting a valid gift of the materials." Alternatively, even
if the material in the file was attorney work product, it constituted "letters, memoranda, and
similar property" prepared by the taxpayer's personal efforts, which by virtue of § 1221 (a)(3)(A)
was an ordinary income asset, and thus under § 170(e)(1)(A) the deduction was limited to basis,
which was zero.
a. Affirmed, but on subtly different reasoning. Jones v.
Commissioner, 560 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 3/27/09). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
decision on the ground that the discovery material is not a capital asset, but did not address
whether the taxpayer owned the discovery material under Oklahoma law. However, the rationale
of the court of appeals for determining that the discovery material was not a capital asset differed
from that of the Tax Court. The Tax Court held that the discovery material constituted "letters,
memoranda, or similar property created by the taxpayer's own efforts" excluded from the
definition of capital asset pursuant under § 1221(a)(3)(A). According to the Court of Appeals,
however, the record clearly demonstrated that the discovery material for which Jones claimed a
charitable contribution deduction was not created by his own personal efforts, and thus
§ 1221 (a)(3)(A) did not apply to it. Rather, the Court of Appeals held that the discovery material,
which was first compiled by the government to assist in its investigation and copies of which
were made, organized, and categorized by the government and delivered to the taxpayer for the
benefit of Jones and his client, was not a capital asset because it constituted letters, memoranda,
or similar property "prepared or produced" for the taxpayer within the meaning of
§ 1221(a)(3)(B). "[T]he discovery material was provided to Taxpayer only because of his
position as lead counsel for McVeigh, and it was the type of material typically produced for
defense counsel in the course of a criminal trial."
5. Golf course perpetual easements gave rise to charitable contribution
deductions. Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-145 (6/22/09).
The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that the owner of a golf course was entitled to a charitable
contribution deduction for its grant to the North American Land Trust of a perpetual
conservation easement covering a golf course that it owned. He further rejected the asserted
§ 6662 accuracy-related penalty because the adjustment he made to value was "approximately 10
percent."
6. The easement has to have some real effect to give rise to a charitable
contribution deduction. Herman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-205 (9/14/09). Judge
Gustafson held that a contribution to a charitable organization of an easement burdening
developable air rights over a certified historic structure owned by another person did not qualify
for a charitable contribution deduction under § 170(h). The easement did not preclude the
taxpayer, the structure's owner, or any subsequent purchaser of the property from altering or
demolishing the structure. Thus, the conservation easement did not preserve an "historically
important land area" or a "certified historic structure" within the meaning of § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv).
X. TAX PROCEDURE
A. Interest, Penalties and Prosecutions
1. The standard for preparer penalties is broadened to include preparers of all
tax returns, and is heightened from "realistic possibility of success" to "more likely than not."
The 2007 Small Business Tax Act, § 8246, amended Code §§ 6694 and 7701 to expand the
applicability of the § 6694 return preparer penalties from "income tax return preparers" to all tax
return preparers. It also heightened the standards of conduct to avoid the imposition of the return
preparer penalty for undisclosed positions with a requirement that there be a reasonable belief
that the tax treatment of the position was "more likely than not" the proper treatment. For
disclosed positions, the standard was increased from "non-frivolous" to "reasonable basis."
Penalty amounts were increased from $250 to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income
to be derived by the preparer under § 6694(a) [negligent], and from $1,000 to the greater of
$5,000 or 50 percent of the income to be derived by the preparer under § 6694(b) [willful or
reckless]. These changes are effective for tax returns prepared after 5/25/07.
a. "God's in His Heaven, all's right with the world." The Tax
Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, § 506, brings the standard for
the § 6694 tax return preparer penalty for undisclosed positions into line with the taxpayer
standard, i.e., substantial authority. It penalizes the taking of an "unreasonable position," which
is defined as a position "unless there is or was substantial authority for the position" or is a
disclosed position "unless there is a reasonable basis .for the position." For tax shelters and
reportable transactions, the position is an "unreasonable position ... unless it is reasonable to
believe that the position would be more likely than not be sustained on its merits." The provision
contains a reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exception. It is retroactive to 5/22/07, except that the
tax shelter provision applies to returns prepared for taxable years ending after 10/3/08.
b. Notice 2009-5, 2009-3 I.R.B. 309 (12/15/08), modifying and
clarifying Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282. This notice provides guidance on the
implementation of the tax return preparer penalty as amended by the Tax Extenders and
Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008.
0 The notice states that "'substantial authority' has the same
meaning as in [Reg.] § 1.6662-4 (d) (2)" and that "[s]olely for purposes of section 6694(a), a tax
return preparer nevertheless will be considered to have met the standard in section 6694(a)(2)(A) if
the tax return preparer relies in good faith and without verification on the advice of another advisor,
another tax return preparer, or other party."
* For tax shelter transactions,
Until further guidance is issued, solely for purposes of section 6694(a), a position
with respect to a tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) will not be
deemed an "unreasonable position" described in section 6694 (a) (2) (A) through
(C) if there is substantial authority for the position and the tax return preparer
advises the taxpayer of the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer in the
event that the transaction is deemed to have a significant purpose of Federal tax
avoidance or evasion. This advice to the taxpayer must explain that, if the
position has a significant purpose of tax avoidance or evasion, then there needs to
be at a minimum substantial authority for the position, the taxpayer must possess
a reasonable belief that the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper
treatment in order to avoid a penalty under section 6662(d) as applicable, and
disclosure in accordance with § 1.66624(f) will not protect the taxpayer from
assessment of an accuracy-related penalty if section 6662(d)(2)(C) applies to the
position. The tax return preparer must contemporaneously document the advice in
the tax return preparer's files.
If a nonsigning tax return preparer provides advice to another tax return preparer
regarding a position with respect to a tax shelter (as defined in section 6662 (d)
(2) (C) (ii)), the position will not be deemed an "unreasonable position" described
in section 6694 (a) (2) (A) through (C) if there is substantial authority for the
position and the nonsigning tax return preparer provides a statement to the other
tax return preparer about the penalty standards applicable to the tax return
preparer under section 6694. Contemporaneously prepared documentation in the
nonsigning tax return preparer's files is sufficient to establish that the statement
was given to the other tax return preparer. If a nonsigning tax return preparer and
other tax return preparer are employed by the same firm, then contemporaneous
documentation of advice provided by any tax return preparer in that firm to the
taxpayer regarding applicable penalty standards, as described in the immediately
preceding paragraph, is also sufficient to establish that the statement was given by
a nonsigning tax return preparer to the other tax return preparers within the firm.
The above interim penalty compliance rules do not apply to a position described
in section 6662A (a reportable transaction with a significant purpose of Federal
tax avoidance or evasion or a listed transaction).
0 The effective dates of this notice are as follows.
For positions other than tax shelters and reportable transaction positions, this
notice is effective for all advice rendered or returns, amended returns, and claims
for refund prepared after May 25, 2007. The interim guidance in this notice for
tax shelters (within the meaning of section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) and reportable
transactions to which section 6662A applies is effective for tax shelter and
reportable transaction positions on tax returns for taxable years ending after the
2008 Act's date of enactment, October 3, 2008.
c. Despite the amended statute, IRS and Treasury still release
final tax return preparer penalty regulations. T.D. 9436, Tax Return Preparer Penalties Under
Sections 6694 and 6695, 73 F.R. 78430 (12/22/08). The proposed regulations were largely left
intact, with provisions reserved for the changes made in 2008, i.e., the reduction of the standard
for undisclosed positions to one of "substantial authority."
* Preparer per position. The final regulations maintain a
framework defining "a 'preparer per position within a firm"' with a presumption that "the
nonsigning tax return preparer within the firm with overall supervisory responsibility for the
position(s) giving rise to the understatement generally will be considered the tax return preparer who
is primarily responsible for the position." If the information presented "would support a finding that
either the signing tax return preparer or a nonsigning tax return preparer within a firm is primarily
responsible," then the IRS may assess the penalty against either, but not against both.
0 May rely on taxpayer's legal conclusions. The rule that a
tax return preparer may not rely on legal conclusions regarding Federal tax issues furnished by
taxpayers was removed from the final regulations with the caveat that tax return preparers
nevertheless have to meet the diligence standards otherwise imposed.
• Estimates. The final regulations will not include any general
rule regarding the use of estimates.
0 Opportunity for disclosure. Nonsigning preparers must
advise clients of the opportunity to avoid penalties for positions for which there is a reasonable basis
but not substantial authority by making appropriate disclosure.
* Anti-abuse exception to 5-percent rule. The final
regulations contain an anti-abuse rule which provides that if a tax professional is abusing the 5-
percent rule to avoid tax return preparer status by deliberately performing all the return preparation
work before the transaction takes place, then the rule is inapplicable.
d. Rev. Proc. 2009-11, 2009-3 I.R.B. 313 (12/15/08). This revenue
procedure identifies the returns which are subject to the § 6694(a) penalty. It is effective 1/1/09
and renders obsolete Notice 2008-12 and Notice 2008-46 and modifies and supersedes the list of
forms in Notice 2008-13.
2. Increased penalty for failure to file on time. For returns required to be
filed after December 31, 2008, the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008
increases the minimum penalty failure to file a return on time to the lesser of $135 or 100 percent
of the tax required to be shown on the return.
a. Watch out for this one when not filing partnership tax returns
for years beginning in 2008! The revenue offset to a tax reduction. P.L. 110-141, "An Act to
exclude from gross income payments from the Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund to the victims of the
tragic event at Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University" was signed by President Bush
on 12/17/08. Section 2 of that Act is an off-Code provision that adds $1 to the § 6698(b)(1)
"Failure to File a Partnership Return" penalty. The $1 addition does not apply to S Corporation
returns. The $1 increase only applies to a taxable year beginning in 2008.
3. T.D. 9437, Amendments to the Section 7216 Regulations - Disclosure or
Use of Information by Preparers of Returns, 73 F.R. 76216 (12/16/08). This Treasury Decision
amends Reg. § 301.7216-3(b)(4) to permit disclosure by a tax return preparer of a taxpayer's
SSN to another tax return preparer located outside the United States only with the taxpayer's
consent. The amended regulation applies to disclosures of tax return information occurring on or
after 1/1/09.
4. It is not criminal tax fraud if you intended to cheat but after the fact
discover a rationale that might disprove the existence of any deficiency. Justice Souter
emphasizes that transactions should be treated in accordance with their substance, regardless of
the intent of their participants. Boulware v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1168, 2008-1 U.S.T.C.
50,206 (3/3/08) (9-0). Michael Boulware was convicted on nine counts of tax evasion and filing
a false income tax return, stemming from his diversion of funds from Hawaiian Isles Enterprises
(HIE), a closely held corporation of which he was the president, founder, and controlling (though
not sole) shareholder. The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of a tax deficiency as an
essential element of tax evasion under § 7201 in reversing the taxpayer's conviction. Boulware
involved a shareholder of a closely held corporation who failed to report millions of dollars from
the corporation. "[H]e siphoned off this money primarily by writing checks to employees and
friends and having them return the cash to him, by diverting payments by HIE customers, by
submitting fraudulent invoices to HIE, and by laundering HIE money through companies in the
Kingdom of Tonga and Hong Kong." The funds were used to support his "lavish lifestyle," and
were treated as distributions of property to him from the corporation. Boulware sought to
introduce evidence that HIE had no earnings and profits in the relevant taxable years and
because the amount diverted did not exceed his basis for his stock, there was no dividend under
§§ 301(c)(1) and 316, and the entire amount was a return-of-capital treatment under § 301(b)(2).
Boulware's argument was that because the return of capital was nontaxable, the Government
could not establish the tax deficiency required as an element of criminal tax fraud. The trial court
refused to admit the proffered evidence, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the return
of capital theory could be advanced only if at the time the occurred the corporation intended it to
be a return of capital, following its prior decision in United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204 (9th
Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court (Justice Souter) vacated the conviction. The Court concluded:
There is no criminal tax evasion without a tax deficiency, ... and there is no
deficiency owing to a distribution (received with respect to a corporation's stock)
if a corporation has no earnings and profits and the value distributed does not
exceed the taxpayer-shareholder's basis for his stock.
* With respect to the intent question the Court reasoned as
follows:
Miller's view that a criminal defendant may not treat a distribution as a return of
capital without evidence of a corresponding contemporaneous intent sits
uncomfortably not only with the tax law's economic realism, but with the
particular wording of §§ 301 and 316(a), as well. As those sections are written,
the tax consequences of a "distribution by a corporation with respect to its stock"
depend, not on anyone's purpose to return capital or to get it back, but on facts
wholly independent of intent: whether the corporation had earnings and profits,
and the amount of the taxpayer's basis for his stock.
* The Court stated the test to be "that economic substance
remains the right touchstone for characterizing funds received when a shareholder diverts them
before they can be recorded on the corporation's books," and that they "may be seen as dividends or
capital distributions for purposes of §§ 301 and 316(a)." He analyzed the treatment of distributions
received with respect to a corporation's stock under § 301(a) and concluded that an exception for
criminal cases was improper, and concluded
The implausibility of a statutory reading that either creates a tax limbo or forces
resort to an atextual stopgap is all the clearer from the Ninth Circuit's discussion
in this case of its own understanding of the consequences of Miller's rule: the
court openly acknowledged that "imposing an intent requirement creates a
disconnect between civil and criminal liability," 470 F.3d at 934. In construing
distribution rules that draw no distinction in terms of criminal or civil
consequences, the disparity of treatment assumed by the Court of Appeals counts
heavily against its contemporaneous intent construction (quite apart from the
Circuit's understanding that its interpretation entails criminal liability for evasion
without any showing of a tax deficiency).
• In footnote 7 to the opinion the Court cited Isenbergh,
"Review: Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation," 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 859 (1982), for the
proposition that the tax consequences of a transaction should depend on What was actually done, and
not on whether alternative routes would have offered better or worse tax consequences.
* The court declined to address the government's altemative
argument that diversion was an unlawful act akin to embezzlement, rather than a distribution with
respect to the corporation's stock, which would result in §§ 301 and 316 being irrelevant and give
rise to deficiency for failure to report the proceeds of a theft, because that question had not been
considered by the court of appeals.
a. Boulware on remand. It was a Pyrrhic victory before the
Supreme Court. He's still going to get room and board from the federal government for a
few years. The Ninth Circuit still refuses to permit the use of the "return of capital" theory.
United States v. Boulware, 558 F.3d 971, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1259 (9th Cir. 3/9/09). In ruling
to affirm Boulware's conviction, the court (Judge Thomas) held that the proffer of expert
testimony to establish the theory that corporate distributions were legally non-taxable when the
corporation had no earnings and profits was properly rejected because the expert testimony
constituted a legal opinion and it was within the discretion of the trial judge to exclude it. Judge
Thomas went on to hold that in order to be non-taxable the distribution had to be made with
respect to the corporation's stock and there was no affirmative evidence "that any nexus existed
between the distribution and Boulware's stock ownership." "[A]t the very least a taxpayer must
tender some evidence of nexus between the corporate distribution and stock ownership, or show
that there were no other alternate explanations, in order to proceed with a return of capital theory
at trial." Boulware did neither, and thus the district court did not err in declining to allow him to
present his theory to the jury.
* He further held there was no evidence that Boulware's stock
basis equaled or exceeded the $10 million of corporate distributions to Boulware.
b. And on the merits in the tax case, Boulware's corporations lose
deductions. HIE Holdings, Inc.v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-130 (6/8/09). Based on a
voluminous trial record, the Tax Court (Judge Laro) denied losses and deductions to corporations
controlled by Boulware and owned in part by his former secretary/mistress in trust for one of
their children. The court denied net operating losses arising from NOL carryovers, disallowed
claimed bad debt deductions, denied deductions for claimed professional fees (related to
Boulware's criminal defense and civil proceedings by the former mistress), and upheld
constructive dividend treatment for distributions to Boulware because professional fees were
paid by his constructive withdrawals from the corporations. The court found that the professional
fees treated as constructive dividends did not exceed the E&P available for the year.
5. Apparently it's OK to lie on irrelevant attachments to an amended
return. United States v. Adams, 314 Fed. Appx. 633, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-889 (5th Cir.
2/17/09). The taxpayer was convicted under § 7206(1) on two counts of filing a false return. One
count was based on the theory that in signing a Form 1040X amended return, by virtue of the
jurat the taxpayer falsely swore to truth of an attached copy of his original Schedule C, which
contained income omissions. (The government did not seek an indictment for making false
statements on the original Form 1040, because the applicable statute of limitations had run.) The
court of appeals reversed the conviction on this count. The jurat on the Form 1040X states that
the taxpayer has "examined this amended return, including accompanying schedules and
statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, this amended return is true, correct, and
complete." By specifying that the signer's examination extends to the amended return and all
attachments while limiting the signer's assurance of truth, correctness, and completeness to just
the amended return, the jurat's language makes a clear distinction between that which the
taxpayer examined and that which he swore was true. In the case of an original return, this
distinction is insignificant because accompanying schedules and statements are generally
considered integral parts of the return to which the jurat applies. In this case, however, the court
concluded that the original Schedule C, which constituted an integral part of his 1999 Form
1040, was not an integral part of the Form 1040X. The purpose of the amended return was to
report additional gross income from the sale of the business, not the operation of the business
and the IRS Form 1040X instructs taxpayers to "[a]ttach only the supporting forms and
schedules for the items changed."
6. It's no defense to a criminal failure to pay charge that you
squandered the money and couldn't have paid it you wanted to. United States v. Easterday,
539 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 8/22/08). The defendant was convicted under § 7202 for willful failure
to pay over withheld employee payroll and income taxes. He had requested "an 'ability to pay
instruction' in order to contend to the jury that his failure to pay over the taxes he owed was not
'willful,' because he had spent the money on other business expenses and therefore could not
pay it to the government when it was due," but the district court refused to give the instruction.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, overruling its prior decision to the contrary in United States v. Poll,
521 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1975), on the ground that the subsequent Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976), by implication repudiated any requirement of
proving ability to pay as an element of the crime of willful failure to pay. Possession of sufficient
funds to pay the tax is not an element of the crime of under § 7202 (or § 7203). A conviction will
be sustained without any showing of the taxpayer's ability to pay and a taxpayer is not entitled to
a jury instruction that to support a conviction the government must prove that the taxpayer couldhave paid the tax. a. Petition for rehearing en bane denied. United States v.
Easterday, 564 F.3d 1004, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1916 (9th Cir. 4/27/09). In denying the
taxpayer's petition for a rehearing en bane (2-1), Judge Schroeder amended the original opinion,
but reached the same conclusion. In the amended option, the court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that as long as United States v. Poll, 521 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1975), a panel opinion had
not been overruled by an en bane panel of the court, a panel of the Ninth Circuit was bound to
follow Poll as law of the circuit. The dissent by Judge Smith would have upheld the taxpayer's
argument that one panel of the Ninth Circuit cannot overrule a decision of an earlier panel, even
though Judge Smith agreed that Poll was wrongly decided.
7. Steven N.S. Cheung, Inc. v. United States, 545 F.3d 695 (9th Cir.
9/23/08). The flush language of § 6621(a)(1) provides for a one and a half point reduction in the
overpayment rate, from 2 points above the Federal short term rate to 2 point above the Federal
short term rate, if an overpayment of tax by a corporation exceeds $10,000. The Ninth Circuit
held that the flush language of § 6621(a)(1) applies to interest payable by the government to a
corporate taxpayer pursuant to a wrongful levy judgment.
8. Williams v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 6 (10/2/08). Because § 6404(e)
authorizes the Commissioner to "abate the assessment" of interest, § 6404(e) operates only after
there has been an assessment of interest; Thus, Tax Court has no jurisdiction under § 6404(h) to
review the IRS's decision not to abate interest until interest has been assessed and the IRS has
mailed a "final determination not to abate such interest." Nor does the Tax Court have
jurisdiction to review the assessment of foreign bank account reporting (FBAR) penalties
imposed under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a) (and assessed under 31 U.S.C.) for violations of the
reporting requirements in 31 U.S.C. Under the statute, FBAR penalties are assessed without a
deficiency notice - a deficiency notice is neither authorized under § 6212(a) nor required by
§ 6213(a) before the assessment may be made.
9. He was convicted of criminal tax fraud, but in the civil case, the IRS
couldn't prove that any of the over $200,000 deficiency was due to fraud, so Judge Holmes
"estimates" $500 of the deficiency due to fraud in order to avoid inconsistency. Barrow v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-264 (11/25/08). Because the IRS issued the deficiency notice
more than three years after the return filing date, the deficiency notice was timely only if the
understatement of tax was fraudulent. The taxpayer had been convicted of criminal tax fraud
with respect to taxable years 1985, 1987, and 1988. In the criminal trial, the government's
primary theory was that Barrow had cheated on his taxes by not reporting on his individual
returns fees that two health care organizations paid to him as the chairman of the board and a
trustee. In the civil action, however, the government's theory was that Barrow's unreported
income was income diverted from the incorporated accounting firm that he headed (because the
government also was seeking a deficiency against the accounting firm). The government argued
that Barrow was collaterally estopped from arguing that the understatement was not fraudulent.
The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) upheld that the taxpayer's argument that because the
government's theory with respect to the unreported fees was different in the civil action from in
the criminal action, the issues in that regard were not identical - a requirement for collateral
estoppel to apply - with respect to the two actions, but that Barrow nevertheless was
collaterally estopped from arguing that the understatement was not fraudulent because they were
"relatively minor items of unreported income or incorrect expenses whose consequences for
Barrow's tax liability are unaffected by the switch in government theories between the cases."
Because in the criminal trial, the government established willful tax evasion beyond a reasonable
doubt, but the jury was not required to return a verdict detailing which items of income had not
reported or which claimed expenses had not been paid, collateral estoppel applied with respect to
the entire claimed deficiency. However, on the merits, Judge Holmes found that even though in
the criminal case the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that some part of Barrow's
underpayments for 1987 and 1988 were due to fraud, in the civil case the Commissioner failed to
prove that any particular underpayments were actually due to fraud. Recognizing that "it would
be inconsistent to hold no part of the underpayment due to fraud," Judge Holmes "estimate[d]
that $500 in 1987 and 1988 was due to fraud for purposes of applying the fraud penalty. But
because no part of any underpayments for 1984 or 1986 (the accounting firm's 1988 and 1989
deficiencies) was due to fraud, the Commissioner's determination for those years was not
sustained.
10. Hip, hip, hypocrisy! Treasury Press Release on the swearing-in of a new
Secretary of the Treasury, http://www.ustreas.gov/news/indexl.html (1/26/09). This appointment
requires IRS employees to feel ashamed - but undeterred - when they propose penalties or
criminal prosecutions with respect to an amount of tax owed that does not exceed $48,268. See,
also, http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg0l.htm.
a. H.R. 735, the Rangel Rule Bill of 2009, was introduced on
1/28/09 by Representative John Carter (R-TX). It would permit taxpayers to immunize
themselves from penalties and interest when they file a return to pay back taxes.
11. Joe Garza won't want to post this opinion on his web site. Estate of
Hurford v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-278 (12/11/08). The Tax Court (Judge Holmes)
began its opinion in the case dealing with the estate of the widow of the president of Hunt Oil
Company as follows:
It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a recently widowed woman in
possession of a good fortune must be in want of an estate planner.
3
Thelma Hurford had devoted her life to family and friends, leaving the
management of the finances to her husband Gary. When he died suddenly, she
had to learn what they owned and decide what to do with it. While she struggled
with this burden, she was herself stricken with cancer and so had to arrange the
accelerated planning of her own estate. Two attorneys vied for her attention and
she chose Joe B. Garza.
4
She lost her life to the cancer. We must now decide how much of her estate will
be lost to taxes.
0 Judge Holmes first found that the property that was sought to
be transferred out of Thelma Hurford's estate using three family limited partnerships and a private
annuity was includible in her estate because the private annuity agreement was not bona fide, but
was a disguised gift and was an exercise by decedent of a right to designate the persons who should
possess or enjoy the property under §§ 2036(a)(2) and 2038(a)(1). The FLP interests placed in the
annuity were undervalued and were held by decedent's children in the same form as before the
transfer. The annuity payments were simply transfers of the property in its original form back to the
decedent. The FLPs lacked a business purpose because there was neither asset protection nor any
advantage in consolidated management. Penalties were not applied because the executor could not
have reasonably known that the estate plan was not within the realm of legitimate estate-planning
practices because it resembled some of Sandy Bisignano's suggestions implemented sloppily. Judge
Holmes sums this up as follows:
There are many other problems with the Marital Trust's assets independent of the
FLP and private-annuity transactions. For example, though Gary's will passed all
of the property in his estate -- except for the Family Trust's assets, his home, and
his personal effects -- into the Marital Trust, only a small portion of it ended up in
the Marital Trust account with Chase or was otherwise titled in the Trust's name.
And Gary's estate took a QTIP election for approximately $ 6,500,000. Were we
to try to construct an alternate holding for this part of Thelma's estate, as the
Commissioner urges, we would quickly run into tricky questions of whether
Thelma's handling of that property was a conversion and disposition of the QTIP
property under sections 2511 and 2519. We'll leave those questions for another
case, and hold instead that all the property that Garza moved from Thelma and the
Trusts into the FLPs and the private annuity is included without discount in her
gross estate under section 2031(a)'s broad language including in an estate "all
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated. (footnote
omitted)
* He concluded:
We consider it well established that a taxpayer has the right to minimize his tax
liability, and it was reasonable for Michael to have relied on professionals in the
arcane and complex field of estate-tax law. That his and his family's choice of
3 Cf, "It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in
want of a wife." Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice.
4 The other attorney was Sandy Bisignano.
advisers proved so unsuitable has led them to their present situation -- unable to
enjoy fully the estate built up by old Mr. Hurford, and seeking relief at court
instead. But we do find that Michael's reliance on the professionals he chose,
however unsuitable they turned out to be, was nevertheless under the
circumstances done reasonably and in good faith. We therefore impose no penalty
for negligence or disregard of the Code.
12. Small businesses that underpay estimated taxes are the backbone of
the American economy. Section 1212 of the 2009 ARRTA amended § 6654(d) to reduce the
100 percent of the prior year's taxes safe-harbor to 90 percent of the prior year's taxes for an
individual whose adjusted gross income for the prior year was less than $500,000, if more than
50 percent of the gross income on the prior year's tax return was from a small business
(generally defined as a business with fewer than 500 employees).
13. IRS announces an amnesty for offshore credit-card abusers who clear
up their tax liabilities by April 15th 2003. IRS News Release IR-2003-05, 2003 TNT 10-11
(1/14/03). An Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative provides that "eligible taxpayers," who
used offshore payment cards or other offshore financial arrangements to hide their income, may
avoid civil fraud and information return penalties [but not failure to pay tax or accuracy-related
penalties] if they come forward and pay up by 4/15/03 and provide full details on those who
promoted or solicited the offshore scheme. Promoters and solicitors are not eligible. The
information release contains the following example:
For example, a taxpayer who understated his income to avoid $ 100,000 in taxes
in 1999 would wind up paying $149,319 to the government. This includes the tax
liability plus $29,319 in interest and an additional accuracy-related penalty of
$20,000.
a. Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-4 I.R.B. 311 (1/14/03). This revenue
procedure contains detailed procedures for the Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative,
including as an exhibit the "specific matters closing agreement" to be executed by the taxpayer.
b. Liechtenstein! IR-2008-26 (2/26/08). The IRS announced that it is
initiating enforcement action involving more than 100 U.S. taxpayers in connection with
accounts in Liechtenstein. According to a story in the 2/19/08 Wall Street Journal, (a) Heinrich
Kieber, a former employee of Liechtenstein's largest bank, LGT Group, has offered confidential
client data to tax authorities on several continents over the past 18 months, and (b) the German
government paid roughly E4.2 million ($6.4 million) to an unnamed individual for the same type
of information.
c. UBS settles with the Justice Department for $780 million. On
2/18/09, the Swiss bank UBS agreed to pay $780 million under a deferred prosecution agreement
over the bank's offshore services to U.S. taxpayers. It also agreed to hand over the names and
account information of some of these taxpayers; however, there were indications that only 250
client names out of 19,000 account holders were being disclosed. 2009 TNT 31-1.
d. The 2009 version is much less of an amnesty than the 2003
version. On 3/26/09, the IRS announced several programs relating to penalties on voluntarily
disclosed offshore accounts. They have a 3/23/09 effective date, and are good for six months.
Several internal memoranda explain how the IRS intends to process voluntary disclosure claims
made regarding offshore accounts. 2009 TNT 57-2.
(1) These memoranda include one on examinations of offshore
transactions [2009 TNT 57-32]; one on the routing of voluntary disclosure cases [2009 TNT 57-
33]; and one authorizing a new penalty structure for voluntary disclosures [2009 TNT 57-34].
(2) IR-2009-84 (9/21/09). The filing deadline for the voluntary
disclosure was extended to 10/15/09, and the IRS announced there would be no further
extensions.
e. The instructions for the new FBAR are FUBAR. IR-2009-58
and Announcement 2009-51, 2009-25 I.R.B. 1105 (6/5/09). The IRS announced that for the
Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBARs) due on 6/30/09, filers of Form TD F
90-22.1 (Rev. 10-2008) need not comply with the new instruction relating to the definition of a
United States Person, i.e.:
United States Person. The term "United States person" means a citizen or
resident of the United States, or a person in and doing business in the United
States. See 31 C.F.R. 103.1 1(z) for a complete definition of 'person.' The United
States includes the states, territories and possessions of the United States. See the
definition of United States at 31 C.F.R. 103.11 (nn) for a complete definition of
United States. A foreign subsidiary of a United States person is not required to
file this report, although its United States parent corporation may be required to
do so. A branch of a foreign entity that is doing business in the United States is
required to file this report even if not separately incorporated under U.S. law.
0 Instead, for this year, taxpayers and others can rely on the
definition of a United States person included in the instruction to the prior form (7-2000):
United States Person. The term "United States person" means: (1) a citizen or
resident of the United States; (2) a domestic partnership' (3) a domestic
corporation; or (4) a domestic estate or trust.
(1) Notice 2009-62, 2009-35 I.R.B. 260 (8/7/09). By this
notice, the IRS extended the filing deadline until 6/30/10 to report foreign financial accounts on
Form TD F 90-22.1 for persons with signature authority over [but no financial interest in] a
foreign financial account and persons with signature authority over, or financial interests in, a
foreign commingled fund.
14. Sentence was unreasonably lenient, said Third Circuit. United States v.
Tomko, 498 F.3d 157, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5621 (3d Cir. 8/21/07). A sentence of one year of
home confinement, "the very mansion built through the tax evasion scheme at issue," a $250,000
fine, three years probation, and 250 hours of community service for evading taxes of $228,557,
was vacated as unreasonably lenient. The case was remanded for resentencing.
a. However, the court en bane affirmed the district court's
sentence. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 4/17/09) (8-5). The majority opinion
(Judge Smith) held that the district court's variation from the [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines' recommendations [which included between twelve and eighteen months'
imprisonment] after consideration of all relevant factors was entitled to "due deference" despite
the fact that some judges in the majority would have imposed prison time on a plumbing
contractor who directed numerous subcontractors who were building his multimillion dollar
home to falsify information on billing invoices so the invoices would show work done at one of
his corporation's many job sites instead of at his home, resulting in a tax deficiency of $228,557.
Defendant's work for Habitat For Humanity's Pittsburgh affiliate and his willingness to work for
its New Orleans affiliate post-Katrina - despite its beginning after his indictment - appears to
have influenced the district court's downward departure.
0 Judge Fisher's dissent focused on the greater apparent
pervasiveness of defendant's scheme, including his repeated statements that his vacation home in
Maryland was "a gift from Uncle Sam," and found that the district court "exceeded the lower outer
limit of the range of appropriate choices it had the discretion to make, and in doing so abused that
discretion" because virtually all other "typical tax evader[s]" possessed the same type of mitigating
factors relied upon by the district court.
B. Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
1. District Court finds tax accrual workpapers protected by the "work
product privilege" and denies the IRS petition for summons enforcement. United States v.
Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. R.I. 8/28/07). Textron engaged in six SILO transactions in
2001 before these became listed transactions in 2005. Under IRS procedures, engaging in more
than one listed transaction means that the IRS will request the entire tax accrual workpapers file.
Textron produced all requested documents with respect to the SILO transactions but refused to
turn over its entire workpaper file. Judge Torres held that the tax accrual workpapers were
prepared "because of' anticipated litigation with the IRS. He refused to follow contrary authority
from the Fifth Circuit in United States v. El Paso Company, 682 F.2d 530 (1982), which used the
more stringent primary purpose test for determining whether documents were prepared "in
anticipation of litigation." He also held that work product protection was not lost when the tax
accrual workpapers were provided to Ernst & Young for its audit of the company because the
AICPA Code § 301 on confidential client information made it very unlikely that the accounting
firm would provide them to the IRS.
a. This split decision has been taken to the bane. United States v.
Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. R.I. 8/28/07), affirmed in part, vacated in part and
remanded, 553 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1/21/09) (2-1), taxpayer's petition for rehearing denied,
(3/24/09), government's petition for en banc rehearing granted, (3/25/09). The majority opinion
(Judge Torruella) affirmed the holding that Textron's tax accrual workpapers are protected by
the work product doctrine on the ground that the First Circuit law is that "dual purpose"
documents created because of the prospect of litigation are protected even though they were also
prepared for a business purpose, i.e., E&Y's audit of Textron. It distinguished United States v. El
Paso Company, 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), as being part of an existing split between the
circuits in the definition of "the anticipation of litigation."
* The majority remanded so that the district court could
consider the questions of whether Textron waived work-product protection by showing its tax
accrual workpapers to E&Y and whether E&Y's workpapers were within the "control" of Textron.
* Judge Boudin dissented on the ground that the proper test
should be whether the tax accrual workpapers were prepared "in the ordinary course of business" or
were otherwise independently required, and their preparation would not be chilled by lack of
protection because they are required by "the financial statement obligations and accounting rules."
He based his opinion on the need for such documents "[i]n the wake of Enron and other corporate
scandals ... ." He later stated,
And, while it may seem one-sided to give the government Textron's blue print to
weaknesses in Textron's tax returns, the return is massive--constituting more than
4000 pages; the government has an important interest in collecting taxes that are
owed; and its inquiries into work papers were focused on a specific type of
transaction that had been shown to be open to abuse. So context should be kept in
mind before shedding too many tears for Textron.
* Note that the government's petition for rehearing en bane was
granted.
b. The First follows the Fifth to El Paso. Reversed by a divided
First Circuit in an en bane rehearing. United States v. Textron Inc., 2009-2 U.S.T.C. 50,574
(1st Cir. 8/13/09) (3-2). The majority (Judge Boudin) held that the work product privilege
protects only work done for litigation purposes (the "prepared for" test or the "primary purpose"
test), and abandoned the prior First Circuit "because of' test, encompassing work done in
preparing financial statements that also is prepared in contemplation of litigation. The majority
followed United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982),
* Judge Boudin concluded:
Textron apparently thinks it is "unfair" for the government to have access
to its spreadsheets, but tax collection is not a game. Underpaying taxes threatens
the essential public interest in revenue collection. If a blueprint to Textron's
possible improper deductions can be found in Textron's files, it is properly
available to the government unless privileged. Virtually all discovery against a
party aims at securing information that may assist an opponent in uncovering the
truth. Unprivileged IRS information is equally subject to discovery.
The practical problems confronting the IRS in discovering under-reporting
of corporate taxes, which is likely endemic, are serious. Textron's return is
massive--constituting more than 4,000 pages--and the IRS requested the work
papers only after finding a specific type of transaction that had been shown to be
abused by taxpayers. It is because the collection of revenues is essential to
government that administrative discovery, along with many other comparatively
unusual tools, are furnished to the IRS.
As Bentham explained, all privileges limit access to the truth in aid of
other objectives, 8 Wignore, Evidence § 2291 (McNaughton Rev. 1961), but
virtually all privileges are restricted--either (as here) by definition or (in many
cases) through explicit exceptions--by countervailing limitations. The Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is qualified, among other
doctrines, by the required records exception, and the attorney client privilege,
along with other limitations, by the crime-fraud exception.
To sum up, the work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done
for litigation, not in preparing financial statements. Textron's work papers were
prepared to support financial filings and gain auditor approval; the compulsion of
the securities laws and auditing requirements assure that they will be carefully
prepared, in their present form, even though not protected; and IRS access serves
the legitimate, and important, function of detecting and disallowing abusive tax
shelters. (footnote and internal citations omitted)
2. The work product privilege claim didn't work, but the § 7525
privilege claim did. Valero Energy Corp. v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-6473 (N.D. Ill.
8/23/07). Valero sought to quash summonses issued by the IRS to Valero's tax advisor, Arthur
Andersen, relating to certain branch transactions, foreign currency transactions, dual
consolidated losses, overall foreign losses, and hedge positions in connection with fluctuation
risks. The court (Judge Kennelly) rejected Valero's claim that the documents were protected by
the work product doctrine. He found that the documents were "best categorized as having been
prepared during the ordinary course of business, with the possibility of future litigation being
secondary at most." He concluded that "Valero confuse[d] the possibility of litigation with the
requirement that to be protected, a document must have been prepared because of anticipated
litigation. The fact that Valero hired Arthur Andersen with an eye toward the complex nature of
the transaction, and the possibility that the IRS might investigate, does not support a contention
that Arthur Andersen prepared its materials because Valero or Andersen anticipated actual
litigation." [Under Seventh Circuit precedent, the work product doctrine applies only when "the
document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of
litigation." Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
in original).] However, the documents were protected under the § 7525 tax practitioner's
privilege as 'confidential tax advice.' Even though it had the effect of avoiding federal income
taxes, the tax shelter exception in § 7525(b) did not apply for two reasons. First, "the
transactions in question did not involve the promotion of tax shelters"; nothing ii the record
indicated that Arthur Andersen had anything to do with 'promotion' of participation in a tax
shelter. Second, the tax shelter exception only applies to a transaction in which tax avoidance is
a "significant purpose," and not where tax avoidance is merely "one of the purposes" of the
transaction. Nothing in the record indicated the purpose of the transactions. [Under Seventh
Circuit precedent, United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 6/11/07), "the
burden rests on the opponent of the privilege to prove preliminary facts that would support a
finding that the claimed privilege falls within an exception."]
a. Valero Energy Corp. v. United States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5916
(N.D. Ill. 8/1/08), on reconsideration, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5929 (N.D. Ill. 8/26/08). On the
government's motion for entry of a further order of an IRS summons issued to Valero's tax
advisors, Arthur Andersen, LLP, and after an in camera inspection of the requested documents,
Judge Kennelly held that the government "met its burden of showing a foundation in fact that the
transactions involved a tax shelter" so the lion's share of the documents are not privileged. The
court refused to construe the word "promotion" in § 7252(b) narrowly, and held that
"promotion" includes participation in the organization or sale of a tax shelter.
b. Affirmed. "Nothing ... limits tax shelters to cookie-cutter
products peddled by shady practitioners or distinguishes tax shelters from individualized
tax advice." Valero Energy Corp. v. United States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5916 (N.D. 111. 8/1/08),
on reconsideration, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5929 (N.D. Ill. 8/26/08), aff'd, 569 F.3d 626 (7th Cir.
6/17/09). The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Evans, affirmed the district court's order
enforcing the summons, noting that "our review of the district court's ruling is deferential, and
we will reverse only if it is clearly erroneous. Findings regarding privilege are fact-intensive,
case-specific questions that fall within the district court's expertise, and, under these
circumstances, 'a light appellate touch is best."' First, the court of appeals described many of the
documents as "the type of information generally gathered to facilitate the filing of a tax return,"
which is "accounting advice ... not covered by the privilege, ...whether or not the information
made it on the tax returns." Other documents dealt with "inventory methods, compensation
packages, or general structure, and analyzed how they affect tax computations." The court
concluded that the documents were discoverable, even though they "'contain[ed] some legal
analysis,' because it comes part and parcel with accounting advice, and is therefore also open to
the government." Finally, the court held that "[n]othing in [the § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) definition of a
'tax shelter'] limits tax shelters to cookie-cutter products peddled by shady practitioners or
distinguishes tax shelters from individualized tax advice. Instead, the language is broad and
encompasses any plan or arrangement whose significant purpose is to avoid or evade federal
taxes."
3. The IRS now permanently can rat out terrorists. The Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 made permanent the § 6103(i)(3) exception for terrorists to
the return confidentiality rules.
4. You can't quash a summons on a tax advisor just because he's the one
who has been referred to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. Khan v. United States,
548 F.3d 549 (7th Cir. 11/20/08). The court upheld the validity of Reg. § 301.7602-1(c)(1),
which limits the application of the § 7602(d)(1) bar on the IRS summons only when there is a
Justice Department referral of the person whose tax liability is at issue. Section 7602(d) does not
authorize quashing a summons on a third party tax advisor in connection with an investigation of
taxpayer's liability even if there has been a Justice Department referral with respect to the tax
advisor.
5. Law firm was not entitled to materials under FOIA because they
might help its clients to circumvent the law. Mayer Brown LLP v. Internal Revenue Service,
562 F.3d 1190, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1799 (D.C. Cir. 4/17/09). The D.C. Circuit (Judge Brown)
upheld the denial of Mayer Brown's FOIA request for various information relating to the IRS's
LILO settlement practices; 5 U.S.C. Exemption 7(E), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E), shields
information if "disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law," and
revelation of the IRS's settlement practices would risk circumvention of the law, including the
Internal Revenue Code.
[E]nforcement of the tax laws, a largely self-policed obligation, depends heavily
on the personal probity of taxpayers and the deterrent effect of severe and certain
sanctions. And, as a slew of high profile cases have recently demonstrated,
compliance will often be delayed until enforcement (or unfavorable exposure) is
imminent ...
[C]ompanies using LILO schemes would love to have information about the
IRS's objectives of settlement, assessment of litigation hazards, and acceptable
ranges for settlement. Why? Because this information would inform their cost-
benefit analysis about the advantages of evading the law. Constructing a phony
tax shelter may only be worthwhile if the IRS's acceptable settlement range is
below 80% of the tax liability. Once armed with (hypothetical) information that
the IRS's acceptable settlements are between 60% and 75%, a questionable tax
scheme becomes viable. Even a failure may be a win. And, once also armed with
information about which cases the IRS does not like to litigate, the illegal tax
shelter can be designed to minimize the chances of litigation or the likelihood of
sanctions.
6. The IRS has the burden of showing that the exception to the FATP
privilege for corporate tax shelter promotion communications applies. Countryside Limited
Partnership v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 17 (6/8/09). When the IRS moved to compel
production of certain meeting notes prepared by one of the taxpayer's accountant-advisors, the
taxpayer claimed that the documents were protected from disclosure by the attorney client
privilege and the § 7525 federally authorized tax practitioner [FATP] privilege. The meeting
notes "constitute[d] a cumulative chronicle of communications, in part confidential, from clients,
including Countryside Limited Partnership ... , to their attorneys for legal advice or to Timothy
Egan ... , whom [the court] found to be an FATP, for tax advice, or from those individuals back
to their clients." The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that the taxpayer has the burden of proving
the preliminary facts necessary to establish the § 7525 privilege. The Commissioner can negate
the privilege claim by proving that the requested documents are written communications in
connection with the promotion of corporate tax shelters and that the exception in § 7525(b) thus
applies. On the facts, Judge Halpern found that because the meeting notes in question were not
themselves communicated to anyone but were merely written summaries of oral
communications, they were not a written communication that could satisfy that element of the
§ 7525(b) exception. The documents in question also were not within the § 7525(b) exception
because the Commissioner failed to show that the accountant had "promoted" a corporate tax
shelter. Section 7525 does not define "promotion," but the legislative history quoted in the
opinion provides, "[t]he Conferees do not understand the promotion of tax shelters to be part of
the routine relationship between a tax practitioner and a client. Accordingly, the Conferees do
not anticipate that the tax shelter limitation will adversely affect such routine relationships." H.
Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 269 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 1023. Judge Halpern found Eagan's
relationship to the taxpayer to be a "routine" relationship that did not involve promotion of a tax
shelter.
Mr. Egan has had a long, close relationship with the Winn organization, preparing
returns, assisting with tax planning when asked, answering questions when asked,
and responding to notices and inquiries from Federal and State tax officials. His
advice with respect to the partnership redemptions and associated transactions
under review in these cases was furnished (as was similar advice with respect to
similar transactions) as part of a long-standing, ongoing, and, hence, routine
relationship with the Winn organization. Mr. Egan provided tax advice to the
Winn organization when requested to do so, and his advice here followed the
same regular course of procedure as did his other tax advice, including tax advice
related to partnership redemptions. His employer, PWC, had no stake in the
outcome of the transactions under review in this case other than in the continued
retention of the Winn organization as a client. It did not receive a fixed fee or a
fee based on a percentage of some claimed tax saving. It was paid by the hour
pursuant to a rate schedule for Mr. Egan's time in rendering his advice, just as it
was for the other services outside of return preparation that he rendered to the
Winn organization.
C. Litigation Costs
1. A contingent attorney's fee has been incurred even if it's not owed.
Morrison v. Commissioner, 565 F.3d 658, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-2096 (9th Cir. 5/13/09). The
Ninth Circuit reversed a Tax Court decision, T.C. Memo 2006-103, which held that a taxpayer
had not "incurred" attorney's fees reimbursable under § 7430 when the fees were advanced by a
corporation owned by the taxpayer under an agreement providing that the taxpayer would
reimburse the corporation if he was able to recover them under § 7430. It should be self evident
that when a third person, e.g., a corporation of which the taxpayer is a shareholder, who has no
direct interest in the litigation pays attorney's fees on behalf of a taxpayer, the taxpayer has
"incurred" the fees as long as the taxpayer has an absolute obligation to repay the third person,
regardless of whether he successfully moves for an attorney's fees award under § 7430. Going a
step further, the Ninth Circuit held that when such a third person pays attorney's fees on behalf
of a taxpayer, the taxpayer has "incurred" the fees if he has only a contingent obligation to pay
the fees in the event that he is able to recover them under § 7430. Because the nature of the
agreement between the taxpayer and the corporation that advanced the attorney's fees was
unclear from the record, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court to apply the
definition it adopted of "incurred," after determining the precise nature of the fee agreement, if
any, between the taxpayer and the corporation.
D. Statutory Notice of Deficiency
E. Statute of Limitations
1. You have to raise the statute of limitations the first time you get the
chance or forever hold your peace. Golden v. Commissioner, 548 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 11/26/08).
Settlement of all claims in an earlier tax court proceeding barred the taxpayer from raising a
claim in a subsequent CDP proceeding that the original deficiency notice was outside the three-
year statute of limitations. Principles of res judicata apply to bar consideration of issues,
including the statute of limitations, that could have been raised in a prior judicial proceeding.
2. You can't rely on an unclarified informal refund claim to beat the
statute of limitations. Greene-Thapedi v. United States, 549 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 12/3/08). To
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of § 7422(a) authorizing district court review of the IRS's
denial of a refund, the taxpayer's timely informal refund claim must be followed by a subsequent
formal refund claim. "The informal claim doctrine is predicated on the expectation that any
formal deficiency will at some point be corrected.... To hold otherwise would eliminate, as a
practical matter, the formal claim requirement."
3. The taxpayer might have been confused by inconsistent letters from
the IRS, but that's no excuse. Leonard v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 435, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-
679 (1/30/09). A letter sent to the taxpayer on Feb. 29, stating that a formal disallowance of a
refund claim that will start the statute of limitations on filing a refund suit would be issued in the
following week, did not toll the period of limitations that had been commenced by a letter sent
on Feb. 6, stating that the refund claim had been disallowed and that a suit for refund could be
commenced within two years of the date of the Feb. 6 letter.
4. Home Concrete & Supply LLC v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678, 103
A.F.T.R.2d 2009-465 (E.D. N.C. 11/21/08). On the government's motion for partial summary
judgment, the district court (Judge Flanagan) held that § 6501(e) extends the statute of
limitations for deficiencies attributable to basis overstatements that result in omitted gross
income exceeding 25 percent of the gross income reported on the return. The court refused to
follow Grapevine Imports, Ltd v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505 (2007), and Bakersfield Energy
Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207 (2007), both of which held that understated gain
attributable to overstated basis was not an omission of "gross income" that would invoke the 6-
year statute of limitations. The district court concluded that those cases were erroneously
decided because they had applied Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), which had
so construed the statutory predecessor of § 6501(e) in the 1939 Code, without taking into
account statutory changes in 1954. The court reasoned as follows:
[G]ross income" as related to dealings in property is defined with reference to the
property's adjusted basis. Any overstatement in basis will necessarily decrease
the amount of gross income that a taxpayer states on his return. In other words, by
overstating basis in the gross income calculation, the taxpayer "leave[s] out" or
fails to "include". "an amount properly includible therein." Therefore, where a
taxpayer incorrectly states an overestimated basis in property, the taxpayer
"omits" gross income by leaving the amount out of gross income stated on the
taxpayer's return.
5. Benson v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.' 3/31/09), aff'g T.C.
Memo. 2006-55 (3/27/06). Items on the tax returns of brother-sister corporations reflecting
payments between them, which on the facts were found to be constructive dividends to their
common shareholder, did not constitute adequate disclosure with respect to the shareholder's
return to prevent the § 6501 (e)(1)(A) six-year statute from being applicable.
F. Liens and Collections
1. Timely request a CDP hearing or forever hold your peace. Wilson v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 5 (9/10/08). The taxpayer failed to timely request a CDP hearing
with Appeals with respect to a proposed levy. Following a late request, Appeals held an
equivalent hearing and issued a form letter "NOTICE OF DETERMINATION CONCERNING
COLLECTION ACTION(S) UNDER SECTION 6320 and/or 6330." The Tax Court dismissed
the taxpayer's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that because the
taxpayer did not timely request a hearing, Appeals did not make a § 6330 determination pursuant
to the equivalent hearing, and thus the letter to the taxpayer was not a valid notice of
determination under § 6330 that the taxpayer was entitled to appeal pursuant.
2. Present all your claims at the CDP hearing or lose your right of Tax
Court review. Brecht v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-213 (9/15/08). When reviewing a
CDP determination, the Tax Court will not consider an issue regarding abatement of interest
under § 6404(e) if it was not properly raised at the CDP hearing and/or considered in the notice
of determination.
3. Hoyle v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 13 (12/3/08). Judge Wells held that
whether the Appeals officer verified as required by § 6330(c)(1) that all procedural requirements,
including that a deficiency notice had been properly mailed to the taxpayer, will be considered
on Tax Court review without regard to whether the issue was raised by the taxpayer at the
Appeals CDP hearing. [Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107 (2007), held that in reviewing
an Appeals officer's CDP determination the Tax Court does not consider issues that are not a
part of that determination.] Because the court was unable to ascertain the basis for the Appeals
officer's verification that the requirements of § 6330(c)(1) were met, the case was remanded to
Appeals to clarify the record.
4. Live by your OIC or pay up. Trout v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 16
(12/16/08). The taxpayer entered into a compromise of tax liability pursuant to § 7122(a),
pursuant to which he agreed to file his tax returns, and pay any tax due, on time for the next five
years. He failed to file returns for two of the required years, and the IRS declared him in default
and sought to levy on his assets. On review of a CDP hearing sustaining the levy, the Tax Court,
in a reviewed opinion by Judge Holmes, held that the IRS did not abuse its discretion in
declaring the OIC in default and seeking to levy on taxpayer's assets. An accepted offer in
compromise is a contract and if the taxpayer fails to satisfy the condition that the taxpayer file
his tax returns and pay any tax due on time for a specified period of subsequent years, the IRS
may void the compromise and collect the original tax liability in full. In interpreting the
compromise agreement to determine whether its terms have been satisfied or breached, the
federal common law of contracts, not any particular state law, applies. Judge Holmes held that
the breach was not immaterial.
5. The government's rights as a lien-holder under the Code trump
conflicting state law. Russell v. United States, 551 F.3d 1174, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-7337 (10th
Cir. 12/19/08) Section 7425(b) provides for the discharge of a junior federal tax lien by a
nonjudicial sale by a senior lien holder, if proper notice is provided to the government. The
Tenth Circuit reversed a district court opinion that vacated the tax lien because the government
did not redeem or purchase the property from the senior lien holder within the period after the
sale of the property as provided by state [Colorado] law, even though the government did not
receive notice of the sale. The Tenth Circuit held that § 7425(b) preempts state law and leaves
federal tax liens undisturbed where the government did not receive notice of a nonjudicial sale.
6. Regardless of whether or not she's a Blues fan, Judge Marvel says the
Queen of the Blues has a legal obligation to honestly report and pay her income tax liability each
year. Taylor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-27 (2/5/09). The taxpayer, Koko Taylor - the
"Queen of the Blues," failed to pay estimated taxes or remit full payment with her tax returns for
several years. The IRS rejected her subsequent offer in compromise, which she grounded on
'economic hardship", because it found no hardship or reasonable cause for failure to pay, and
following a collection dues process hearing issued a determination that a levy should proceed.
The Queen of the Blues appealed to the Tax Court, but Judge Marvel upheld the IRS'.s
determination.
Both petitioner and respondent repeatedly commented on petitioner's
stature as a beloved and well-known professional singer as support for their
respective positions in these consolidated cases. We disagree with both parties
insofar as they contend that a taxpayer's celebrity status is somehow relevant to
what this Court must do in deciding whether the Commissioner's collection action
may proceed. Every taxpayer, no matter how famous or notorious, has a legal
obligation to honestly report and pay his or her income tax liability each year and
is entitled to fair enforcement of Federal tax laws. A taxpayer like petitioner
whose business income is generated by performances must carefully comply with
estimated tax requirements. The record establishes that petitioner had outstanding
tax liabilities for 1998, 2000, and 2001 because she did not make required
estimated tax payments when due and that respondent did not abuse his discretion
in determining that the filing of an NFTL was appropriate and that respondent
may proceed to collect petitioner's outstanding tax liabilities by levy. Respondent
gave petitioner ample opportunity to rectify her failure to pay estimated tax when
due and considered petitioner's collection alternatives in accordance with
applicable administrative and legal requirements.
7. Pennoni v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 552 (12/4/07). After the taxpayer
failed to file a federal income tax return for tax year 1998, the IRS sent him a Proposed
Individual Income Tax Assessment, claiming that he owed $17,764. Although the IRS eventually
agreed that the taxpayer was owed a refund in the amount of $2,801, it sent him a refund check
in the amount of $80,166. The IRS recognized its mistake after the taxpayer cashed the check,
and it sent the taxpayer a Notice of Balance Due and ultimately placed a levy on his bank,
account and garnished his wages. The taxpayer sued the Government, seeking an order requiring
it to repay amounts it took from his bank account and wages, plus costs, and the Government
filed a motion to dismiss the action, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction because the
taxpayer did not file an administrative claim for a refund before he filed suit. The court found
that the taxpayer did not have to file an administrative claim before he filed suit because he was
not seeking a tax refund. Instead, he was suing the Government for illegal exaction, and the suit
was timely under the six-year statute of limitations pertaining to lawsuits filed under the Tucker
Act, so the Government's motion to dismiss was denied.
a. The IRS might not have to follow administrative procedures to
"reassess" liability for an erroneous refund, but the taxpayer has to follow administrative
procedures before filing suit to recover money to which he was never entitled. Pennoni v.
United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 351, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1057 (2/26/09). The Court of Federal
Claims (Judge Firestone) applied the principles of United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining,
128 S. Ct. 1511 (2008), which held that the requirements of § 7422 are to be strictly construed,
to hold that § 7422(a) requires that administrative remedies be pursued before a taxpayer files
suit seeking recovery of amounts that the IRS has collected by administrative levy, without
following deficiency or assessment procedures, to recoup an erroneous refund. The court
concluded that "even if the plaintiff is correct in its characterization that the IRS improperly used
its levy powers to collect a non-tax debt created by the erroneous refund, rather than to collect an
unpaid tax liability, this case nonetheless clearly falls within the 'any sum' language of section
7422(a). By its terms, section 7422(a) extends beyond suits for 'the recovery of any internal
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,' to suits for the
recovery of 'any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected."'
0 The taxpayer is a tax lawyer who did not dispute that he
received and negotiated the check and that it was an erroneous refund!
b. Strategic Housing Finance Corporation of Travis County v. United
States, 86 Fed. Cl. 518, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1097 (2/27/09). Judge Scott interpreted the
requirements of § 7422(a) in the same manner as Judge Firestone did in Pennoni and denied a
nonprofit housing finance corporation/tax-exempt bond issuer's refund claim, for which there
had no administrative claim filed, seeking to recover an IRS-accelerated arbitrage rebate
overpayment made under protest. The plaintiff characterized the suit as one for an "illegal
exaction" or "illegal taking."
8. Mason v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 14 (5/6/09). The taxpayer sought
review of a CDP hearing with respect to § 6672 penalties assessed against her as a responsible
person for failure to collect and pay over withholding taxes of a corporation. She had not been
permitted to contest liability at the CDP hearing, even though prior to the CDP hearing the
taxpayer had not received a notice of the IRS's intent to assess § 6672 penalties. The Tax Court
(Judge Gerber) held that because the taxpayer had not received a notice of intent to assess a trust
fund recovery penalty, she had not had an opportunity to dispute that tax liability under
§ 6330(c)(2)(B). Because the taxpayer did not have an opportunity to dispute the underlying tax
liability at any time during the administrative proceedings and raised the issue at the CDP
hearing, the Tax Court reviewed the liability de novo. However, a notice of intent to assess
§ 6672 penalties is valid for purposes of assessing the penalties, even though the taxpayer has
not received the notice. Thus, the penalties were validly assessed. On the facts, the taxpayer was
a "responsible person" who willfully failed to pay over withholding taxes and was liable for the
trust fund penalties. The IRS's determination to uphold the lien filing was not an abuse of
discretion.
9. Even the certainly dead face the certainty of taxation. Estate of
Brandon v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 4 (8/27/09). Judge Foley held that a tax lien that is filed
after the taxpayer's death with respect to taxes assessed prior to the taxpayer's death is valid,
even though at the time the lien was filed ownership of the property had passed to the taxpayer's
estate. Under § 6321 a tax lien arises when the assessment is made and under § 6322 continues
to be enforceable until it is satisfied or it becomes unenforceable by a lapse of time, and the IRS
complied with the lien notice and filing requirements.
G. Innocent Spouse
1. The Tax Court sticks to its position that it has broad discretion in
reviewing denial of innocent spouse relief. Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. No. 10 (5/15/08)
(reviewed, 2 judges dissenting). Judge Haines held that the Tax Court continues to follow its
holding in Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32 (2004), vacated on unrelated jurisdictional
grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), that (1) its determination whether the IRS abused its
discretion in denying innocent spouse relief under § 6015(f) is made in a trial de novo, and (2) it
may consider evidence introduced at trial which was not included in the administrative record.
He rejected the IRS's argument that pursuant to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Robinette v.
Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006), rev'g 123 T.C. 85 (2004), the Tax Court's review
is limited to the administrative record. Judge Haines distinguished Robinette as involving review
of a § 6330 CDP determination: "Whereas section 6015 provides that we 'determine' whether
the taxpayer is entitled to relief, section 6330(d) provides for judicial review of the
Commissioner's determination by allowing the taxpayer to 'appeal such determination to the Tax
Court' and vesting the Tax Court with 'jurisdiction with respect to such matter'. As discussed
above, the use of the word 'determine' suggests that we conduct a trial de novo."
a. Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 11 (4/23/09). This opinion
dealt with issues not addressed in Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. No. 10 (5/15/08), which
held that in determining whether the IRS abused its discretion in denying innocent spouse relief
under § 6015(f) the Tax Court conducts a trial de novo, and may consider evidence introduced at
trial which was not included in the administrative record. In this reviewed opinion by Judge
Haines, in which eight other judges joined, supported by a concurring opinion of two other
judges, the Tax Court held that it applies de novo standard of review as well as de novo scope of
review. Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106 (2002), aff'd, 353 F3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003), and
Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000), which applied an abuse of discretion standard of
review are no longer controlling. Applying this standard of review, equitable relief was granted
on the facts. Six judges dissented from the opinion with respect to the standard of review and
two judges who concurred with respect to the standard of review dissented on the merits.
b. And the Eleventh Circuit agrees with the Tax Court that it's
more powerful than the IRS's administrative record. Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262,
103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-801 (1 1th Cir. 2/10/09) (2-1). In an opinion by Judge Wilson, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the Tax Court properly considered facts that were not in the administrative
record in determining in a trial de novo that the IRS abused its discretion in denying innocent
spouse relief under § 6015(f). He concluded that Commissioner had not shown that the Tax
Court's reasoning to that effect in Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32 (2004), vacated on other
grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2/28/06), and Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. No. 10
(5/15/08) was in error, and he rejected the Commissioner's argument that the Administrative
Procedure Act required that the Tax Court's review be limited to the administrative record.
Section 6015(e), providing for Tax Court jurisdiction to review the IRS's denial of innocent
spouse relief in a stand alone petition cannot be read in isolation from the remainder of rules
governing Tax court review of deficiency "determinations," which differ from "appeals" from
the IRS's decision.
[Section] 6015 is "part and parcel" of the statutory framework for Tax Court
review of IRS deficiency determinations. ... It is from this framework that the
"[Tax Court's] de novo review procedures emanate." ... Accordingly, when
Congress chose to use the same statutory language in § 6015 as it used in
establishing the longstanding trial de novo procedure for deficiency actions, "it
did so in full awareness of [the Tax Court's] long history of de novo review,"...
and did not intend to impose a different procedure. Thus, per § 559, "the APA
does not disturb or supersede [the Tax] Court's longstanding de novo judicial
review procedures for cases involving spousal relief under section 6015." ...
* The Court noted that the legislative history of the APA
confirms it does not supersede the Tax Court's adjudication procedures, quoting the relevant
language from the House report.
* Finally, the decision regarding the scope of review was not a
Pyrrhic victory: the taxpayer won on the merits.
* Judge Tjoflat [dis?lrespectfully dissents. Judge Tjoflat
wrote a lengthy dissent concluding that the Administrative Procedures Act did apply to limit the Tax
Court's review to the administrative record. He caustically concluded as follows:
Today, the court has given the Tax Court the authority to second-guess the
Commissioner at its whim, superimposed upon the farce that the Commissioner's
determination is given discretionary weight. Under such a scheme, why should
the Commissioner conduct his hearings in a careful and diligent manner? Why
bother when the Commissioner knows that his review of the facts and law will be
ignored? For that matter, why should taxpayers be required to fund and use the
IRS appeals process since any conclusions made by those federal officials will
dissipate in the Tax Court like whispers in the wind? I have found no satisfactory
answers to these questions. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the court's
judgment.
2. Kollar v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 12 (11/25/08). Judge Marvel held
that the Tax Court's jurisdiction under § 6015(e)(1) to review the denial by the IRS of § 6015(f)
equitable relief extends to relief solely from liability for interest on a tax deficiency where relief
from the principal deficiency is not in issue. Sections 6601(e)(1) and 6665(a) provide that "'tax'
for purposes of the Code included interest and penalties, except in certain cases not relevant to
[the question of § 6015(e)(1) jurisdiction]."
3. Taxpayer is screwed out of substantive rights by Congress's failure to
adequately deal with procedural issues. Pollock v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 3 (2/12/09).
The taxpayer sought § 6015(f) nondeficiency stand alone innocent spouse relief. In April 2007,
the IRS denied the relief before § 6015(e) was amended to confer jurisdiction on the Tax Court
to review denial of such relief. The taxpayer did not seek judicial review of the IRS
determination. Subsequently, Congress amended § 6015 to confer jurisdiction on the Tax Court
to hear § 6015(f) nondeficiency stand-alone cases, effective for tax liabilities "arising or
remaining unpaid on or after [December 20, 2006]." When the IRS sought to collect the taxes in
a lien- enforcement action, the district court invoked the doctrine of equitable tolling to give the
taxpayer 30 days to file a petition with the Tax Court to review the denial of innocent spouse
relief. The taxpayer filed her petition within the time limit set by the district court's order. The
Tax Court (judge Holes), although showing sympathy for he taxpayer's plight granted the
Commissioner's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the taxpayer filed her petition
more than 90 days after the IRS had mailed the notice of determination to her. The
§ 6015(e)(1)(A) 90-day limit for filing a Tax Court petition for review of the IRS's denial of
innocent spouse relief is jurisdictional and therefore does not allow for equitable tolling. Thus,
even though the taxes remained unpaid on December 20, 2006, the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction
because the petition for review had not been timely filed. The timely filing requirement applied
even though on the last day for filing a petition, the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review the
denial of innocent spouse relief.
4. That regulation ain't got no equity and it ain't got no empathy, so it's
invalid. The Tax Court majority responds to "the sounds of [congressional] silence." Lantz v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 8 (4/7/09). The taxpayer sought equitable relief from joint income
tax liability under § 6015(f), but the IRS denied relief on the ground that she had not requested
relief within two years from the IRS's first collection action, as required by Reg. § 1.6015-
5(b)(1). Consequently, the IRS did not reach the substantive issues of the claim. In a reviewed
opinion by Judge Goeke, joined by eleven judges, with four dissents, the Tax Court held Reg.
§ 1.6015-5(b)(1) to be invalid as applied to § 6015(f) relief. [Following the Golsen rule, the Tax
Court applied Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
because the Seventh Circuit held in Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States,142 F.3d 973, 979
(7th Cir. 1998), that regulations issued under general or specific authority of the IRS to
promulgate necessary rules are entitled to Chevron deference; Reg. § 1.6015-5 was issued under
both a general grant of authority under § 7805 and a specific grant of authority in § 6015(h).]
The court focused on the explicit inclusion of a two-year deadline in both § 6015(b) and
§ 6015(c), in contrast to the absence of any deadline in § 6015(f), to find that the regulation was
not a reasonable interpretation of the statute under the Chevron standard.
"'It is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely' when it
'includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another'.
... We find that by explicitly creating a 2-year limitation in subsections (b) and (c)
but not subsection (f), Congress has "spoken" by its audible silence. Because the
regulation imposes a limitation that Congress explicitly incorporated into
subsections (b) and (c) but omitted from subsection (f), it fails the first prong of
Chevron ...
Had Congress intended a 2-year period of limitations for equitable relief,
then of course it could have easily included in subsection (f) what it included in
subsections (b) and (c). However, Congress imposed no deadline, yet the
Secretary prescribed a period of limitations identical to the limitations Congress
imposed under section 6015(b) and (c).
0 As a result, the IRS abused its discretion in failing to consider
all facts and circumstances in the taxpayer's case. Further proceedings are required to fully
determine the taxpayer's liability.
a. Mannella v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 10 (4/13/09). The IRS
sent the taxpayer a notice of intent to levy and notice of the right to a § 6330 CDP hearing on
6/4/04. On 11/1/06, more than two years later, the taxpayer requested § 6015 relief from joint
and several liability, which the IRS denied on the grounds that the request was untimely. The
taxpayer claimed that she did not receive her notice of intent to levy because on her former
husband received the notices, signed the certified mail receipts, and failed to deliver of inform
her of the notice. Judge Haines held that actual receipt of the notice of intent to levy or of the
notice of the right to request relief from joint and several liability is not required for the 2 -year
period in which to request relief under §§ 6015(b) and (c) to begin. The taxpayer's request for
relief under §§ 6015(b) and (c) was not timely; However, the taxpayer's claim for relief under
§ 6015(f), was timely because Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 8 (4/7/09), held that Reg.
§ 1.6015-5(b)(1) requiring a request relief within two years from the IRS's first collection action
is invalid as applied to § 6015(f) relief.
H. Miscellaneous
1. The Court of Federal Claims refused to exclude most of Stuart Smith's
report, but the language Judge Damich used was "unprintable." Murfam Farms LLC v. United
States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-6319, 83 Fed. Cl. 635 [sic]5 (9/19/08). Judge Damich permitted
Stuart Smith to opine on whether the Proskauer Rose opinions were of a quality that the
taxpayers could reasonably rely on them, but not on whether the Proskauer Rose opinions were
correct.
Plaintiffs present Mr. Stuart Smith, a tax attorney, to opine on whether the
Proskauer Rose opinions were of the type, character, and quality upon which a
taxpayer could reasonably rely. The Government makes two primary arguments
for the exclusion of Mr. Smith's testimony: (1) that, because Mr. Smith relies on
the wrong law (i.e., certain Treasury Circular 230 and not Treasury Regulation
1.6664-4), the testimony contained in Mr. Smith's report is unreliable, and (2)
that Mr. Smith presents nothing more than legal analysis.
The Government first asserts that Mr. Smith's analysis is unreliable
because the only standard by which to properly gauge a reasonable cause defense
to accuracy-related penalties is I.R.C. section 6664(c) and the Treasury
Regulations promulgated under that section. In response, Plaintiffs assert that Mr.
Smith's report does not state that Treasury Circular 230 is the correct standard by
which to consider a reasonable cause defense. Instead, Plaintiffs assert, "Mr.
Smith references the Circular 230 standards only in his evaluation of the quality
of the tax opinions to demonstrate that such opinions were 'objectively
reasonable."'
The Court does not find that Mr. Smith's analysis is unreliable under Rule
702. The Court notes that Mr. Smith's report states, quite unmistakably, that "it is
plainly not necessary for an opinion to satisfy the particular requirements of this
Circular for a taxpayer to act reasonably in relying on it." Moreover, it seems
reasonable to the Court that a tax professional might look to a Treasury Circular
for at least general guidance in determining the level of quality necessary for a tax
opinion. As such, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Mr. Smith's discussion of
Treasury Circular 230 does not render his report "unreliable" under Rule 702.
The Government also argues that Mr. Smith's report simply presents an
argument on an issue of law to be decided by the Court. As Plaintiffs point out,
however, Mr. Smith's report does not opine that the Proskauer Rose opinions
were legally correct. Rather, Mr. Smith's report simply opines that the Proskauer
Rose opinions appear to have been prepared based on a certain standard of care,
and are of a threshold quality such that taxpayers such as the Plaintiffs could
reasonably rely on them.
The Court finds that only certain portions of Mr. Smith's report constitute
improper testimony on a legal issue. While discussing the characteristics of the
Proskauer Rose opinions in a section titled "(2) Relate Law to Facts", Mr. Smith's
report also analyzes the Internal Revenue Service's legal position on the COBRA
transactions at issue, finding it to "lack an objective appearance of
5 The Editor's Note in Westlaw reads, "The opinion of the United States Court of Federal Claims, in
Murfam Farms, LLC ex rel. Murphy v. U.S., published in the advance sheet at this citation, 83 Fed.Cl.
635, was withdrawn from the bound volume because it was not intended for print publication. For
electronic version, see 2008 WL 4725468."
reasonableness." Despite Mr. Smith's attempt to disguise his legal discussion as
an objective analysis of the quality of the Proskauer Rose opinions, this section of
Mr. Smith's report appears to be little more than a legal argument that Plaintiffs'
analysis of the transactions is correct while the Government's analysis is not.
There is a difference between opining that a legal analysis is thorough-enough to
be reasonably relied upon and opining that the legal analysis is correct while
another is incorrect. The former opinion can be helpful to the court, while the
latter is not. In addition, the merit of the Internal Revenue Service's subsequent
legal position on the COBRA transactions at issue would play no part in a
determination of whether the Proskauer Rose opinions could reasonably have
been relied upon prior to execution of the transactions. Similarly, Mr. Smith
provides a discussion of the Eastern District of Texas's decision in Klamath
Strategic Investment Fund v. United States, which was issued well after the
Proskauer Rose opinions were written (citing Klamath, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D.
Tex. 2007)). Mr. Smith attempts to use the Klamath opinion as subsequent
corroboration that the analysis contained in the Proskauer Rose opinions was
correct. Neither of these discussions is helpful to the Court.
a. And a criminal sentence for obstructing and impeding the
administration of federal tax laws was vacated because a CPA's two "very good" defense
counsel failed to retain an expert witness in tax law to determine the proper amount of tax
loss. Baxter v. United States, _ F. Supp. 2d ,104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5090 (N.D. Ill. 6/25/09).
After plea negotiations, a CPA pleaded guilty to one count of violating § 7212(a) (obstructing
and impeding the administration of federal tax laws) and in the plea agreement stated that "the
offense involved a tax loss of more than $550,000 [i.e., $576,000]" but the government asserted
that she was accountable for a tax loss of $5.1 million for sentencing purposes. The court
rejected the $5.1 million amount after a 2005 hearing, but did not understand that the $576,000
amount was included in the rejected $5.1 million tax loss. In this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding to
"vacate, set aside or correct sentence," Judge Holderman held that her two ["very good"]
criminal defense lawyers provided constitutionally ineffective counsel "because they had failed
to retain a tax expert to ascertain the correct amount of tax loss attributable to Baxter's criminal
conduct and had failed to evaluate the correct tax ramifications of Baxter's criminal conduct for
sentencing purposes."
2. Beware of showing the "real books" to the guy who claims he wants to
buy your business. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 made permanent the
IRS's Code § 7608(c) authority to engage in undercover operations.
3. Claims for a method for hedging risk in commodities trading are held not
to concern patent-eligible subject matter. This leads to the possible conclusion that tax strategies
are not patentable. However, the Federal Circuit did not overrule the State Street case and the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 10/30/08)
(9-3), cert. granted sub nor. Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (6/1/09). The Federal Circuit (Judge
Michel) affirmed a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that claims for a
method for managing (hedging) the risks in commodities trading did not constitute a patent-
eligible subject matter. The meaning of a patentable "process" under 35 U.S.C. § 101 ["Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine [etc.] ... may obtain a patent therefore
.... ] includes only the transformation of a physical object or substance, or an electronic signal
representative of a physical object or substance.
4. A tie goes to the taxpayer, otherwise § 7491 doesn't count. Knudsen v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 11 (11/12/08). Section 7491 does not require the trial court to
decide whether the burden of proof has been shifted to the Government in all cases where the
issue of a burden shift is raised. Where parties have satisfied their burden of production by
offering some evidence, the Tax Court (Judge Marvel) holds that the party supported by the
weight of the evidence prevails "regardless of which party bore the burden of persuasion, proof
or preponderance." "[A] shift in the burden of preponderance has real significance only in the
rare event of an evidentiary tie."
5. Politics as usual; but different politics now. A union suit no longer means
underwear but whether it suits a union (such as the NTEU). IR-2009-19 (3/5/09): After
conducting an extensive review of the private debt collection program, including the cost
effectiveness of the effort, the IRS will not renew its contracts with two private debt collection
agencies, the agency announced today. The IRS determined that the work is best done by IRS
employees who have more flexibility handling cases, which is particularly important with many
taxpayers currently facing economic hardship.
6. The government gets a chance to establish a greater deficiency when
the civil suit follows the criminal prosecution. McHan v. Commissioner, 558 F.3d 326, 103
A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1076 (4th Cir. 2/27/09). The IRS is not barred by collateral estoppel from
asserting a deficiency in a civil proceeding that is based on the determination of a greater
understatement of income than was determined to have been the amount of unreported income in
a prior criminal proceeding against the taxpayer. Collateral estoppel does not apply "where the
party against whom the doctrine is invoked had a heavier burden of persuasion on that issue in
the first action than he does in the second."
7. The taxpayer has no legal remedy to restrain backup withholding.
Zigmont v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-48 (3/5/09). Special Trial Judge Armend held that
the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin the IRS (under § 6213(a)) from collecting amounts
through § 3406 backup withholding. Backup withholding is not a deficiency. Nor is it a proposed
lien or levy subject to CDP procedures that the tax Court has jurisdiction to review under
§ 6330(e)(1).
8. Two stop shopping to find out if the redetermined deficiency was
discharged in a prior bankruptcy. Ferguson v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 498, 103 A.F.T.R. 2d
2009-2170 (5th Cir. 5/12/09), aff'g, T.C. Memo 2006-32 (2006). If subsequent to the taxpayer's
discharge in bankruptcy the IRS issues a deficiency notice for a year prior to the discharge and
the taxpayer properly invokes the Tax Court's jurisdiction for a redetermination of the
deficiency, the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether the taxpayer's liability was
discharged in bankruptcy.
9. When they called, should he have said, "I gave at the office"?
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson announced his resignation to become head of
the American Red Cross. 2007 TNT 76-1 (4/19/07). In his message to IRS employees, he said,
"Together, we have rebalanced the organization, bringing to life the equation: Service +
Enforcement = Compliance."
a. Now, we can all look forward to seeing the IRS getting stiffed.
Brown's successor as Acting Commissioner will be Deputy Commissioner for Operations
Support Linda Stiff, who will assume the position of Deputy Commissioner for Services and
Enforcement and, on Brown's departure, Acting Commissioner. 2007 TNT 146-2 (7/30/07).
b. Apparently someone at the Red Cross under Mark Everson
was also getting stiffed. It appears that Everson was really "giving at the office." Mark
Everson resigned his Red Cross presidency on November 27, 2007 because the Red Cross Board
learned that he "engaged in a personal relationship with a subordinate employee." All in all, it is
a sad commentary on the IRS that Everson could not find anyone there with whom to have a
"personal relationship."
c. Is this a come-down? Mark Everson has joined Alliantgroup as
vice chair. 2009 TNT 148-3 (8/5/09). "I couldn't be more pleased that Mark Everson has decided
to join us," said Alliantgroup CEO Dhaval Jadav. "His service with the IRS and with the OMB
gives him unmatched insight into building positive bridges between taxpayers, CPA firms, and
the IRS."
10. Two bites at the apple for the IRS, because the apples are different
varieties. Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 3 (8/24/09). The
trust was the shareholder of four corporations that sold all of their assets for cash, resulting in
large capital gains. Following the asset sales, the trust sold all of the stock of the corporations to
a midco - actually named Midco - which purportedly sheltered the corporations' capital gains
with losses from newly contributed high basis, low value assets, following which the assets of
the corporations were stripped. Initially, the IRS asserted a deficiency against the trust on the
theory that the corporations had been constructively liquidated while still owned by the trust and
the trust had received the cash balances held by the corporations. A docketed Tax Court case on
this issue was settled with the IRS conceding that there was no deficiency. Subsequently, all four
corporations entered into closing agreements with the IRS under which substantial taxes were
due with respect to the asset sales. At that time, however, all four of the corporations were
insolvent. The IRS asserted transferee liability against the trust, and the trust raised the defenses
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Judge Goeke held that neither res judicata and collateral
estoppel applied. The cause of action in the deficiency cases was different than the cause of
action in the transferee liability case. The deficiency case dealt with the trust's fiduciary income
tax liability on the sale of the stock in the corporations. That determination would not have
required the trust to pay the unpaid tax liabilities of the corporations. The trust's liability as
transferee differs from the trust's income tax liability. Collateral estoppel did not apply because
no facts were determined in the earlier proceeding that concluded with the IRS's concession.
Because the question whether there were liquidating distributions to the trust was not litigated
and was not essential to the decisions in the deficiency actions, collateral estoppel did not bar the
IRS from asserting in the transferee action that there were liquidating distributions from the
corporations to the trust.
11. The taxpayer won the complex legal issue, inadvertently conceded the
critical factual issue, and thus lost the case. Ron Lykins, Inc. v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 5
(9/2/09). A deficiency asserted against the taxpayer corporation for 1999 and 2000 was resolved
in a Tax Court case, Ron Lykins, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-35. The taxpayer
incurred an NOL in 2001, and the taxpayer requested and received a tentative refund attributable
to carrying back the NOL to 1999 and 2000 before the IRS issued the deficiency notice. The
deficiency notice did not refer to the NOL carrybacks from 2001 or take into account the refunds
in its computation of tax liability. Subsequently, the IRS disallowed the tentative NOL
carrybacks and taxpayer raised the issue of the NOL carrybacks, but the Tax Court held that
there was no deficiency without regard to the NOL carrybacks, neither party having put on
evidence as to the NOL carrybacks. After initially allowing the tentative refund attributable to
the NOL carrybacks, the IRS disallowed them and summarily assessed the amounts of the
tentative refunds pursuant to § 6213(b)(3). The IRS gave notice of intent to levy and the taxpayer
requested a CDP hearing. Following the CDP hearing the IRS issued a notice of determination to
proceed with collection, and the taxpayer appealed. The taxpayer did not attempt to prove the
merits of the 2001 NOL in either the CDP hearing or the Tax Court, but argued that under res
judicata, the 2006 decision in the original deficiency case barred the IRS from asserting that it
owed more taxes for 1999 and 2000. The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) first found that collateral
estoppel did not bar the taxpayer from raising the 2001 NOL carryback, because the merits of the
2001 NOL were not "actually litigated" in the prior deficiency case. More importantly, he held
that even assuming that either party could have litigated the NOL in the prior deficiency case, res
judicata did not bar either the taxpayer or the IRS from raising or disputing the 2001 NOL
carryback and its effect upon the 1999 and 2000 tax liabilities. The reason res judicata did not
bar relitigation of the impact of the NOL carryback was that § 6511 (d)(2)(B) explicitly permits
the taxpayer to pay the summary assessments and pursue an overpayment remedy for NOL
carrybacks without the bar of res judicata. On the other side of the coin, although § 6212(c)(1)
generally bars the IRS from issuing a second notice of deficiency after a taxpayer has filed a Tax
Court petition, § 6213(b)(1) and (3) expressly allow the IRS to determine an additional
deficiency that results from a tentative carryback refund even if the IRS has previously issued a
deficiency notice of for the carryback year and the taxpayer has filed a Tax Court petition. The
court emphasized that it was not holding simply that § 6212(c)(1) by itself trumps res judicata,
and that the IRS avoids res judicata whenever it is permitted by § 6212(c)(1) to determine an
additional deficiency, but that §§ 6411, 6212(c)(1), and 6213(b)(3) create a unique procedure for
tentative carryback refunds, because recapture of a tentatively allowed refund is not ordinarily
the subject of a taxpayer's petition in a deficiency case. However, in the end the court held for
the IRS, concluding that because the taxpayer failed to carry the burden of proving its loss in
2001 and establishing the validity of the carrybacks to 1999 and 2000, having conceded the issue
by not raising it the CDP hearing, the proposed levy to collect the summary assessment would be
upheld.
XI. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A. Employment Taxes
1. Wisdom from the Mount. Medical residents may be students for
FICA taxes. United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida Inc., 486 F.3d 1248 (1 1th
Cir. 5/18/07). Section 3121(b)(10) provides that employment taxes are not payable with respect
to services performed in the employ of a college or university by a student who is enrolled and
regularly attending classes. The Government argued that legislative history with respect to the
repeal of an exemption for medical interns in 1965 (former § 3121(b)(13)) established as a
matter of law that medical residents are subject to employment taxes. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that § 3121(b)(10) is unambiguous in its application to students and that the statute
requires a factual determination whether the hospital is a "school, college, or university" and
whether the residents are "students."
a. This is no April fool. The Minnesota District Court also finds
that medical residents at the University of Minnesota are students. Regents of the University
of Minnesota v. United States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1532 (D. Minn. 4/1/08). The university's
summary judgment motion is granted by the District Court holding that medical residents at the
University of Minnesota are not subject to employment taxes under the student exclusion of§ 3121(b)(10). The court reiterated its conclusion that the full-time employee exception in Reg.
§ 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d), as amended in 2004, is invalid.
b. The District Court finds that the Mount Sinai Medical Center
is a school and the residents are students. United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of
Florida, Inc., 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5373 (S.D. Fla. 7/28/08). After the decision in Minnesota v.
Apfel, 151 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 1998), Mount Sinai Medical Center obtained refunds for FICA
taxes paid in 1996-1997. The United States filed suit against the Medical Center for erroneous
refunds. Following the Eleventh Circuit's direction to make a factual determination whether the
program qualifies for the § 3101(b)(10) exception, the District Court found that the Medical
Center's residency programs were operated as a "school, college, or university," that residents
were present for training in patient care, which was an intrinsic and mandatory component of the
training, and that the residents were "students" who were regularly enrolled and attending
classes. The court also found that the students' performance of patient care services was incident
to their course of study.
c. South Dakota medical residents are also students. Center for
Family Medicine v. United States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5623 (D. S. Dak. 8/6/08). Following
Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 1998), the South Dakota District Court held that
medical residents in the Center for Family Medicine (CFM) and University of South Dakota
School of Medicine Residency Program (USDSMRP) were eligible for the student exception to
the definition of employment under § 3101(b)(10). The court rejected the government's assertion
that CFM was not a school, college or university because CFM was affiliated with a non-profit
hospital. The court found that CFM's work includes teaching its medical residents the skills
required to practice in their chosen profession. The court also concluded that the students were
"enrolled" in the institution and that their attendance at noon conferences and medical rounds
established that the students regularly attended classes. Tossing a small bone to the government,
the court held that chief residents in the programs, who are essentially coordinators for the
residency programs, were not students.
d. Residents in Chicago are also students. University of Chicago
Hospitals v. United States, 545 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 9/23/08). The court affirmed the district
court's denial of the government's motion for summary judgment based on the government
argument that medical residents are per se ineligible for the student exemption from employment
taxes under § 3121(b)(10). The court indicates that a case-by-case analysis is required to
determine whether medical residents qualify for the statutory exemption.
e. And ditto for medical residents in Detroit. United States v.
Detroit Medical Center, 557 F.3d 412, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1044 (6th Cir. 2/26/09). Reversing
the District Court's summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit joins the lineup holding that medical
residents at the seven Detroit area hospitals operated by the Detroit Medical Center in a joint
program with Wayne State University, which provides graduate medical education, may be
students entitled to exemption from employment taxes under § 3 121 (b)(10). The court remanded
the case for further development of the record regarding the nature of the residents' relationship
to the hospitals and the education program. The court indicated that further development of the
record would not preclude deciding the matter on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit also
affirmed summary judgment that the stipends paid to medical residents were not scholarships or
fellowships excludible from income under § 117. The court found both that the stipends were
received in exchange for services and that the medical residents were not candidates for a degree
as required for exclusion under the terms of § 117.
f. And ditto again for Sloan-Kettering. United States v. Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 563 F.3d 19, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-1409 (2d Cir. 3/25/09).
Following similar decisions in the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for the United States holding that the
District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of New York erred in holding as a matter
of law that medical residents at the Albany Medical Center and the hospitals of the Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center were not eligible for exclusion from employment taxes under
§ 3121(b)(10). The cases were remanded to the trial courts for factual determinations whether
the residents were students and whether the hospitals were schools.
g. But the tide turns for the Mayo Clinic. Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education and Research v. United States, 568 F.3d 675, 2009-1 U.S.T.C. 50,432 (8th
Cir. 6/12/09). For purposes of the student exclusion from FICA taxes under § 312 1(b)(10), Reg.
§ 31.3121(b)(10)-2(c), (d), limits the definition of a school, college, or university to entities
whose "primary function is the presentation of formal instruction." Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)
provides that to qualify as a "student" rather than be classified as an employee, any services
rendered must be "incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study" at the institution
for which the student provides the services. Furthermore, under the regulation, a person whose
work schedule is 40 hours or more per week is a full-time employee rather than a student. The
District Court, in granting refunds of employment taxes, declared the regulation invalid.
Applying the deference standard of Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984), the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment for the
United States. The court concluded that application of the exemption only to students pursuing a
course of study who are not full time employees is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The
court declined to consider whether the portion of the regulation limiting the definition of a
school or college is valid because the medical residents were not students under the regulation in
any event.
2. Truck drivers are employees but relief was granted under § 530 of the
Revenue Act of 1978. Peno Trucking, Inc. v. Commissioner, 296 Fed. Appx. 449 (6th Cir.
10/3/08). The taxpayer leased tractor-trailer combinations to another company and supplied the
drivers. The drivers entered into agreements with the taxpayer that they were independent
contractors and the taxpayer reported the drivers' incomes on Form 1099. The court affirmed the
Tax Court's holding that the drivers were employees relying on the Tax Court's conclusions that
(1) the taxpayer oversaw the drivers' responsibilities, determined the days they could work, and
controlled the loads they would haul; (2) made a substantial investment to acquire and maintain
the trucks; (3) the drivers did not assume a risk of loss; (4) the taxpayer had the right to
discharge its drivers; (5) the drivers performed a service that was essential to the taxpayer's
operations; (6) the drivers worked in the course of the taxpayer's business rather than having a
transitory relationship with the taxpayer; and (7) although the taxpayer and its drivers entered
into written agreements which expressly provided that the drivers were independent contractors,
the facts indicated otherwise. The appellate court reversed the Tax Court's holding that the
taxpayer was not entitled to relief under § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, which protects
employers from employment tax if there was a reasonable basis for treating workers as
independent contractors. The court noted that the taxpayer had consistently treated drivers as
independent contractors and that the taxpayer reasonably relied on state workers' compensation
decisions as a basis for that status.
3. Section 403(b) salary reduction agreements defined. T.D. 9367,
Payments Made by Reason of a Salary Reduction Agreement, 72 F.R. 64939 (11/19/07).
Treasury has finalized regulations, § 31.3121(a)(5)-2, defining contributions to § 403(b) plans
under a salary reduction agreement that are subject to employment taxes. Employer contributions
to a § 403(b) plan that are not made pursuant to a salary reduction agreement are not subject to
employment taxes. A salary reduction agreement exists if the employee elects to reduce
compensation pursuant to a cash or deferred election, the employee elects to reduce
compensation under a one-time irrevocable election made at or before the time of initial
eligibility to participate in the plan, or the employee agrees as a condition of employment
(whether imposed by statute or otherwise) to make a contribution that reduces compensation.
a. The Seventh Circuit agrees with the IRS position on
involuntary plans, with penalties. University of Chicago v. United States, 547 F.3d 773 (7th
Cir. 10/29/08). Upholding the District Court (100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-6261 (N.D. Ill. 8/22/07)), the
appellate court held that contributions to employee § 403(b) plans were subject to FICA
withholding. The University of Chicago required employees to make payments into a § 403(b)
plan and referred to the employee contributions as being withheld from salaries. Employees were
required to sign a "salary reduction agreement." The University also contributed to the plan on
behalf of employees. Section 3121(a)(5)(D) excludes from wages subject to employment taxes
any payment under a § 403(b) annuity contract, "other than a payment for the purchase of such a
contract which is made by reason of a salary reduction agreement." The University argued that
FICA taxes are payable only with respect to contributions only if the employee voluntarily
agrees to receive a lower stated salary plus payments to the plan in lieu of cash. The court
reasoned that § 3121(a)(5)(D) applies to salary supplement arrangements rather than plans that
provide for a reduction in employee compensation to fund contributions.
0 In addition, the court affirmed penalties in the amount of the
employee withholding that the University failed to collect and failure to deposit and failure to pay
penalties. The court found that the University's failure to make the deposits was not due to
reasonable cause. The University asserted under the "divisible tax doctrine" that its payment of a
portion of the tax in order to bring the refund action absolved it of the penalty. The court indicated
that the divisible tax doctrine is jurisdictional and does not absolve the taxpayer from applicablepenalties. 4. Temporary and Proposed Regulations simplify filing for small
employers. T.D. 9440, Employer's Annual Federal Tax Return and Modifications to the Deposit
Rules, 73 F.R. 79354 (12/29/08); REG-148568-04, Employer's Annual Federal Tax Return and
Modifications to the Deposit Rules, 73 F.R. 79423 (12/29/08); Rev.Proc. 2009-13, 2009-3 I.R.B.
323 (12/29/08). Temp. Reg. § 31.601 l(a)-lT(a)(5) provides for annual filing of employment tax
returns for employers notified by the IRS to file annual returns on Form 944 (instead of quarterly
filings on Form 941), generally applicable to employers with less than $1,000 of annual
employment tax liability (Social Security, Medicare, and wage withholding). The temporary
regulations were revised to make the use of Form 944 optional for taxpayers who notify the IRS
that they will file the quarterly Form 941 and permit taxpayers to change their filing method
from year-to-year. Temp. Reg. §§ 31.601 l(a)-lT(a)(5) and 31.601 1(a)-4T(a)(4) allow taxpayers
who estimate that their employment tax liability will be $1,000 or less to contact the IRS to
express a desire to file Form 944 instead of Form 941, following which the IRS will send a
notice to the taxpayer directing the taxpayer to file the Form 944 annually. Taxpayer in receipt of
this notice must continue to file the Form 944 until they contact the IRS to change the filing
requirement and receive confirmation from the IRS that their filing requirement has been
changed. Rev. Proc. 2009-13 contains procedures for changing the filing status. The temporary
regulations also modify the "look-back" rules for determining whether Form 941 filers with less
than $2,500 of employment tax liability in a quarter can file quarterly rather than monthly or
semi-weekly deposits.
5. Ten ways to be a contractor - estate rebuffed in its attempt to collect
damages and indemnification on its claim that decedent was an employee of multiple employers
rather than an independent contractor. Estate of Suskovich v. Anthem Health Plans of Virginia,
Inc. 553 F.3d 559, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-573 (7th Cir. 1/22/09). The decedent worked as a
computer programmer for Wellpoint, a health insurance company and Trasys, an information
technology company. The decedent's estate claimed damages from the companies for failure to
treat the decedent as an employee and provide certain employee benefits, and claimed
indemnification for employment taxes paid directly by the decedent. The court upheld the
District Court's finding that the decedent was an independent contractor based on the District
Court's application of the ten factor test for employment status of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency. The court concluded, "[i]n fact, overwhelming evidence suggests that he considered
himself an independent contractor, filed his tax returns as an independent contractor, and was
compensated like an independent contractor. Accordingly, the district court properly awarded
summary judgment to WellPoint and Trasys on this issue."
6. The Tax Court follows the 6th and 2d Circuits to hold that pre-2009
employment tax liability of a disregarded LLC must be paid by the sole-member. Medical
Practice Solutions, LLC v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 7 (3/31/09). Following the decisions in
Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), and McNamee v. Dept. of the Treasury,
488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007), the Tax Court (Judge Cohen), held that the check-a-box regulations
treating a single member entity that does not elect to be treated as a corporation as a disregarded
entity, Reg. § 301.7701-3(b), are valid and as a result the sole member of a disregarded limited
liability company is responsible for the L.L.C.'s unpaid employment taxes. After 1/1/09, under
Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv), a disregarded entity is treated as a corporation for purposes of
employment tax reporting and liability. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the
amendment to the regulations, which reverses the prior rule, demonstrates that the prior
regulation imposing employment tax liability on the sole-member of the disregarded entity was
unreasonable. The court stated that, "In light of the emergence of limited liability companies and
their hybrid nature, and the continuing silence of the Code on the proper tax treatment of such
companies in the decade since the present regulations became effective, we cannot conclude that
the above Treasury Regulations, providing a flexible response to a novel business form, are
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."
7. "Check-the-Box." OK! Medical Practice Solutions, LLC v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 7 (3/31/09). This case involved review of a CDP determination that
collection of unpaid employment taxes of a single member LLC that was a disregarded entity
should proceed against the sole member of the LLC. The only issue before the court (Judge
Cohen) was whether "check-the-box" regulations, § 301.7701-3(b), in effect for the periods in
issue, were invalid in allowing collection of employment taxes against the sole member of a
limited liability company. Citing Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), and
McNamee v. Dept. of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007), both of which upheld the
validity of the "check-the-box" regulations in the same context, applying Chevron US.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the court upheld the validity of the "check-
the-box" regulations in the first Tax Court case to challenge their validity.
0 The LLC performed "medical practice consulting," and was
not in the specialty of gynecology.
8. Rev. Rul. 2009-11, 2009-18 I.R.B. 896 (4/16/09). Under § 3401(h), added
by the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008, differential wages paid to an
employee on active duty in the military are treated as wages for purposes of income tax
withholding. This revenue ruling explains that these are supplemental wages that are to be added
to the employee's regular wages for the period for purposes of calculating wage withholding.
However, differential wages paid to a person providing service to the military for an extended
period of time are not wages subject to FICA and FUTA tax. See Rev. Rul. 69-136, 169-1 C.B.
252.
9. Hi-Q Personnel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 13 (5/4/09). The
taxpayer corporation provided temporary workers for clients for fees related to the work
performed. The taxpayer offered the workers a choice between being paid in cash or by check.
The taxpayer reported workers paid by check as employees and paid applicable employment
taxes. The taxpayer failed to pay employment taxes for workers paid in cash. The taxpayer's
president, Luan Nguyen, plead guilty to Federal criminal charges for failing to pay employment
taxes on $14,845,019 of wages paid to temporary workers. The court (Judge Halpern) agreed
with the IRS that because of its president's plea agreement in the criminal matter, the taxpayer
could not contest its liability for employment taxes or fraud penalties under the doctrine of issue
preclusion or collateral estoppel. The court concluded that the plea agreement was a judgment on
the merits with respect to identical issues, and that the corporation's president and sole
shareholder was in privity with it with respect to the obligation to pay employment taxes. The
court also concluded Mr. Nguyen's guilty plea imputed his fraudulent intent to the corporation
for purposes of fraud penalties.
10. Both back pay and front pay are subject to withholding. Josifovich v.
Secure Computing Corp., 104 A.F.T.R. 2d 2009-5807 (D. N.J. 7/31/09). Josifovich entered into a
settlement agreement with her former employer for unpaid commission income, violations of the
New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act and the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination. The settlement included back pay for prior work and front pay for compensation
she would have received after the settlement date. The parties could not agree on whether the
payments were subject to wage withholding and sought to resolve the issue in the District Court.
The court recognized that payments for back wages were subject to wage withholding. The court
also concluded that the front pay was based on contract and quasi-contract claims under the New
Jersey statutes for wages that are thus subject to withholding. The court, which is in the Third
Circuit, did not cite the Eighth Circuit opinion in Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., 157 F.3d 582
(8th Cir. 1998), which held that front pay is not subject to wage withholding or FICA. The court
also rejected Ms. Josifovich's claim that the damage award in the settlement should be grossed
up to account for the withholding taxes.
11. Zhang v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R. 2d 2009-5396 (Fed. Cl. 9/22/09).
Nonresident aliens, Chinese nationals who were temporary contract workers in the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, are subject to FICA taxes. The Commonwealth
is statutorily connected to Guam, which is a U.S. territory, through a covenant that causes the
Commonwealth to be considered within the U.S. for FICA purposes. The court notes that the
covenant mandates that, except for FICA tax proceeds, income and other tax revenues shall be
remitted to the treasury of the Commonwealth instead of the U.S. Treasury.
B. Self-employment Taxes
1. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Division C,
§ 504(c), provides that amounts received by a taxpayer engaged in the fishing business from the
settlement of Exxon Valdez litigation are not treated as self-employment income.
C. Excise Taxes
1. Ahoy mates! The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
Act§ 306, retroactively extends the $13.50 per gallon payment of excise tax to Puerto Rico (up
from $10.50) for imported rum.
2. Benefits for Robin Hood's children hunting pork. The Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Act § 503(a), amends § 4161(b)(2)(B) to exempt from
excise tax all-natural arrow shafts measuring 5/16 of an inch that are not suited for use with
bows drawing more than 30 pounds.
3. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act, § 113, extends the temporary increase in the coal
excise tax of § 4121, funding the Black Lung Disability Trust, to 12/31/18.
a. Section 202 extends the gasoline excise tax credit of § 6426 for
biodiesel and renewable diesel fuels to fuels produced before January 1, 2010, and increases the
biofuel credit from 50 cents to $1 per gallon.
b. Section 206 amends § 4053 by adding an exclusion from the heavy
truck excise tax of § 4051 for truck heating and cooling devices that do not require operation of
the main engine while the vehicle is parked.
4. Refund claims for telephone excise taxes are subject to the three year
statute of limitations of § 6511(a). RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 103
A.F.T.R.2d 2009-2360 (Fed. Cir. 5/26/09). RadioShack filed a refund action for erroneously
collected telephone excise taxes in 1996. The IRS stopped collecting the tax in May 2006 and
announced in Notice 2006-50, 2006-1 C.B. 1141, that it would accept claims for refund of taxes
billed between February 28, 2003, and August 1, 2006, pursuant to claims for refund filed in
accord with the Notice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the Federal Claims Court
that the refund action is subject to the three year statute of limitations of § 6511 (a) and the court
lacked jurisdiction to consider the refund claims. Claims for taxes paid in 2002 are still pending.
5. Northstar Trekking LLC v. United States, 103 A.F.T.R. 2d 2009-2616 (D.
Ak. 5/4/09). The Alaska District Court (Judge Sedwick) held that a helicopter glacier tour
company that operated Alaska glacier tours mostly for tour ship customers did not operate on a
regular line and was thus exempt from the Air Transportation Excise Tax.
6. Telephone excise tax trouble for the government ahead. Cohen v.
United States, _ F.3d _, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5841 (D.C. Cir. 8/7/09) (2-1). In this telephone
excise case, Judge Janice Rogers Brown's majority opinion held that the telephone excise tax
challenge litigation violated neither (1) the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) ["no suit for
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed"] nor (2) the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) [which allows for
declaratory relief but specifically excludes federal taxes from its reach] because (1) this
standalone Administrative Procedure Act [5 U.S.C. § 702] claim is "the anomalous case where
the wrongful assessment is not disputed and the litigants do not seek a refund," and (2) the
Declaratory Judgment Act is coextensive with the Anti-Injunction Act [citing circuit precedent].
Judge Brown began her opinion:
Comic-strip writer Bob Thaves [creator of Frank and Ernest (1972)]
famously quipped, "A fool and his money are soon parted. It takes creative tax
laws for the rest." In this case it took the Internal Revenue Service's ("IRS" or
"the Service") aggressive interpretation of the tax code to part millions of
Americans with billions of dollars in excise tax collections. Even this remarkable
feat did not end the IRS's creativity. When it finally conceded defeat on the legal
front, the IRS got really inventive and developed a refund scheme under which
almost half the funds remained unclaimed. Now the IRS seeks to avoid judicial
review by insisting the notice [Notice 2006-50] it issued, acknowledging its error
and announcing the refund process, is not a binding rule but only a general policy
statement.
We conclude the notice bound the Service, tax collectors, and taxpayers.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Appellants' claims made
under the Administrative Procedures Act ('APA').
0 Judge Brown further stated:
The IRS insists taxpayers do not need to follow the notice in order to
exercise their right to file suit under section 7422. It claims, "Nothing in [the
notice] prohibits taxpayers from submitting otherwise valid claims for refund
under the usual statutory procedures for claiming a refund of tax, nor does it in
any way sanction taxpayers who elect to use the statutory procedure." Appellee's
Br. 58. That's just mean. To go the "statutory" route, as the IRS suggests, places
taxpayers in a virtual house of mirrors. Section 7422 requires taxpayers to file a
refund claim "with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that
regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof." 26
U.S.C. section 7422. Regulation, 26 CFR section 301.6402-2, enunciates the
process for filing a refund claim. Of primary importance here, it dictates the
appropriate form for the taxpayer to use. Id. section 302.6402-2(c). It states, in
relevant part, that "all claims by taxpayers for the refunding of taxes, interest,
penalties, and additions to tax shall be made on Form 843." Id. Form 843,
however, does not permit this type of refund claim. At the top of the form, it
reads, "Do not use Form 843 if your claim is for ... [a]n overpayment of excise
taxes reported on Form(s) 11-c, 720, 730, or 2290." Form 720 is the Quarterly
Federal Excise Tax Return on which communications excise taxes, including the
excise tax at issue here, are reported by the service providers (who collect and
remit the taxes). Therefore, taxpayers cannot use Form 843 to file their refund
claim. The instructions for Form 843, however, suggest that taxpayers fill out
Form 8849 "to claim a refund of excise taxes other than those resulting from
adjustments to [their] reported liabilities" and refers them to IRS Publication 510,
Excise Taxes, "for the appropriate forms to use to claim excise tax refunds." IRS
Publication 510 states, "Do not use Form 8849, Form 720, or Form 843 to make
claims for nontaxable service; the IRS will not process these claims." Even if the
taxpayer ignored the reference to the IRS publication, Form 8849 itself cautions
"Do not use Form 8849... to claim any amounts that were or will be claimed on
Schedule C (Form 720), Claims . . . ." While this language sounds slightly more
flexible, taxpayers have no way of knowing whether their service provider has or
will claim the nontaxable funds at issue.
Counsel for the IRS took the enigmatic position at oral argument that if
the taxpayers had used either Form 843 or Form 8849 to file their refund claims,
then IRS's acceptance would have been mandatory and the claims would have
sufficed to meet section 7422's jurisdictional exhaustion requirements. Tr. of Oral
Arg. at 29-31. But these assertions directly conflict with the cautionary
instructions printed in bold typeface on the front of both forms and the explicit
directions given in IRS Publication 510. Furthermore, the IRS provided
absolutely no authority supporting its position. In reality, unless taxpayers follow
the dictates of Notice 2006-50, they run into nothing but dead ends. The "usual
statutory procedures for claiming a refund of tax," Appellee's Br. 58, provide no
avenue by which individual taxpayers can fulfill their obligations in order to seek
judicial review. ***
Despite the obvious infirmities of these options, the IRS still has the
chutzpah to chide taxpayers for failing to intuit that neither the agency's express
instructions nor the warning on its forms should be taken seriously. According to
the IRS, taxpayers should have realized all the options the Service said were
closed to them -- using forms that proclaim their inapplicability in bold letter or
filing informal claims that could not be perfected -- were nonetheless sufficient to
fulfill their administrative refund obligations and to serve as a prerequisite to
judicial review. Not hardly. Taxpayers bear a heavy burden when pursuing refund
claims, but we have yet to demand clairvoyance. ***
In sum, the IRS unlawfully expropriated billions of dollars from
taxpayers, conceded the illegitimacy of its actions, and developed a mandatory
process as the sole avenue by which the agency would consider refunding its ill-
gotten gains. It cannot avoid judicial review of that process by simply designating
it a policy statement. Notice 2006-50 constituted a final agency action that
aggrieved taxpayers by hindering their access to court. Accordingly, we reverse
the district court and remand Appellants' APA claims for further consideration.
0 Judge Brown did conclude that "[a]ppellant Neiland Cohen
filed his refund claim prematurely and, thus, affirm the district court's dismissal of his refund claim."
The case was remanded to the district court for its consideration of the merits.
* Judge Kavanaugh dissented, stating that the appellant could
simply have followed the procedures of Notice 2006-50.
a. "Enough, already!" The IRS cries, "Uncle." Notice 2006-50,
2006-25 I.R.B. 1141 (5/25/06), revoking Notice 2005-79, 2005-2 C.B. 952. The IRS announced
that it will stop assessing the § 4251 telephone excise tax on long distance services, and that it
will provide for refunds of taxes paid on services billed after 2/28/03 and before 8/1/06. These
refunds are to be requested on 2006 Federal income tax returns, the right to which will be
preserved by the IRS scheduling overassessments under § 6407. Individuals are eligible to
receive a safe harbor amount, which has not yet been determined. Interest received on the
refunds will have to be reported as 2007 income.
7. The telephone excise tax may involve only one-way communication.
IRS v. WorldCom, Inc., 2009-2 U.S.T.C. 70,290, 5881 (S.D. N.Y. 8/7/09). WorldCom
purchased central office based remote access (COBRA) services from local exchange carriers in
order to receive information across analog dial-up connections and route the communication to
its computer servers. Reversing the Bankruptcy Court's allowance of a refund of the
telecommunications excise tax and remanding for further findings, the District Court overruled
the Bankruptcy Court's interpretation of § 4252(a) as requiring capacity for two-way
communication in order to impose the telecommunications excise tax. Section 4252(a) defines
telephone service as "access to a local telephone system, and the privilege of telephonic quality
communication with substantially all persons having telephone or radio telephone stations ... "
Distinguishing § 4252(b)(2), the court held that the phrase "communication with" does not
require communication to and from telephone stations. Thus, the essential in-bound nature of
communication into the COBRA system may fall within the definition of § 4252(a).
XII. TAX LEGISLATION
A. Enacted
1. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division A], the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 [Division B], and the Tax Extenders and
Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008 [Division C], P.L. 110-343 was signed by
President Bush on 10/3/08.
0 The provisions of these Acts authorize the Secretary of the
Treasury to establish a Troubled Assets Relief Program to purchase troubled assets from financial
institutions; provide Alternative Minimum Tax relief; extend expiring tax provisions and establish
energy tax incentives; and temporarily increase Federal Deposit Insurance limits.
2. The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of
2008, P.L. 110-351 was signed by President Bush on 10/7/08
3. A tax reduction provision that included a revenue offset. P.L. 110-141,
"An Act to exclude from gross income payments from the Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund to the
victims of the tragic event at Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University" was signed by
President Bush on 12/19/08. Section 2 of that Act is an off-Code provision that adds $1 to the
§ 6698(b)(1) "Failure to File a Partnership Return" penalty.
4. "I gets WRERA and sick of trying." The Worker, Retiree, and Employer
Recovery Act of 2008 ("WRERA"), P.L. 110-458, was signed by President Bush on 12/23/08.
5. Arra! Or, shall we call it Arrgh? The American Recovery & Reinvestment
Act of 2009 ("2009 ARRA"), P.L. 111-5, was signed by President Obama on 2/17/09. Title I of
Division B of 2009 ARRA may be cited as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of
2009 ("2009 ARRTA"); title II of Division B is called Assistance for Unemployed Workers and
Struggling Families.
